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ESSAYS
APPLYING ANTITRUST LAW TO NCAA
REGULATION OF "BIG TIME" COLLEGE
ATHLETICS: THE NEED TO SHIFT FROM
NOSTALGIC 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY
IDEALS OF AMATEURISM TO THE
ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE
21ST CENTURY*
MATrHEW J. MirhEN**
The original purpose of intercollegiate athletics was to provide an
extracurricular activity for talented students who attended college pri-
marily to earn an academic degree that would enable them to pursue a
career outside of professional athletics. According to the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), "[s]tudent-athletes shall be am-
ateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be
motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social
benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is
an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation
by professional and commercial enterprises."' Today, this concept of an
"amateur" athlete and the student-athlete model still applies for most
sports and most students, especially women's sports and men's non-reve-
nue sports.2
* Presented on January 8, 1999, as part of the Law and Sports Section of the Association
of American Law Schools symposium titled The NCAA's Evolving Role in Governing
Intercollegiate Athletics.
** Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute, Marquette University
Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHmsc AssOCIATION, 2000-01 NCAA DIVISION I MAN-
UAL, art. 2.9 (2000-01) (hereinafter MANuAL). However, as Dean Rodney Smith observed in
his presentation, commercial sponsorship of college athletic events has been present since the
mid-1800s.
2. Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25
RUrGERS L. REv. 269 (1994).
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Not all NCAA sponsored sports fit neatly within this amateur model.
Athletes participating in NCAA Division I football and basketball often
are more interested in developing their skills in hope of a future profes-
sional playing career than in earning a college degree. In fact, universi-
ties sponsoring "big-time" football and basketball programs effectively
serve as a farm system for the National Football League and National
Basketball Association by providing the training environment and play-
ing field for talented football and basketball players to hone their physi-
cal talents.
The tremendous public popularity of men's college football and bas-
ketball creates a substantial revenue-generating capacity and the pros-
pect of increased visibility for universities. The significant economic
rewards of winning have generated fierce off-field competition among
universities for inputs necessary to produce winning teams (e.g., coaches
and players) as well as efforts to fully exploit the economic value of their
athletic products by maximizing fan and booster support, television reve-
nues, and commercial sponsorships. The economic realities of this envi-
ronment contrast sharply with the nostalgic ideal of the college amateur
athlete whose participation in a sport is merely incidental to a univer-
sity's provision of higher education in an academic environment.
The NCAA's basic regulatory objective is "to maintain intercollegi-
ate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the ath-
lete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and profes-
sional sports."4 In other words, the NCAA seeks to: 1) preserve the ama-
teur nature of college sports; 2) as a component part of higher education;
and 3) to ensure competitive balance on the playing field. Although
these are laudable objectives, they are quite difficult to achieve given the
economic reality of "big-time" college athletics, namely an existing "ath-
letics arms race" fueled by the multi-million dollar economic rewards of
winning teams fielded by members operating "big time" programs.5
The NCAA effectively determines the permissible nature and scope
of virtually all aspects of both on-field and off-field competition among
its members. It appears to function as an economic cartel in its regula-
tion of Division I football and basketball programs. The NCAA's mem-
3. See generally, MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INc.: THE ATrLEnc DEPARTMENT
vs. THE UNIVERSrrY (1990); MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO VIcroRy: THE CRisES THAT
SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS (1998).
4. MANUAL, art. 1.3.1.
5. John C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find A Place In Commercialized College Sports?,
3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 211-12 (1995).
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ber schools are economic competitors that collectively possess
monopsony power over the demand for college football and basketball
players and monopoly power over the supply of college football and bas-
ketball games. They frequently agree to limit (or prohibit) free market
forces from determining input prices for players, output of games, and
other aspects of economic competition among themselves. The NCAA
polices and enforces its rules and agreements by disciplining violators.
Although individual NCAA members have an incentive to gain a com-
petitive advantage by not complying with the association's rules, there is
an economic necessity to remain a part of this national organization to
reap the economic rewards of "big-time" college sports.
Given the economic realities of "big-time" college athletics, many
NCAA rules limiting economic competition among universities appear
to violate the federal antitrust laws. However, although there have been
several antitrust suits challenging the legality of NCAA imposed re-
straints affecting Division I football and basketball, most litigation has
been unsuccessful. In analyzing judicial treatment of the NCAA and its
rules for antitrust purposes, it is important to look at the historical evolu-
tion of antitrust jurisprudence concerning intercollegiate athletics.
Courts initially held that NCAA rule-making, regulatory, or enforce-
ment activities do not sufficiently impact interstate trade or commerce to
establish Sherman Act jurisdiction.6 NCAA rules designed to promote
amateurism and protect academic integrity were deemed to constitute
regulation of noncommercial activity that does not trigger antitrust scru-
tiny. Beginning in the mid-1970s, courts began recognizing that the pro-
vision and regulation of "big-time" intercollegiate athletics is business
activity subject to the Sherman Act, but were reluctant to find that
NCAA regulations violated the antitrust laws.7
In 1984, in NCAA v. Board of Regents,8 the Supreme Court held that
the NCAA does not have a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws,
although it is a nonprofit entity with educational objectives, because the
"NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize
revenues." 9 The Court invalidated NCAA restrictions on its members'
6. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295,303 (D. Mass. 1975); College Ath. Placement Serv. v.
NCAA, No. CIV. A. 74-1144, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7050, at *10 (D. N.J. Aug. 22, 1974),
affd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974).
7. Association of Intercollegiate Ath. for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
8. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
9. Id. at 101. The two dissenting justices criticized the Court's majority for "treating inter-
collegiate athletics under the NCAA's control as a purely commercial venture in which col-
2000]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
sale of television rights to football games that prevented economic com-
petition among them. However, the Court acknowledged the NCAA's
role "as the guardian of an important American tradition" and its "his-
toric role in the preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate ama-
teur athletics." 10 The Court's majority strongly suggested that primarily
noncommercial NCAA rules to preserve amateurism, academic integ-
rity, and competitive balance do not violate the antitrust laws."
After Board of Regents, courts generally have rejected antitrust chal-
lenges to NCAA rules by providing great deference and discretion to the
NCAA. These courts have assumed that NCAA rules are ancillary non-
commercial restraints necessary to produce intercollegiate athletics and/
or to further legitimate higher education objectives. Courts appear eager
to find that NCAA regulation that does not directly fix prices for inputs
(e.g., coaches' salaries)' a or the sale of output (e.g., television rights)' 3 is
either: 1) characterized as noncommercial and not subject to antitrust
challenge 4 ; 2) not found to have significant anticompetitive effects 5 ; or
3) assumed to be procompetitive by being the least restrictive means of
furthering the NCAA's stated objectives (which are usually judicially
deemed to be legitimate).' 6
On the one hand, courts have held that agreements among NCAA
member schools that directly fix prices in input or output markets for
college sports are illegal. The Board of Regents Court ruled that the
NCAA's exclusive football television rights plan violates the antitrust
laws because it effectively establishes a set price for televised football
games without any offsetting procompetitive justification, such as pre-
serving competitive balance or the integrity of intercollegiate athletics.
Consistent with Board of Regents, in Law v. NCAA, the Tenth Circuit
recently held that an NCAA imposed cap of $16,000.00 on Division I
leges and universities participate solely, or even primarily, in the pursuit of profits" because of
the "essentially noneconomic nature of the NCAA's program of self-regulation." Id. at 121,
133.
10. Id. at 101 n.23.
11. Id. at 101-02.
12. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
13. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984).
14. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), affjd on other grounds, 524 U.S. 982
(1999); Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 193 F.R.D. 693 (D. Kan. 2000); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F.
Supp. 2d 460 (D. N.J. 1998); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
15. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
16. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conf., 101
F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming validity of conference sanctions imposed on member uni-
versity for violation of amateurism rules because no proof this procompetitive objective can
be achieved in substantially less restrictive manner).
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entry-level basketball coaches' salaries is an unreasonable restraint of
trade as a matter of law. 7 Applying the truncated or "quick look" rule
of reason, the court found this salary cap has the naked anticompetitive
effect of fixing one of the costs of producing Division I basketball games
without furthering product availability or competitive balance among
NCAA members in the least restrictive manner.!'
At the other end of the spectrum, courts have uniformly upheld
NCAA eligibility standards that athletes must satisfy to participate in
intercollegiate athletics. Athlete eligibility requirements promulgated by
the NCAA appear to be virtually per se legal under the antitrust laws.
Courts have rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA regulations designed
to preserve the amateur nature of college sports, such as the "no draft"
and "no agent" rules' 9 and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on
institutions for violation of the NCAA's amateurism rules.2 °
In Smith v. NCAA, 2' the Third Circuit ruled that an NCAA eligibility
rule prohibiting a student from participating in intercollegiate sports
while enrolled in a graduate program at an institution other than where
she earned her undergraduate degree does not violate the antitrust
laws.2' The court distinguished Law because the challenged rule is not "a
restriction on [any] business activities of [NCAA] institutions."' Moreo-
ver, Law observed that "courts should afford the NCAA plenty of room
under the antitrust laws to preserve the amateur character of intercolle-
giate athletics. 24
Adidas' recent antitrust challenge to NCAA restrictions on its mem-
bers' sale of promotional rights to sponsors illustrates judicial unwilling-
ness to acknowledge that universities engage in economic competition
among themselves off the playing field and that some NCAA rules may
restrain trade. In Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA,2 5 Adidas alleged that
NCAA limits on the size of manufacturer logos on uniforms and playing
equipment unreasonably restrained competition among NCAA member
institutions for the sale of advertising rights.26 The court initially denied
Adidas' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of this
17. Law, 134 F.3d at 1010.
18. Id. at 1016-19.
19. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089, 1091; Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746.
20. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345-46; Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1318-20.
21. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
22. Id. at 184-87.
23. Id. at 186.
24. 134 F.3d at 1022 n.14.
25. 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
26. Id. at 1100.
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rule.27 Observing that Law provides no guidance regarding the line be-
tween commercial and noncommercial activities, the court characterized
the subject NCAA regulation as noncommercial because it does not
have the purpose or effect of giving NCAA members a direct economic
benefit.28 Rather, it found the rule furthered the NCAA's legitimate ob-
jective of preventing the commercialization of college sports, notwith-
standing that patches identifying football bowl game sponsors on player
uniforms are not subject to the size limits of this rule (not to mention
that athletes may be required to wear a particular manufacturer's shoes
as part of a sponsorship agreement with an NCAA university).29
Subsequently, the court granted the NCAA's motion to dismiss
Adidas' complaint."0 The court found that Adidas failed to properly al-
lege a relevant market in which competition is adversely affected by the
challenged NCAA rule.3' Adidas only asserted a reduction in competi-
tion in the market for the sale of advertising rights on uniforms worn by
players at NCAA institutions.3 2 However, the court ruled that the appro-
priate relevant market "includes all advertising vehicles that are reason-
ably interchangeable with NCAA promotional rights on athletic
apparel, 3 such as uniforms worn by players for professional and
Olympic sports teams. In other words, the court concluded that the
NCAA's rule restricting the size of manufacturer logos on uniforms has
no significant anticompetitive effect as a matter of law.
The Adidas trial court's disposition of the case is another example of
unwarranted judicial deference to NCAA regulation of economic com-
petition among its member institutions. The Adidas holding is inconsis-
tent with the Board of Regents and Law precedent establishing a
framework of antitrust analysis for NCAA regulatory activity with a
commercial impact. Adidas' allegations, at the very least, raise a factual
issue for discovery regarding the anticompetitive effects of this NCAA
rule. If the limitation on logo size has the effect of reducing economic
competition among NCAA members, the NCAA must prove that it fur-
thers a valid procompetitive objective that cannot be accomplished by a
substantially less restrictive means.
27. Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1287 (D. Kan. 1999).
28. Id. at 1296.
29. Id.
30. Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 1999).
31. Id. at 1104.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1102.
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There is no valid justification for permitting the NCAA to determine
arbitrarily the permissible degree of economic competition among its
members or, in light of these universities significant economic self-inter-
est, for courts to defer to the NCAA's judgment. Courts should abandon
anachronistic precedent based on unrealistic ideals of the "amateur" na-
ture of "big-time" college athletics and develop a principled antitrust ju-
risprudence more consistent with the economic realities of college sports
in the 21st century.
I am not advocating that all NCAA regulation of competition vio-
lates the antitrust laws. However, courts should not continue to make
unrealistic or unwarranted assumptions about the economic effects of
NCAA rules reducing or eliminating competition among its approxi-
mately 1,100 member schools. NCAA regulation that has anticompeti-
tive, intrabrand effects should be proven to be the least restrictive means
of promoting interbrand competition as a matter of fact, rather than be-
ing presumed to do so as a matter of law.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION'S
ROLE IN REGULATING
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS"
RODNEY K. SMITH**::
I. INTRODUCTION
As one whose scholarship focuses on religious liberty and sport, I am
often asked why I write in such seemingly disparate areas. My typical
response is that given my interest in the role of religion in society, I
certainly should be interested in sport, the religion of the American peo-
ple. This response invariably engenders a slight smile and chuckle.' I
fear that there is some truth to the statement. Although I do not have
the statistics necessary to prove it, my impression is that as many adults
are zealously devoted to "the game" on any given day as are devoted to
a worship service at a religious institution. As a people, we seem almost
fixated on sport and devote much space in newspapers and newscasts to
sport, with little space being allocated to religion. Yet, the discourse re-
garding sport is generally just description of events occurring, and rarely
peers more deeply into the ramifications of specific issues', or of the
* Presented on January 8, 1999, as part of the Law and Sports Section of the Association
of American Law Schools symposium titled The NCAA's Evolving Role in Governing
Intercollegiate Athletics.
Rodney K. Smith, Herff Chair in Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, The Uni-
versity of Memphis. Professor Smith has served as a member of the NCAA Infractions Ap-
peals Committee and as a Dean at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, the University of
Montana, and Capital University. The author acknowledges the research assistance of Robert
Walker.
1. I often wonder whether the response is based on a feeling that I have said something
cute, or whether it is founded in a deeper disquietude over the fact that I may just be right.
2. Sports sections are filled with description and occasional polemics over aspects of the
role of sport in society, but that discourse rarely goes beyond the superficial as to specific
issues raised. For example, commentators repeatedly argue that intercollegiate athletes
should be "paid" without discussing in any depth the ramifications of their suggestions on the
athletes and educational institutions. Marty Lang, Pay-For-Play Versus NCAA, at http:Iwww.
linkmag.com/link/FebMar_99/990121ccl-sports.html (Feb.-Mar. 1999). Academics, who un-
derstand the need to study major phenomena that affect our culture in great depth, often shun
the exploration of deeper ethical and moral issues related to sport. For example, once during
lunch with a group of my faculty colleagues, a fellow faculty member asked me what I thought
about "the game" that weekend. I responded that I did not watch the game. Almost aghast,
he wondered out loud, "how can you teach sports law and not watch the game." As academ-
ics, like our journalistic counterparts, we are too often caught up in the anecdotal moment of
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general issue of our virtually thoughtless zeal for sport in contemporary
society. While I find this to be personally troubling, it is just such
thoughtless zeal as to sport, and the desire to see one's team win at virtu-
ally any cost,3 that contributes to the increasing regulation of athletics at
virtually all levels.
Devotees of a given team, including coaches and fans alike, often
strive mightily to find clever ways to unbalance the playing field in their
team's favor through questionable recruiting techniques or other de-
vices. This propensity to seek undue advantages in sport has made regu-
lation of intercollegiate athletics a necessity in order to maintain even a
semblance of a balanced playing field. Each new, creative way of bend-
ing the rules to create an undue advantage has necessarily led to the
development of new rules and regulations.4 In turn, the growth in the
number of rules has required development of an extensive structure to
ensure that the rules are enforced.
In this essay, I will briefly examine the historical development of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter NCAA) and the
regulation of intercollegiate athletics. I will also offer some general com-
ments regarding the history and future of the regulation of intercollegi-
ate athletics.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC AssOCIATION
A. 1840-1910
The need for regulation of intercollegiate athletics in the United
States has existed for at least a century and a half. One of the earliest
interschool athletic events was a highbrow regatta between Harvard and
Yale Universities, which was commercially sponsored by the then power-
"the game," and rarely pause to reflect thoughtfully on the very ramifications of sport in our
society. This is even more true when, as educational institutions, we have made an academic
home for intercollegiate athletics.
3. This is reminiscent, in some ways, of the zeal of some religionists that has led them to
conduct holy wars in order to prove that their religion is superior.
4. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION, 2000-01 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL
(2000) [hereinafter MANUAL]. Including the index, the MANUAL is 479 pages long, with small
print. These rules are in large measure a reflection of efforts to curtail the creativity of devo-
tees of a particular team to find ways to gain an advantage over another institution. Each time
a new way of creating an unfair advantage is concocted in the head of a coach or other devo-
tee of a given team, a new rule is spawned to deal with that excess. In turn, as rules prolifer-
ate, an increasingly complex structure for enforcing the rules is necessitated.
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ful Elkins Railroad Line.' Harvard University sought to gain an undue
advantage over its academic rival Yale by obtaining the services of a
coxswain who was not a student.6 Thus, the commercialization and pro-
pensity to seek unfair advantages existed virtually from the beginning of
organized intercollegiate athletics in the United States. The problem of
cheating, which was no doubt compounded by the increasing commer-
cialization of sport, was a matter of concern. 7 Initially, these concerns
led institutions to move the athletic teams from student control to
faculty oversight.' Nevertheless, by the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, two leading university presidents were voicing their fears that inter-
collegiate athletics were out of control.9 President Eliot at Harvard was
very concerned about the impact that commercialization of intercollegi-
ate athletics was having, and charged that "lofty gate receipts from col-
lege athletics had turned amateur contests into major commercial
spectacles."'" In the same year, President Walker of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology bemoaned the fact that intercollegiate athletics
had lost its academic moorings and opined that "[i]f the movement shall
continue at the same rate, it will soon be fairly a question whether the
letters B.A. stand more for Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Athletics.""
In turn, recognizing the difficulty of overseeing intercollegiate athletics
at the institutional level, whether through the faculty or the student gov-
ernance, conferences were being created both to facilitate the playing of
a schedule of games and to provide a modicum of regulation at a
broader level.' 2
5. These regatta, which were student run for the most part, were among the first intercol-
legiate athletic events.
6. Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Penalty: How
Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 988-89 (1987) [hereinafter Smith,
Death Penalty]; Rodney K. Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games With the Re-
form of Big-Time Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 567, 569-70 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Little
Ado].
7. The commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, with the payment of star athletes,
was rather firmly entrenched by the latter part of the 19th Century. For example, it is re-
ported that Hogan, a successful student-athlete at Yale at that time, was compensated with:
(1) a suite of rooms in the dorm; (2) free meals at the University club; (3) a one-hundred
dollar scholarship; (4) the profits from the sale of programs; (5) an agency arrangement with
the American Tobacco Company, under which he received a commission on cigarettes sold in
New Haven; and (6) a ten-day paid vacation to Cuba. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6,
at 989.
8. Id. at 989-90.
9. Smith, Little Ado, supra note 6, at 570.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 990.
20001
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Despite the shift from student control to faculty oversight and some
conference regulation, intercollegiate athletics remained under-regu-
lated and a source of substantial concern.' 3 Rising concerns regarding
the need to control the excesses of intercollegiate athletics were com-
pounded by the fact that in 1905 alone, there were over eighteen deaths
and one hundred major injuries in intercollegiate football. 4 National
attention was turned to intercollegiate athletics when President
Roosevelt called for a White House conference to review football
rules.'5 President Roosevelt invited officials from the major football
programs to participate.' 6 Deaths and injuries in football persisted, how-
ever, and Chancellor Henry MacCracken of New York University called
for a national meeting of representatives of the nation's major intercolle-
giate football programs to determine whether football could be regu-
lated or had to be abolished at the intercollegiate level. 7
Representatives of many major intercollegiate football programs ac-
cepted Chancellor MacCracken's invitation and ultimately formed a
Rules Committee." President Roosevelt then sought to have partici-
pants in the White House conference meet with the new Rules Commit-
tee.19 This combined effort on the part of educators and the White
House eventually led to a concerted effort to reform intercollegiate foot-
ball rules, resulting in the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (hereinafter IAA), with sixty-two original members.20 In 1910,
the IAA was renamed the NCAA.21 Initially, the NCAA was formed to
formulate rules that could be applied to the various intercollegiate
sports.2 2
In the years prior to the formation of the NCAA, schools wrestled
with the same issues that we face today: the extreme pressure to win,
which is compounded by the commercialization of sport, and the need
for regulations and a regulatory body to ensure fairness and safety.' In
terms of regulation, between 1840 and 1910, there was a movement from
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW 1 (1986); Smith, Death Penalty, supra
note 6, at 990.
16. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 990.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 991; SCHUBERT, supra note 15, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Smith, Little Ado, supra note 6, at 571.
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loose student control of athletics to faculty oversight, from faculty over-
sight to the creation of conferences, and, ultimately, to the development
of a national entity for governance purposes.24
B. 1910-1970
In its early years, the NCAA did not play a major role in governing
intercollegiate athletics.25 It did begin to stretch beyond merely making
rules for football and other games played, to the creation of a national
championship event in various sports.26 Indeed, students, with some
faculty oversight, continued to be the major force in running intercollegi-
ate athletics.2 7 By the 1920s, however, intercollegiate athletics were
quickly becoming an integral part of higher education in the United
States.28 Public interest in sport at the intercollegiate level, which had
always been high, continued to increase in intensity, particularly as suc-
cessful and entertaining programs developed, and also with increasing
access to higher education on the part of students from all segments of
society.
29
With this growing interest in intercollegiate sports and attendant in-
creases in commercialization, outside attention again focused on govern-
ance and related issues.3" In 1929, the highly respected Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Education issued a significant re-
port regarding intercollegiate athletics and made the following finding:
[A] change of values is needed in a field that is sodden with the
commercial and the material and the vested interests that these
forces have created. Commercialism in college athletics must be
diminished and college sport must rise to a point where it is es-
teemed primarily and sincerely for the opportunities it affords to
mature youth.3'
The Carnegie Report, echoing themes that appear ever so relevant in the
year 2000, concluded that college presidents could reclaim the integrity
of sport.32 College administrators "could change the policies permitting
24. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 989-91.
25. Id. at 991.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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commercialized and professionalized athletics that boards of trustees
had previously sanctioned. 33
While the NCAA made some minor attempts to restructure rules to
increase integrity in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, those ef-
forts were insufficient to keep pace with the growing commercialization
of, and interest in, intercollegiate athletics 4.3  Recruitment of athletes
was not new, but the rising desire to win, with all its commercial ramifi-
cations, contributed to recruitment being raised to new heights.3 Red
Grange, for example, is often given credit for "starting the competition
for football talent through.., recruiting."36 Public interest in intercolle-
giate athletics continued to increase with support from the federal gov-
ernment during the 1930s. The capacity of the NCAA to regulate
excesses was not equal to the daunting task presented by the growth of,
interest in, and commercialization of sport.37
After World War II, with a dramatic increase in access to higher edu-
cation on the part of all segments of society, largely through government
support for returning military personnel to attend college, public interest
expanded even more dramatically than it had in the past.3 Increased
interest, not surprisingly, led to even greater commercialization of inter-
collegiate athletics. With the advent of television, the presence of radios
in the vast majority of homes in the United States, and the broadcasting
of major sporting events, these pressures further intensified.39 More col-
leges and universities started athletic programs, while others expanded
existing programs, in an effort to respond to increasing interest in inter-
collegiate athletics. These factors, coupled with a series of gambling
scandals and recruiting excesses, caused the NCAA to promulgate addi-
tional rules, resulting in an expansion of its governance authority.40
In 1948, the NCAA enacted the so-called "Sanity Code," which was
designed to "alleviate the proliferation of exploitive practices in the re-
cruitment of student-athletes."'4 1 To enforce the rules in the Sanity
Code, the NCAA created the Constitutional Compliance Committee to
interpret rules and investigate possible violations.4' Neither the Sanity
33. Id.
34. Id. at 991-92.
35. Id. at 992.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 992.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Code with its rules, nor the Constitutional Compliance Committee with
its enforcement responsibility, were successful because their only sanc-
tion was expulsion, which was so severe that it rendered the Committee
impotent and the rules ineffectual.43 Recognizing this, the NCAA re-
pealed the Sanity Code in 1951, replacing the Constitutional Compliance
Committee with the Committee on Infractions, which was given broader
sanctioning authority.' Thus, in 1951, the NCAA began to exercise
more earnestly the authority which it had been given by its members."5
Two other factors are worth noting in the 1950s: (1) Walter Byers
became Executive Director of the NCAA, and contributed to strength-
ening the NCAA, and its enforcement division, over the coming years to
televise intercollegiate football; and (2) the NCAA negotiated its first
contract valued in excess of one million dollars, opening the door to in-
creasingly lucrative television contracts in the future.46 The NCAA was
entering a new era, in which its enforcement authority had been in-
creased, a strong individual had been hired as executive director, and
revenues from television were beginning to provide it with the where-
withal to strengthen its capacity in enforcing the rules that were being
promulgated. 7 Through the 1950s and 1960s, the NCAA's enforcement
capacity increased annually. 8
C. 1971-1983
By 1971, as its enforcement capacity had grown yearly in response to
new excesses arising from increased interest and commercialization, the
NCAA was beginning to be criticized for alleged unfairness in the exer-
cise of its enhanced enforcement authority.49 Responding to these criti-
cisms, the NCAA formed a committee to study the enforcement process,
and ultimately, in 1973, adopted recommendations developed by that
committee designed to divide the prosecutorial and investigative roles of
the Committee on Infractions."° In the early 1970s, as well, the member-
ship of the NCAA decided to create divisions, whereby schools would be
placed in divisions that would better reflect their competitive capacity.51
43. Id. at 992-93.
44. Id. at 993.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 992.
50. Id. at 994.
51. Id. at 993.
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Despite these efforts, however, by 1976, when the NCAA was given ad-
ditional authority to enforce the rules by penalizing schools directly, and,
as a result, athletes, coaches, and administrators indirectly, criticism of
the NCAA's enforcement authority grew even more widespread." In-
deed, in 1978, the United States House of Representatives Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Investigation held hearings to investigate the
alleged unfairness of the NCAA's enforcement processes. 3 Once again,
the NCAA responded by adopting changes in its rules designed to ad-
dress many of the criticisms made during the course of the hearings. 54
While concerns were somewhat abated, the NCAA's enforcement
processes continued to be the source of substantial criticism through the
1970s and 1980s. 5
The NCAA found itself caught between two critiques. On the one
hand, it was criticized for responding inadequately to the increased com-
mercialization of intercollegiate athletics, with all its attendant excesses;
while on the other hand, it was criticized for unfairly exercising its regu-
latory authority. 6 Another factor began to have a major impact as well.
University and college presidents were becoming more directly con-
cerned with the operation of the NCAA for two major reasons: (1) as
enrollments were beginning to drop, and expenses were increasing in
athletics and elsewhere, presidents began, with some ambivalence, to see
athletics as an expense, and as a potential revenue and public relations
source; and (2) they personally came to understand that their reputa-
tions as presidents were often tied to the success of the athletic program
and they were, therefore, becoming even more fearful of the NCAA's
enforcement authority.5 7
D. 1984-1999
In difficult economic times for higher education in the 1980s, univer-
sity presidents increasingly found themselves caught between the pres-
sures applied by influential members of boards of trustees and alumni,
who often demanded winning athletic programs, and faculty and educa-
tors, who feared the rising commercialization of athletics and its impact
52. Id. at 994.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 995.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 995-96.
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on academic values.58 Many presidents were determined to take an ac-
tive, collective role in the governance of the NCAA, so they formed the
influential Presidents Commission in response to these pressures. 59 In
1984, the Presidents Commission began to assert its authority, and by
1985, it took dramatic action by exercising their authority to call a spe-
cial convention to be held in June of 1985.60 This quick assertion of
power led one sports writer to conclude that "There is no doubt who is
running college sports. It's the college presidents."'"
The presidents initially were involved in a number of efforts to
change the rules, particularly in the interest of cost containment. 62
These efforts were not all successful.63 Over time, however, the presi-
dents were gaining a better understanding of the workings of the NCAA,
and they were beginning to take far more interest in the actual govern-
ance of intercollegiate athletics.64 A little over a decade later, the presi-
dents' involvement grew to the extent that they had changed the very
governance structure of the NCAA, with the addition of an Executive
Committee and a Board of Directors for the various divisions, both of
which are made up of presidents or chief executive officers.65
In NCAA v. Tarkanian6 6, in a 5-4 decision, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor, freeing the
NCAA from defending against due process allegations brought by
Coach Jerry Tarkanian.67 Despite this victory, concerns persisted re-
garding due process in the NCAA's enforcement processes. In time, the
presidents decided to take action in reforming the enforcement pro-
cess.6" The presidents were involved in forming a Special Committee to
Review the NCAA Enforcement and Infractions Process, 69 and sup-
ported the naming of one of their own, President Rex E. Lee of Brigham
58. Id. at 995; Rodney K. Smith, Reforming Intercollegiate Athletics: A Critique of the
Presidents Commission's Role in the N.C.A.A.'s Sixth Special Convention, 64 N.D. L. REv.
423, 427 (1988).
59. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 996-97.
60. Smith, supra note 58, at 428-30.
61. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 997.
62. Smith, supra note 58, at 428.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. MANUAL, supra note 4, at 22-23.
66. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
67. Id. at 199.
68. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssoCIATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REvIEv THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT AND INFRACTIONS PRO-
CESS, Oct. 28, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS].
69. The Committee was charged as follows:
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Young University, as Chairman. 7° This distinguished committee, which
included other luminaries such as former Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court Warren E. Burger, issued a report in 1991.71 The
Committee made the following basic recommendations: (1) "Enhance
the adequacy of the initial notice of an impending investigation and as-
sure a personal visit by the enforcement staff with the institution's chief
executive officer; '72 (2) "Establish a 'summary disposition' procedure
for treating major violations at a reasonably early stage in the investiga-
tion;" 73 (3) "Liberalize the use of tape recordings and the availability of
such recordings to involved parties; '74 (4) "Use former judges or other
eminent legal authorities as hearing officers in cases involving major vio-
lations and not resolved in the 'summary disposition' process;"'75 (5)
"Hearings should be open to the greatest extent possible; ' 76 (6) "Pro-
vide transcripts of all infractions hearings to appropriate involved par-
ties;"'77 (7) "Refine and enhance the role of the Committee on
Infractions and establish a limited appellate process beyond that com-
mittee; '78 (8) "Adopt a formal conflict-of-interest policy; '79 (9) "Expand
the public reporting of infractions cases;"80 (10) "Make available a com-
Conduct a thorough review of the enforcement and infractions process, including (a)
the investigation process by the enforcement staff; (b) the function of the Committee
on Infractions, including the hearing process and the method used to determine penal-
ties if guilty, and (c) the release of information to the public regarding sanctions and
the conduct of press conferences at institutions announcing sanctions. The purpose of
the review is to make sure that the process is being handled in the most effective way,
that fair procedures are guaranteed, that penalties are appropriate and consistent; to
determine ways to reduce the time needed to conclude the investigation and the infrac-
tions process, and to determine if there can be innovative changes that will make the
process more positive and understandable to those involved and to the general public.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3. This recommendation certainly reflected a concern on the part of chief execu-
tive officers that they were not sufficiently involved in the enforcement process, when an insti-
tution was being investigated.
73. Id. at 4. Again, in this area, the recommendation called upon the staff to "share with
the chief executive officer its information regarding rules violations" at an early stage. Id. at 5.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 7. This recommendation was adopted, with the creation of the Infractions Ap-
peals Committee, a five-member committee, that hears appeals from the Committee on In-
fractions, and has been developing appellate case law or jurisprudence.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id.
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pilation of previous committee decisions;""' and (11) "Study the struc-
ture and procedures of the enforcement staff."' 2  These
recommendations have been taken seriously, and, as implemented, are
helping to improve the enforcement processes.
During this time period, there were a number of additional develop-
ments that had an impact on the role of the NCAA in fulilling its en-
forcement and governance of responsibilities. Even in a short history,
like this one, a few of those developments are noteworthy.
As the role of television and the revenue it brings to intercollegiate
athletics has grown in magnitude, the desire for an increasing share of
those dollars has become intense. The first television event in the 1950s
was a college football game, and the televising of college football games
remained under the NCAA's control for a number of years.8 3 In time,
however, a group of powerful intercollegiate football programs were de-
termined to challenge the NCAA's handling of the televising of games
involving their schools.8 4 In NCAA v. Board of Regents85, the United
States Supreme Court held that the NCAA had violated antitrust laws.86
This provided an opening for those schools, and the bowls that would
ultimately court them, to directly reap the revenues from the televising
of their football games.87 This shift has effectively created a new division
in football called the College Football Association, which is made up of
the football powerhouses in Division 1.88 Because these schools have
been able to funnel more television revenues in their direction, which
has led to increases in other forms of revenue, they have gained access to
resources that have unbalanced the playing field in football and other
sports.8 9
Another matter that has dramatically impacted intercollegiate athlet-
ics during the past two decades is Title IX, with its call for gender equity
81. Id. This provision, together with the developing appellate case law, will make for a
jurisprudence of enforcement that will warrant study in the future. It will also help establish
the fairness or equality of treatment that characterizes the rule of law.
82. Id.
83. SCHUBERT, supra note 15, at 2.
84. Id.
85. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
86. Id. at 113, 120.
87. SCHUBERT, supra note 15, at 57-58.
88. Id. at 58.
89. It is clear that the membership of the College Football Association has been able to
use those additional revenues to enhance their entire athletics program, giving them a compet-
itive edge.
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in intercollegiate athletics. 90 With some emphasis on proportionality in
opportunities and equity in expenditures for coaches and other purposes
in women's sports, new opportunities have been made available for wo-
men in intercollegiate athletics.91 The cost of these expanded opportuni-
ties have been high, however, particularly given that few institutions
have women's teams that generate sufficient revenue to cover the cost of
these added programs.92 This increase in net expenses has placed signifi-
cant pressure on intercollegiate athletic programs, particularly given that
the presidents are cost-containment conscious, desiring that athletic pro-
grams be self-sufficient.93 Revenue producing male sports, therefore,
have to bear the weight of funding women's sports.94 This, in turn, raises
racial equity concerns because most of the revenue producing male
sports are made up predominantly of male student-athletes of color,95
who are expected to deliver a product that will not only produce suffi-
cient revenue to cover its own expenses, but also a substantial portion of
the costs of gender equity and male sports that are not revenue
producing.96
The gender equity and television issues have been largely economic
in their impact, but they do indirectly impact the role of the NCAA in
governance. Since football funding has been diverted from the NCAA
to the football powerhouses, the NCAA for the most part has had to rely
even more heavily on its revenue from the lucrative television contract
for the Division I basketball championship. 97 Heavy reliance on this
funding source raises racial equity issues, since student-athletes of color,
particularly African-American athletes, are the source of those reve-
nues. 98 Thus, the very governance costs of the NCAA are covered
predominantly by the efforts of these student-athletes of color.99 This
inequity is exacerbated by the fact that schools and conferences rely
heavily on revenues from the basketball tournament to fund their own
institutional and conference needs.' 00
90. Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender Equity
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. REv. 329, 367 (1996).
91. Id. at 355.
92. Id. at 368.
93. Id. at 359-60.
94. Id. at 368.
95. Id. at 369-70.
96. Id. at 370.
97. Id. at 348.
98. Id. at 349.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 369-70.
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Generally, developments during the past two decades have focused
on governance and economic issues.101 There have been some efforts,
however, to enhance academic integrity and revitalize the role of faculty
and students in overseeing intercollegiate athletics." 2 Of particular note
in this regard has been the implementation of the certification process
for intercollegiate athletic programs. 3 The certification process in-
volves faculty, students (particularly student-athletes), and staff from an
institution in preparing an in-depth self-study, including substantial insti-
tutional data in the form of required appendices. 0 4 The study covers the
following areas: Governance and Rules Compliance, Academic Integ-
rity, Fiscal Integrity, and Commitment to Equity. 05 This process helps
institutions focus on academic values and related issues.'0 6 These efforts
also provide the chief executive officers with additional information and
a potentially enhanced role in intercollegiate athletics at the campus
level.' 7
The past two decades have been active ones for the NCAA. With
meteoric rises in television and related revenues, the commercialization
of intercollegiate athletics has continued to grow at a pace that places
significant strain on institutions and the NCAA. These commercial pres-
sures, together with increasing costs related to non-revenue producing
sports, costly gender equity requirements, and other resource demands
(e.g., new facilities), make it challenging to maintain a viable enforce-
ment process and a balanced playing field.
III. THE FUrURE
Over the past 150 years, the desire to win at virtually any cost, com-
bined with the increases in public interest in intercollegiate athletics, in a
consumer sense, have led inexorably to a highly commercialized world of
intercollegiate athletics.'0 These factors have created new incentives for
universities and conferences to find new ways to obtain an advantage
over their competitors. This desire to gain an unfair competitive advan-
tage has necessarily led to an expansion in rules and regulations. This
101. Smith, Little Ado, supra note 6, at 573.
102. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 1058.
103. This certification process has been in place for a number of years and is becoming
institutionalized. Smith, Little Ado, supra note 6, at 573.
104. Id. at 573-74.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 576.
107. Id.
108. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 991.
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proliferation of rules and the development of increasingly sophisticated
regulatory systems necessary to enforce those rules, together with the
importance that attaches to enforcement decisions, both economically
and in terms of an institution's reputation (and derivatively its chief ex-
ecutive officer's career), places great strain on the capacity of the NCAA
to govern intercollegiate athletics. This strain is unlikely to dissipate in
the future because the pressures that have created the strain do not ap-
pear to be susceptible, in a practical sense, to amelioration. Indeed, the
one certainty in the future of the NCAA is the likelihood that big-time
intercollegiate athletics will be engaged in the same point-counterpoint
that has characterized its history; increased commercialization and pub-
lic pressure leading to more sophisticated rules and regulatory systems.
As rules and regulatory systems continue along the road of increased
sophistication, the NCAA will more closely resemble its industry coun-
terparts. It will develop an enforcement system that is more legalistic in
its nature, as regulatory proliferation leads to increasing demands for
fairness. In such a milieu, chief executive officers will have to take their
responsibilities for intercollegiate athletics even more seriously.10 9 It can
be hoped, as well, that their involvement, and the increased involvement
on the part of faculty and staff, through the certification process and
otherwise, will lead to a more responsible system in terms of the mainte-
nance of academic values. If the NCAA and those who lead at the insti-
tutional and conference levels are unable to maintain academic values in
the face of economics and related pressures, the government may be less
than a proverbial step away." 0
109. It can be anticipated, as well, that chief executive officers will be held increasingly
accountable for rules violations at their institutions.
110. Just as the government (the legislative and judicial branches) became involved at the
turn of the century and again in the 1970s, it is likely that similar oversight will occur in the
future. With increased formalization of regulatory processes, the judiciary may well become
more involved.
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CORPORATE SPONSORSIUPS OF SPORTS
AND ENTERTAINMENT EVENTS:
CONSIDERATIONS IN
DRAFTING A SPONSORSHIP
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
By GREGORY J. HELLER & JEFFERY A. HEc A1N'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview of Corporate Sponsorships in the Sports and
Entertainment Industry
As we enter a new millennium, corporations are continuously look-
ing for ways to effectively reach their target markets. One method of
access that has exploded in popularity in recent years is the sponsorship
of sports and entertainment events. With broad demographics and well-
known personalities, corporate sponsorships of sports and entertainment
events are at an all-time high, as growth in sponsorship was estimated to
continue at a double-digit pace in 1999.2 It was projected that North
American companies would spend $7.6 billion on the sponsorship of
sports and entertainment events in 1999, while worldwide spending was
projected to be $19.2 billion, 12% and 11% increases, respectively, from
1998. 3
The projected breakdown of North American companies' sponsor-
ship spending on sports and entertainment events for 1999 was as fol-
lows: (i) $5.1 billion on sports events, representing 67% of the projected
total sponsorship spending for 1999; (ii) $756 million on entertainment
tours and events, representing 10% of the projected total sponsorship
spending for 1999; (iii) $685 million on festivals, fairs and annual events,
representing 9% of the projected total sponsorship spending for 1999;
(iv) $630 million on "cause" marketing events, representing 8% of the
projected total sponsorship spending for 1999; and (v) $460 million on
1. Gregory J. Heller is Assistant Team Counsel for the Atlanta Braves, Atlanta Hawks
and Atlanta Thrashers, and Counsel to Turner Sports, Atlanta, Georgia. Jeffrey A. Hechtman
is a partner with the Chicago, Illinois law firm of Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered.
2. 1999 Sponsorship Spending: $7.6 Billion, IEG SPONSORSHIP REP. (IEG, Inc., Chi., Ill.),
Dec. 21, 1998, at 1.
3. Id. at 1. 4.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
the arts, representing 6% of the projected total sponsorship spending for
1999. 4
Some of the largest corporations in the world make significant invest-
ments in sports or entertainment properties. There are sixty-one United
States-based companies which have spent more than $10 million on the
sponsorship of sports and entertainment events.5 Included among the
organizations spending significant dollars on the sponsorship of sports
and entertainment events are well-known companies such as Philip Mor-
ris, Coca-Cola, McDonald's, and General Motors and lesser-known com-
panies such as Mars, Inc., Bausch & Lomb, Inc., and Thomson
Consumer Electronics.6
B. Recent Sponsorships in the Sports and Entertainment Industry
Corporate sponsorships of sports and entertainment events occur in a
wide-range of events for varying amounts of investment. Examples in-
clude AFC Enterprises (Church's Chicken) recently paying in excess of
$750,000 to be the presenting sponsor of the Kirk Franklin gospel tour;
Levi Strauss & Co. paying in excess of $250,000 to be the title sponsor of
the snowboarding Sno-core tour; and American Express paying in excess
of $500,000 to be the official card of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association. 7 In contrast, for as little as $1500, a company can be a cor-
porate sponsor of the Independence Bowl, an annual college football
game,8 while companies such as Anheuser-Busch spent as much as $10
million to be the co-sponsor of the Federation Internationale Football
Association World Cup,9 and Pittsburgh-based PNC Bank entered into a
naming rights agreement with the Pittsburgh Pirates for $30 million dol-
lars.10 Even utility companies are entering the sponsorship field, as Sem-
pra Energy recently announced a $20 million deal with the Los Angeles
Staples Center, home to the National Hockey League's Los Angeles
Kings and the National Basketball Association's Los Angeles Clippers
and Los Angeles Lakers. 1
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. New Deals, IEG SPONSORSHIP REP. (IEG, Inc., Chi., Ill.), Dec. 21, 1998, at 7.
8. Independence Bowl, Corporate Sponsorships, at http://www.independencebowl.org/
sponsor.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2000).
9. New Deals, supra note 7, at 7.
10. PNC Ponies Up $30M for Naming Rights to Pirates' New Park, SPORTS Bus. DAILY
(Street & Smith's Sports Group, South Norwalk, Conn.), Aug. 7, 1998, at 10.
11. Utilities Tie More Power Into Their Deals, IEG SPONSORSHIP REPORT (IEG, Inc., Chi.,
Ill.), Dec. 21, 1998, at 6.
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C. Corporate Sponsors and Event Management Firms
As previously mentioned, there are a large number of companies in
the United States investing millions of dollars in the sponsorship of
sports and entertainment events. With so many dollars at stake in con-
nection with the investment involved in sponsoring a sports or entertain-
ment event, a corporate sponsor ("Sponsor") should ensure that the
event is managed, coordinated and promoted with great care and exper-
tise. As a result, there are great opportunities for sports and entertain-
ment event management firms ("EMF") to provide services for Sponsors
in this multi-billion dollar industry. A number of different EMFs con-
duct business in the sports and entertainment industry today. EMFs
range from large, well-known companies such as the Cleveland-based
International Management Group ("IMG"), to smaller, lesser-known
companies such as Ryno Sports located in Carlsbad, California.'2 As
Sponsors and EMFs approach the management of a particular sponsor-
ship, both the Sponsor and the EMF should be cognizant of their respec-
tive rights and responsibilities regarding the EMF's management and
implementation of a sports or entertainment event. With so much at
stake, a well-thought-out Sponsorship Management Agreement
.("SMA") is essential.
This article sets forth a variety of considerations in preparing a SMA
for the Sponsor and the EMF and suggests ways to deal with specific
issues involved in the SMA. Part II addresses considerations in the man-
agement services provided by an EMF for a Sponsor in managing and
coordinating an event. Part III addresses contractual provisions relating
to the management fees and expenses of such management services.
Part IV discusses term, cancellation and exclusivity provisions to be con-
sidered in the SMA, while Part V sets forth considerations relating to
intellectual property rights of the Sponsor and EvF. Finally, Part VI
discusses a variety of miscellaneous provisions which should be included
in the SMA.
II. MANAGEMENT SERVICES
A. Overview
Many issues should be addressed in structuring and drafting the
SMA. The SMA must clearly set forth the sponsorship management ser-
vices to be provided by the EMF. A Sponsor should be concerned with
an EMF's ability and commitment to make available and provide the
12. Ryno Sports, About Us, at http://www.rynosports.com (last visited Sept. 16, 2000).
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personnel, materials, services and functions necessary to ensure the suc-
cess of its sponsorship of an event. Conversely, an EMF needs to have a
clear understanding of its responsibilities, tasks and authority in order to
manage a successful event and fulfill its client's best interests. Neverthe-
less, the management of an event entails so many variables that certain
issues may arise during the course of the event that are not addressed in
the SMA, such as a cancellation by a performer or the unavailability of a
venue. The SMA should be flexible in order to deal with these situa-
tions. A sample provision addressing this issue is as follows: "Client ac-
knowledges that the nature of the event is such that it is impossible to list
all of the responsibilities of the EMF. Nonetheless, the EMF shall be
generally responsible for the coordination of the event management and
implementation."
B. Types of Services
EMFs across the country offer a wide range of services. Examples
include: (i) Harper Entertainment, located in Gallatin, Tennessee, which
"specializes in creating and implementing entertainment, sports, and me-
dia-driven promotions, and corporate sponsorship programs;"' 3 (ii) Ex-
ecutive Sports International, located in North Palm Beach, Florida,
which provides services including event management, on-site surveys,
sponsorship sales and sports marketing consultations;' 4 and (iii) National
Media Group, located in New York, New York, which provides services
such as creating and implementing sports and entertainment programs
and representing talent and organizations.' 5 The SMA should set forth
the types of services the EMF will provide for the Sponsor in connection
with the event, as well as the Sponsor's expectations, requirements and
limitations on the EMF's authority. In general, the SMA should state
that the EMF is responsible for the overall coordination, management
and implementation of the event.
There are a variety of other services that an EMF could also provide,
such as: (i) sponsorship sales; (ii) researching and analyzing potential
markets and venues; (iii) assigning an event manager to coordinate logis-
tics at the venue for access, shipping, merchandising and other adminis-
trative matters; (iv) coordinating with artists, athletes or their agents for
13. Harper Entm't Group, at http://www.harpergroup.com (last visited Sept. 16, 2000).
14. Executive Sports Int'l, at http://www.nicklaus.com/executivesports (last visited Sept.
16, 2000).
15. Nat'l Media Group, at http://wwv.nmgsports.com/about.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2000).
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their participation in the event; (v) establishing and negotiating market-
ing and sales programs; (vi) providing advance coordination, manage-
ment and implementation of sponsorship activities, including arranging
for signage displays, promotional displays, artists' or athletes' "meet and
greets," hospitality rooms, ticketing needs, merchant visits, and the dis-
tribution of promotional merchandise; (vii) developing radio trade for
mention in advance of the event; (viii) negotiating and coordinating tele-
vision rights; (ix) providing event information to both the Sponsor and
key personnel of the Sponsor, such as event dates, venues, venue sites,
and any other information the Sponsor may request; (x) providing a
summary and analysis of each event for the Sponsor, including a sum-
mary of the Sponsor's visibility and exposure at the venue and surround-
ing merchants, a summary of media coverage, and a summary of signage
placement; (xi) filling vacant seats for the event for which the Sponsor
has provided tickets; (xii) providing Sponsor with materials that require
Sponsor's consent, including artwork or advertisements; and (xiii) sourc-
ing and securing all items such as signage and promotional materials.
With so many possible services to be provided by an EMF, both the
Sponsor and the EMF should ensure that the SMA clearly identifies the
services to be provided and a time frame in which the services should be
completed. The SMA could contain provisions detailing the services to
be provided by the EMF similar to the following: "The EMF shall pro-
vide to Client all event sponsorship management and implementation
services described in Exhibit A, attached hereto, and any other services
referred to in this Agreement. The EMF and Client may agree, in writ-
ing, to change the list of services set forth in Exhibit A."
C. Specific Considerations
1. EMF's Considerations
The EMF should pay particular attention to the services description
in drafting and negotiating the SMA. It is important for the EMF to
have clarification from a Sponsor with respect to a Sponsor's expecta-
tions. At the same time, the EMF should get an affirmative acknowl-
edgement from a Sponsor that the nature of the event may make it
impossible to list all of the EMF's duties, allowing the EMF to go be-
yond the scope of the services listed when necessary to successfully per-
form its duties for the event. In addition, the EIVIF should negotiate a
provision in the SMA that protects the EMF's rights if the EMF is re-
quired to perform services outside of the scope of the SMA, or if the
Sponsor alters the nature of the event for which the management ser-
vices are to be provided. The EMF could protect its rights by securing a
2000]
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provision which states that it will be entitled to adjust its management
fee if the scope of the services it is required to provide is altered.
Another key to the EMF's success in managing the event is accessi-
bility to the Sponsor, athletes or artists involved in the event, and knowl-
edge of the marketing objectives of the Sponsor. The EMF should
negotiate an accessibility provision into the services section of the SMA
that contains a provision allowing the EMF's representative access to
the Sponsor, artist and/or athletes and their representatives with respect
to the Sponsor's marketing objectives for the event. Additionally, the
SMA should require that the EMF's representative be informed and
aware of all promotional activities connected with the event, including
photo appearances and public appearances, and that the EMF represen-
tative be allowed to participate in the coordination of these activities.
Also, the SMA should allow the EMF's representative to be afforded all
clearances and privileges usually provided to a staff member of the event
and/or an athlete's or artist's agent.
Another beneficial provision for the EMF is an acknowledgment
from the Sponsor that a majority of the services are provided to the
Sponsor in the planning and preparation of the event, which take place
before the start of the event. This provision enables the EMF to better
establish and prove that it is entitled to all or a large portion of its man-
agement fee if the event or events which make up the event are
cancelled.
Finally, the EMF should secure a provision which protects its rights
to: (i) continue to develop creative and unique programs and provide
services to other clients for other events; and (ii) include references in its
promotional materials and the event's promotional materials that it has
provided services for a particular Sponsor or for a specific event. A sam-
ple provision from a SMA which addresses these rights is as follows:
"Client acknowledges and agrees that nothing contained in this Agree-
ment shall prohibit the EMF from providing services similar to the ser-
vices provided pursuant to this Agreement to a third party, so long as
such engagement does not violate the exclusivity provisions set forth
herein."
2. Sponsor's Considerations
A Sponsor has a great deal of time, money and effort at stake in
connection with its sponsorship of an event. Therefore, it should care-
fully scrutinize the management services section of the SMA. For exam-
ple, a Sponsor should typically secure a covenant from the EMF that the
EMF will perform its services using reasonable care and being subject to
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the highest industry standards. In addition, a Sponsor must be cognizant
to limit its liability in an event and insert provisions relating to the
EMF's employees or independent contractors.
First, a Sponsor must be aware of the qualifications of individuals an
EMF employs in providing its services. To protect against potential ille-
gal labor claims, a Sponsor should negotiate a provision in the SMA
whereby the EMF will perform its services in accordance with all laws,
including, without limitation, the Child Labor Act and the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986.16 To protect itself from a breach of
this provision by the EMF, the Sponsor should secure a veto right al-
lowing it to prohibit an employee or independent contractor of the EIF
from working an event if such employee or independent contractor does
not meet the Sponsor's requirement for qualification or was hired in vio-
lation of the law. While a veto right is a beneficial provision for a Spon-
sor to retain, it must also be careful to specifically delineate that the
EMIF is an independent contractor of the Sponsor and that employees of
the EMEF are not employees of the Sponsor. The Sponsor should ensure
that this critical factor is clearly spelled out. Failure to do so could po-
tentially result in worker's compensation, unemployment and tax liabil-
ity to the Sponsor. A sample independent contractor provision is as
follows: "The parties shall be and act as independent contractors, and
under no circumstances shall this Agreement be construed as creating an
agency, partnership, joint venture or employment between the parties."
The Sponsor must also be cognizant of the materials being created by
the EMF on behalf of the Sponsor for the event. With this in mind, the
Sponsor should seek to secure an agreement from the EMF that all
materials created by the EMF in connection with an event will be "works
made for hire" within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976,17 as
amended, and are the sole and exclusive property of the Sponsor. A
sample "works made for hire" provision is as follows: "As part of the
services provided hereunder, EMF will propose and deliver, as applica-
ble, EMF's original concepts, designs, mechanicals, layouts, etc. for the
Event which shall be deemed 'works made for hire' and Sponsor shall be
considered the 'author' of such works." Additionally, the Sponsor may
include in the SMA a provision that at the conclusion of the event or
termination of the SMA, the EMF will, at the option of the Sponsor,
destroy all promotional materials or return all such materials to the
Sponsor.
16. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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The Sponsor should also secure the right to modify the timing and
nature of the event in order to ensure flexibility to make the event suc-
cessful. A sample provision securing this right is as follows: "The parties
acknowledge that the schedule of events may change from time to time
and that Sponsor will use its best efforts to notify the EMF of such
changes." This is of particular importance when there are a number of
events involved at a wide range of venues in many different markets.
Typically, the Sponsor and EMF will agree that there will be a certain
number of events at particular venues in a specific number of markets.
If a particular venue or market is not achieving the results the Sponsor
desires, the retention of a right to modify the location or nature of the
event will allow the Sponsor to address this concern.
Finally, the Sponsor should ensure that the SMA contains a provision
requiring the EMF to provide an analysis of all market activities of the
event, in order to measure its success, and provide quantitative docu-
mentation of such analysis, updated on a periodic basis, throughout the
duration of the event. A sample provision securing this right is as fol-
lows: "EMF shall provide Sponsor with documentation of all manage-
ment services and an analysis of all market activities and such other
detail and quantitative reporting as is generally provided in the industry
and as may from time to time be agreed upon by EMF and Sponsor."
III. MANAGEMENT FEES AND EXPENSES
A. Overview
While the services to be provided by the EMF are important to suc-
cessfully drafting a SMA, the provisions relating to the EMF's fees and
expenses in connection with the event are of equal importance. The
EMF wants fair compensation and timely reimbursement for expenses,
while a Sponsor wants to ensure that payments are in accordance with
the nature of the services being provided, as well as the ability to control
the manner and type of expenses for the event. Management fees for a
sports or entertainment event can run from thousands to millions of dol-
lars depending on the nature and length of the event. The city of Sacra-
mento, California paid the Wilkinson Group, a San Francisco-based
EMF, $90,000 over a six-month period plus 15% commission on any cor-
porate sponsorships for local sports events it sold on behalf of the city.' 8
Recently, Cleveland-based IMG received approximately $6.6 million
from New Millennium Experience Co., in connection with IMG's sale of
18. Mark Larson, What's in a Name? Big Bucks, Bus. J. (Sacramento), Sept. 11, 1998, at 3.
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sponsorships for the United Kingdom's Millennium Dance. 9 Disputes
over fees and expenses can also lead to a Sponsor's decision to end its
relationship with an event. Computer giant IBM's decision to no longer
sponsor the Olympics was based in part on the inability of IBM and the
International Olympic Committee ("IOC") to agree on how much local
organizers should pay in connection with IBM's sponsorship of the
event.2 o
B. EMFs Considerations
An EMF is obviously concerned with how and when it will be paid.
In setting forth the management fees the Sponsor must pay in connec-
tion with the EMT's management of an event, the EMF will typically
attempt to secure in advance as much of its fee as possible and provide
for timely reimbursement of, or an advance on, its expenses. The start-
up time, planning and implementation that go into the successful man-
agement of an event may cause the EMF to incur a great deal of cost and
expense prior to the start of an event. By securing a large portion of the
management fee upon the execution of the SMA, the EMF is better able
to withstand this initial impact of time and money. The SMA should
spell out exactly how and when the management fee is earned, whether
it is on an event-by-event basis, hourly basis, or for achieving certain
results or milestones. With this in mind, the EMF should secure an ac-
knowledgment from the Sponsor that the Sponsor realizes a great deal
of the management services are provided before the first event, and that
all, or a certain portion, of the management fee is non-refundable and in
no event will it be reduced. A sample provision of this acknowledgment
is as follows: "Based upon the nature of the event, including, but not
limited to, EMF's investment in front-end development, creative and
planning work and the allocation of EMT's resources for the entire pro-
ject, 50% of EMF's management fee is non-refundable notwithstanding
the number of events completed."
The EMF must also be cognizant of the occurrence of additional
events or the Sponsor's substitution of new events for the events that the
EMT agreed to manage and implement. In order to maintain flexibility
and continue to provide services, the EMF should negotiate a provision
that allows it to adjust its management fee in the event of additional or
19. Working with Sales Agents: A Guide for Agencies and Properties, IEG SPONSORSHIP
REP. (IEG, Inc., Chi., Il.), Jan. 11, 1999, at 4.
20. Big Blue's Olympic Burnout, SPORTS Bus. DAmY (Street & Smith's Sports Group,
South Norwalk, Conn.), Aug. 7, 1998, at 1.
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substituted events. An EMF must also protect itself from a situation in
which it allocates a great deal of time and money and the Sponsor ab-
ruptly cancels the event. Payment of the majority of the fee up-front can
reduce the risk of this occurring and the EMF being impacted negatively.
EMFs should also be concerned with the expenses the EMIF will in-
cur in connection with providing management services. The parties
should agree to a budget and allow for an adjustment from time to time,
by written agreement, between the Sponsor and the EMF. The EMF
should negotiate a provision which allows it to reallocate budgeted items
that do not alter the total budgeted amount. In addition, as costs and
expenses with the management and implementation of an event can be
quite high, the EMF should negotiate the reimbursement of its expenses
within a timely period or require the Sponsor to advance funds for cer-
tain expenses or pay vendors directly. Finally, an EMF may also attempt
to negotiate a provision which allows the EMF to mark-up certain items
such as banners, event announcements and event merchandise which re-
quire the EMF's time to source and develop.
C. Sponsor's Considerations
A Sponsor has a great deal to consider as well with respect to the
management fees and expenses section of the SMA. As previously dis-
cussed, it is the Sponsor who is funding the event and expending great
amounts of time and money. It is important for the Sponsor to require
the EMF to commit to a budget and receive an acknowledgment from
the EMF that the budget agreed to by the parties is a reasonable projec-
tion of what the EMF expects it will cost to successfully manage and
implement the event. From the Sponsor's perspective, it is more appeal-
ing to pay the EMF its fees after the event has occurred, or for a sports
or entertainment event which consists of multiple events, on a per event
basis. In addition, the Sponsor should negotiate a provision allowing it
to substitute different types of events, and/or add additional events, at
no additional cost. With respect to the budget and expenses, the Spon-
sor should include provisions which require the EMF to strictly adhere
to the budget and obtain the Sponsor's prior approval for budgeted
items in excess of a nominal amount. Also, the Sponsor should also re-
quire the EMF to submit invoices of all expenses that will be reim-
bursed, paying only actual costs for the production of materials. Finally,
the Sponsor should secure the right to audit the books and records of the
EMF for an extended period after the conclusion of the event. A sample
audit provision is as follows: "Upon reasonable prior notice, Sponsor
shall have the right during the term of this Agreement and for six
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months thereafter to inspect and review the books and records of EMF
relating to this Agreement."
IV. TERM, CANCELLATION, AND EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS
A. Overview
As discussed above, both the Sponsor and EMF have a great deal at
stake in connection with a Sponsor's sponsorship of a sports or en-
tertainment event. As such, the duration of the SMA, the ability to can-
cel an event and the right to ensure that an EMF's services are exclusive
to a particular Sponsor are of particular importance to both a Sponsor
and an EMF. Term and cancellation provisions of the SMA set forth the
nature of the Sponsor's and EMF's ability to ensure a commitment to
the event and allow flexibility to cancel the event upon a realization that
it will not be successful. The term provision of the SMA sets forth the
length of time the Sponsor and EMF expect to conduct business with
each other. The term of the SMA could be as short as a few weeks or as
long as several years. Conversely, cancellation provisions allow a Spon-
sor or an EMF to terminate the arrangement between the Sponsor and/
or the EMF. Cancellation provisions may be "at-will" and require no
prior notice or may be lengthy and require certain conditions be met.
Exclusivity provisions set forth the extent of the EMF's performance of
services for other Sponsors and/or the Sponsor's right to retain other
EMFs to provide services to the Sponsor. Exclusivity rights are desira-
ble to prevent a quality EMF from performing the same service or type
of event for a competitor of a Sponsor. Conversely, an EMF would ben-
efit tremendously if it retained the right to be the exclusive provider of
services for a Sponsor. Bank One Louisiana's sponsorship of Louisiana
State University ("LSU") athletes prohibits LSU from allowing other
financial institutions to use LSU sports' logos to market products. 21 Ad-
ditionally, it was reported in 1998 that IBM, a previous sponsor of the
Olympic Games, based its decision to terminate its long-standing rela-
tionship with the Olympics in part on the IOC's decision to seek sepa-
rate sponsorship deals for handling the Olympics' Internet service and
web sites.22
21. Peter Shinkle, Banking on the Tigers, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Aug. 25, 1998, at
1C.
22. Big Blue's Olympic Burnout, supra note 20, at 1.
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B. EMF's Considerations
In light of today's competitive marketplace among EMFs, it is most
likely in the EMF's best interest to secure a long-term arrangement with
a Sponsor. A long-term arrangement allows an EMF the security of
steady workflow as its business continues to grow. As a strategy to con-
tractually require or encourage a Sponsor to enter into a long-term rela-
tionship, the EMF should secure a provision in the SMA which states
that if the event is extended beyond its anticipated completion date, or a
similar agreement is entered into by the Sponsor to sponsor the event or
a similar event beyond the completion date, then the SMA will be ex-
tended for each additional extension of the agreement on the same
terms and conditions. In connection with this extension, the EMF
should secure an acknowledgement that the parties will negotiate the
EMF's management fee and expenses in good faith, consistent with in-
dustry standards, and that such fees and expenses may not be decreased.
The EMF should also be cognizant of securing rights to provide ser-
vices for future events of the Sponsor. The EMF should secure a right of
first refusal from the Sponsor which would allow the EMF to manage
additional events sponsored by the Sponsor that are similar to the events
for which the EMF has already been retained. The following is a sample
right of first refusal provision:
In the event that the Sponsor elects to conduct or sponsor an
event similar to or the same as the event being sponsored pursu-
ant to this Agreement (the "Additional Event"), and Sponsor re-
ceives an offer (the "Offer") from a third party event
management firm (the "Competitive EMF") to manage and im-
plement the sponsorship of the Additional Event, Sponsor shall
provide the EMF a copy of the Offer received by the Competitive
EMF. The EMF shall have the right, but not the obligation, to
provide the Sponsor written notice of its intent to match the Offer
for the management of the Additional Event, upon terms no less
favorable than the Offer. If the EMF has rejected the Offer, the
Sponsor may retain the Competitive EMF to manage the Addi-
tional Event. Sponsor shall give EMF written notice of its inten-
tion to sponsor an Additional Event.
The EMF should also negotiate an alternative provision which states that
if the Sponsor decides to sponsor additional events the parties will nego-
tiate in good faith to provide that the EMF be permitted to bid on the
management and implementation of such event.
While an EMEF is most likely interested in securing a long-term ar-
rangement with a Sponsor, there are certain instances in which an EMF
should secure the right to cancel its participation in the event. The most
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obvious circumstance under which the EMF should secure a cancellation
right is when the Sponsor fails to pay the EMF its fees and expenses
under the SMA. A second scenario for which the EMF should negotiate
a cancellation right is when the Sponsor breaches a material term of the
SMA. Finally, an EMF should protect itself by securing a cancellation
right in a situation where the Sponsor's image and/or philosophy is no
longer consistent or compatible with the EMF. An example of this oc-
currence is when the Sponsor is found to have violated the law and an
EMF no longer wants to be associated with the Sponsor. A cancellation
right under this example would permit the EMF to discontinue its rela-
tionship with the Sponsor.
After securing a term that the EMF is comfortable with, and provid-
ing the necessary cancellation provisions for its protection, the EMF
should also negotiate a provision indicating that it is the exclusive man-
ager of the Sponsor's event. Consistent with the exclusivity provision,
the EMF should secure the right to provide services for other Sponsors
of other events. A sample exclusivity provision is as follows: "EMF shall
be Sponsor's exclusive sponsorship manager of the Event."
C. Sponsor's Considerations
While the EMF has a great deal at stake in negotiating acceptable
provisions with regarding the term, cancellation and exclusivity provi-
sions of the SMA, these provisions are even more important for the
Sponsor to consider. With its name and a great deal of time and money
invested in a particular event, the Sponsor should ensure that it is in
control of the duration of its involvement with a particular sports or en-
tertainment event. With this in mind, it is unlikely that a Sponsor will be
willing to enter into a multi-year sponsorship management agreement
for a particular event. Rather, the Sponsor is more likely to negotiate
the right to terminate the SMA at any time, in its sole discretion, if the
Sponsor does not feel that the event is creating the publicity and eco-
nomic return that the Sponsor deems necessary to continue the event.
A Sponsor will typically secure a termination provision that allows it
to terminate the SMA and retain another EMF if the Sponsor is not
satisfied with the current EMF services being provided. This is typically
referred to as a "for cause" termination right. Examples of "for cause"
include an EMF's failure to follow a Sponsor's guidelines and rules for
implementing the event, failure to deliver adequate analysis, and poor
promotion of an event. Another potential "for cause" situation of con-
cern to a Sponsor when negotiating the cancellation rights is the ability
to cancel the event, and terminate the EMF, if the EMF is found to have
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violated any laws including, without limitation, any laws which deal with
child labor, immigration and/or the use of illegal aliens. Conversely, the
EMF will most likely try to negotiate a provision which would allow it to
cure any failure or breach of a "for cause" provision. A sample cancella-
tion provision is as follows:
Sponsor shall have the right to terminate this Agreement upon
thirty days prior written notice if EMF has failed to perform its
obligations under this Agreement in accordance with customary
industry standards, provided any performance failures identified
by Sponsor in such notice have not been cured within said thirty
days.
As mentioned earlier, the Sponsor will also desire the ability to can-
cel the event and terminate the SMA if the event is no longer profitable,
desirable or no longer fits into the Sponsor's marketing plan. Examples
of this include situations in which the athletes and/or artists involved in
the event committed an act that a Sponsor considered detrimental to the
Sponsor and/or was regarded as an act of bad moral character damaging
to the name and reputation of the Sponsor. Pepsi encountered this situ-
ation after signing a $70 million deal with Michael Jackson who was ac-
cused of improper behavior.13
Finally, when retaining an EMF, a Sponsor should try to negotiate a
provision which restricts the EMF's ability to provide the same types of
services to a company which is competitive with, or in the same industry
as, the Sponsor. An exclusivity provision such as this allows the Sponsor
to prevent the EMF from creating programs similar to the Sponsor's
event for a competitor of the Sponsor and diluting the Sponsor's good-
will and investment in a particular event. Additionally, most Sponsors
would not want to label an EMF as its exclusive manager of a particular
type of event as the sponsor may require multiple EMFs to provide the
services necessary to ensure the success of that particular event.
V. INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Overview
Another important aspect of the SMA deals with the intellectual
property rights that are exchanged in connection with the sponsorship of
a sports or entertainment event. Bank One Louisiana recently agreed to
a sponsorship deal with LSU that will pay the LSU Athletic Department
23. Emily Bell, Media Guardian: Nike Don't Put the Boot In, GUARDIAN (London), Jan.
30, 1995, at T17.
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$3.65 million over five years.24 Bank One officials indicate that they will
spend more than $5 million to use LSU logos and carry out a variety of
promotional activities.25 As evident by the time and expense invested in
the sponsorship of a particular event, in addition to the expense associ-
ated with securing trademark protection, both the Sponsor and the EMF
have a great deal at stake in protecting their respective intellectual prop-
erty rights in connection with the sponsorship of sports and entertain-
ment events.
B. EMF's Considerations
One of the most important aspects of the EMF's ability to success-
fully promote, coordinate and implement the event on behalf of the
Sponsor is the use of the Sponsor's, athlete's and/or artist's intellectual
property rights in connection with the event. With this in mind, the
EMF should negotiate an acknowledgement from the Sponsor that the
EMF is granted the right to use all of the Sponsor's intellectual property
rights, including trademarks, trade names, trade dress and copyrights in
its promotion and management of the event. A sample provision secur-
ing this right is as follows: "Sponsor grants to EMF a non-exclusive li-
cense to use any trademark or other intellectual property rights of
Sponsor in connection with EMEF's providing the management services
set forth herein." Additionally, the EMF should secure the right to use
the Sponsor's intellectual property rights in the promotion of its own
business.
Also of importance is the ability of the EMF to use the name and
likeness of athletes and/or artists involved in the particular event in or-
der to effectively ensure the event's success. As such, the EMF should
also negotiate a representation and acknowledgement from the Sponsor
that the Sponsor has the right to use the athlete's and/or artist's intellec-
tual property rights in connection with the EMEF's management and pro-
motion of the event. The EMEF should also require that the Sponsor
provide evidence of those rights and indemnify the EMF for any failure
of the Sponsor to obtain such rights. As an example, an EMF cannot
effectively promote the XYZ Company's sponsorship of the John Doe
Music Tour if the EMF does not know that it has the right to use both
XYZ's and John Doe's trademarks, tradenames and images in promot-
ing the event. The SMA should identify the circumstances under which
an EMIF may use the Sponsor's, athlete's and/or artist's intellectual prop-
24. Shinkle, supra note 21, at 1C.
25. Id.
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erty rights. Alternatively, the Sponsor may be retaining the EMF to se-
cure such rights of an athlete or an artist on behalf of the Sponsor for a
particular event. Finally, the EMF should also ensure that its own intel-
lectual property rights are protected pursuant to the SMA by providing
that its own intellectual property rights will remain the sole and exclu-
sive property of the EMF.
C. Sponsor's Considerations
While it is important for the EMF to have the ability to use the intel-
lectual property rights of the Sponsor, athletes and/or artists, in its im-
plementation and management of an event, a Sponsor has even more at
stake in negotiating this section of the SMA. Companies such as Ailtel,
McDonald's and Quaker Oats have invested a great deal of time and
money in developing and protecting their intellectual property rights.2 6
With this in mind, while the Sponsor may grant the EMF a non-exclusive
license to use such intellectual property, it is essential that the Sponsor
secure an acknowledgment from the EMF that such intellectual property
will remain the sole and exclusive property of the Sponsor and/or the
artists and athletes. In addition, the Sponsor should negotiate provisions
which restrict the parameters in which the EMF can use such intellectual
property, such as retaining the right to approve certain usage of trade-
marks and tradenames. To further protect its intellectual property
rights, the Sponsor should also require in the SMA that an EMF will
promptly notify the Sponsor of any infringement of the Sponsor's intel-
lectual property rights, and retain the right to prosecute and protect its
intellectual property rights in case of infringement.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A. Overview
There are a number of miscellaneous provisions which should be in-
cluded in the SMA, including provisions dealing with indemnification,
insurance and confidentiality. These provisions are necessary for the
protection of both the EMF and the Sponsor and should be carefully
drafted and negotiated.
B. Indemnification and Insurance Provisions
Both the EMF and the Sponsor have a great deal at stake in connec-
tion with the management and sponsorship of a sports or entertainment
26. 1999 Sponsorship Spending: $7.6 Billion, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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event. With this in mind, both the Sponsor and the EMF should negoti-
ate a provision in the SMA which provides that one party will indemnify
and hold the other party harmless from certain events. An indemnifica-
tion provision allows a Sponsor or an EMF that suffers a loss to look to
the other party to reimburse or protect such party from that loss. Typical
events from which a Sponsor or EMF would negotiate indemnification
include a breach of the terms of the SMA by the other party, negligent
or intentional acts of a party and the violation by a party of a third
party's intellectual property rights. A sample indemnification provision
is as follows:
Sponsor will indemnify and hold harmless EMF and its share-
holders, affiliates, officers, directors and employees from and
against all claims, expenses, suits and judgments arising from or
connected with (i) any alleged or actual breach by Sponsor of any
provision of this Agreement, (ii) any negligent or intentional acts
of Sponsor in connection with the Event or (iii) any violation of
any intellectual property rights of any third parties caused by the
use of Sponsor's trademarks.
An EMF should negotiate an exception to its indemnification obliga-
tions in the event a breach of the SMA by an EMF is a result of the
EMF's acting pursuant to a Sponsor's directive.
Related to an EMF's and Sponsor's indemnification obligations, both
the EMF and Sponsor should also require the other party to provide a
certificate of insurance evidencing such party's insurance coverage in an
amount acceptable to both parties. Insurance provisions typically in-
clude requirements of commercial general liability insurance and should
include coverage for death, bodily injury and property damage. The par-
ties may also negotiate a provision that they will be named additional
insureds on the other party's insurance policy in addition to securing the
right of being notified of any change or cancellation of the other party's
insurance coverage.
C. Confidentiality
In connection with a Sponsor's retention of an EMF to manage and
coordinate a sports or entertainment event, both parties are likely to
provide the other party access to and disclosure of proprietary informa-
tion. This information could include items such as marketing plans, fi-
nancial information, client lists and sales information. It is in both the
EMF's and Sponsor's best interests to include a provision in the SMA
which provides that each party will keep the other party's proprietary
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information confidential and provide for the return of such information
to the other party at the end of the event.
D. Press Releases
As discussed above, while it is important for both an EMF and a
Sponsor to protect its respective proprietary information, an EMF may
be desirous of making announcements to the public of its affiliation with
a Sponsor and/or athlete or artist. This may prove useful to the EMF in
marketing its services to other Sponsors. The SMA should contain a
provision which provides for a joint press release announcing and
describing the event. Joint participation in the press release allows the
Sponsor some control over the details of the event which are described,
while permitting the EMEF to promote its own business in the process.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the sponsorship of sports and entertainment events continues to
grow in this century, both Sponsors and EMFs have a great deal at stake
in this multi-billion dollar industry. With so many dollars at stake, it is
important for both the Sponsor and EMF to clearly set forth their re-
spective rights and responsibilities in connection with an EMF's manage-
ment and coordination of an event. A well-drafted SMA is essential to a
successful Sponsor/EMF arrangement and a successful event. The con-
siderations set forth in this article should provide insight into some of the
more important provisions that should be considered in drafting a SMA
for corporate sponsorships of sports and entertainment events.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Constant technological development has introduced another player
in sports broadcasting: virtual advertising, a form of digital technology
that allows advertisers to insert computer-generated brand names, logos
or animated images into previously recorded television programs or
movies. In sporting events, the advertisements can even be inserted live
as the game is played, as seen in Superbowl XXXIV on January 31,
2000.1 This technology has been used since 1995, but has not experienced
a major breakthrough yet. Several Major League Baseball ("MLB")
teams have made use of virtual advertisements along the wall behind
home plate.' Beginning this 2000 season, the technology will be used in a
minimum of twenty Sunday Night baseball games.3 Some teams in the
National Basketball Association ("NBA") display virtual advertisements
on their billboards on the sideline, while many collegiate conferences
have already made use of virtual advertising in their regular season and
tournament broadcasts.4 The National Football League ("NFL"), how-
ever, has yet to approve the use of virtual advertisements during regular
season games.' The Formula One, with some of the world's largest sport-
1. The New Jersey based company Princeton Video Image, Inc., at http://
www.princetonvideoimage.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2000), globally and regionally inserted
advertisements for the past three Super Bowls, NFL pre-season and NFL Europe games,
MLB games, professional soccer matches, motor sports and thoroughbred horse races.
2. For example, the games of three MLB teams, the San Francisco Giants, Philadelphia
Phillies and San Diego Padres, included virtual advertisements last season. See Stuart Elliott,
Real or Virtual? You Call It, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at C1.
3. The agreement with ESPN and Princeton Video Image, Inc., covers the use of virtual
advertising in more nationally televised baseball games than in any other previous season and
will begin with the first week of the baseball season. Press Release (Feb. 22, 2000), at http:/l
%vwv.corporate-ir.net/ireye/irsite.zhtml?ticker=PVII&script=410&layout=6&item id=75829
(last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
4. These conferences are the Mid Atlantic Athletic Conference, Atlantic 10, Big South,
Midwestern Collegiate, and others. Pete Dougherty, Virtual Reality Hits MAAC Telecasts,
TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Mar. 5, 2000, at E6.
5. The NFL's exercised restraint is probably based on the lack of control over the virtual
images on the television screen because the advertisements could be eclipsed or overshad-
owed by virtual signs. Alan Snel, These are Ads for All Stadiums; Only Home Viewers See
'Virtual' Logos, SUN-SEN'nmL (Fort Lauderdale), Dec. 31, 1998, at 1D. However, the NFL
approved its use in high school and college broadcasts, as well as pre- or postseason profes-
sional games.
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ing events, has successfully employed the technology in the third season
for the international broadcast of races in countries where tobacco ad-
vertising is banned.6 With the establishment of European and World soc-
cer leagues, virtual advertisements open the advertising market for
national or even regional advertisers and do not limit the advertising
space to worldwide operating companies. However, in international soc-
cer it was not until recently that the Federation Internationale de Foot-
ball Association7 ("FIFA") approved regulations that allow the use of
virtual advertisements on any flat area in the stadium at any time, except
on the playing field during the play itself.8 Whereas in Latin America,
where virtual advertising - even on the playing field - experiences a
widespread acceptance for soccer telecasts, the several European soccer
leagues are still struggling to adopt a uniform standard. With the rising
popularity of the NFL in Europe, not to mention "NFL Europe," a simi-
lar development can be expected with regard to internationally broad-
casted football games, which is not limited to the Superbowl.
Although virtual advertising allows signs, billboards, and other types
of in-stadium and on-field advertisements to be inserted into the tele-
vised picture in virtually any empty space, the demand has been medio-
cre, mainly because of the high costs of insertion in the early days of the
technology. Another reason for the reserved acceptance is the lack of
judicial review. So far, broadcast stations have exercised a rule of self-
restriction about use and abuse of virtual advertising, absent an agree-
ment.9 In fact, most professional marketing contracts are silent on rules
on alteration by virtual advertising. There exists no explicit federal regu-
lation with regard to virtual advertising. Despite the liberal advertising
market in the United States, there are limits by virtue of common law.
6. Such as the races in EU member states England, France, Germany, and Belgium, but
not in Monte Carlo. Johnny Watterson, Sport and Tobacco Drifting Apart, IRISH TIMs, May
24, 1997, at 8.
7. This is the governing body for world league soccer.
8. On January 1, 2000, FIFA's "Regulations for the Use of Virtual Advertising" became
effective, available at http://hvwv.fifa2.com/fifa/handbook/Va/downloadsNirtualRegs e.txt
(last visited Mar. 15, 2000). The issue of these regulations is intended to ensure that virtual
advertising is applied reasonably and the integrity of football matches maintained. See also,
Reuters, Fifa Yellow-Cards Virtual Ads, WIRED NEws, Dec. 22, 1999, available at http:/wwv.
wvired.com/news/print/0,1294,33232,00.htnil (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
9. Virtual placement has to be done "tastefully," Virtual Ads, Real Problems, ADVERTIS-
ING AGE, May 24, 1999, at 30; "responsibly," Bruce Horovitz, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 1996, at
1B; "with taste and discretion," Patrick Allossery, Virtual Ads Make Their Global Debut:
Technology Draws Both Supporters and Detractors, FIN. PosT (Nat. Post), Oct. 8, 1999 at C3;
and "in a subtle way," Dougherty, supra note 4, at E6.
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First, conflicts arise when "real" advertisements are substituted by
virtual advertisements without the consent of the owner of the physical
location. This practice generates new forms of conflicts among adjacent
parties, such as sponsors, different advertisers, team owners, broadcast
stations, and the stadium owners.10 The question often boils down to
who owns the rights to place and sell those advertisements." Further-
more, any altering of the appearance of the broadcasted event, with re-
gard to the advertising, raises copyright issues under the existing
doctrine of commercial substitution or may even violate Sections 111,
119, and 122 of the Copyright Act, as amended by the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999.12 Finally, such behavior could consti-
tute Unfair Competition under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham
Act.' 3 Virtual advertising and product placement add a new level of
commercialism to television broadcasts by blurring the line between ad-
vertising and programming, ultimately exposing the consumer to an
ever-increasing stream of commercials. Whereas in Europe, a heated le-
gal discussion has evolved on these issues, the American marketplace,
with its liberal advertising policy, and the judiciary has not taken it into
significant consideration. However, in the long run these problems will
have to be faced.
The purpose of this analysis is to address these potential issues and
present solutions that incorporate the international - especially Euro-
pean - standards for the use of virtual advertising.
II. FEATURES OF VIRTUAL ADVERTISING
Virtual advertising is the use of high-power computers to place still
or video images into live video broadcasts in real time so that they look
10. This form of advertising strategy is referred to as "ambush-ad," see infra Part V.D.;
e.g. when CBS covered up a Times Square Advertisement on New Years Eve's broadcast with
a CBS logo. Ned Potter, Arbitrary Digital Advertising (Jan. 31, 2000), available at http://
more.abcnews.go.com/onair/closerlook/wntO00131_cldigitaladsfeature.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2000); Paul Vercammen, Digital Developments: Networks Changing Images on Your
TV, available at http://vww.cnn.com/2000/SHOWBIZITV/01/ 25/digital.inserts/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2000); Alex Kuczynski, On CBS News, Some of What You See Isn't There, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at Al. In the sports context, this may not always be a problem, because
the teams control the sale of advertising space in the stadium and in the broadcast to both
kinds of advertisers. However, problems do arise, when different entities are involved.
11. Dean Bonham, 'Virtual Technology' Takes the Field- With an Ad-Itude, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Feb. 21, 1999, at Cl.
12. The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, §1948, 106th Cong. (1999), available at
http:lfrwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bingetdo.cgi?dbname=l6_cong-bills&docid = f:sl948is.
txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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as if they are part of the original scene. It works by tampering with the
digital broadcast signal before it reaches our homes. In more technical
terms, virtual advertising refers to the computer manipulation of authen-
tic images, either live or delayed, and the substitution of various ele-
ments of those images with the purpose of implementing advertising
messages into the signal transmitted by television or by similar current
or future technologies (on-line, desktop publishing, single frame,
DVD.).14 The technology is based on a patented adaptive occlusion pro-
cess, a sophisticated version of something similar to the blue-screen tech-
nology used in broadcast weather forecast maps. 5 Before the broadcast,
the cameras are set up at certain angles, so as to give the best impres-
sions of the game while allowing in-stadium advertisements to be ex-
posed to the viewer as well. In the virtual advertising system, a computer
instantly superimposes the advertisement when it recognizes a previ-
ously designated spot and adjusts it accordingly as the camera follows
the action. This technology allows advertisers to cover over existing ad-
vertising signage in a stadium and can even feature two- or three-dimen-
sional animations.' 6 Virtual advertising companies can disguise the video
advertisements as standing billboards, banners blowing in the wind, or
logos painted directly on the playing field. The advertisements also can
be combined with special effects, such as the pitch speed indicator and
game statistics. Players "occlude" the ad or logo so that they appear to
move in front of it. The technology does not only occur in sports tele-
casts, but also in entertainment programs and even movies.' 7
Television exposure is the advertisers' most important benefit of any
small advertisement, for which they sometimes pay millions of dollars
per season. The advantages of virtual advertising are evident.'" This
technology enhances the possibilities available to advertisers and raises
television advertising to a new level. It is possible to effectively reach
consumers through unique marketing strategies by adjusting virtual ad-
14. FIFA Regulations for the Use of Virtual Advertising § 2a, available at http:ll
wxvw.fifa2.com/fifa/handbook/Va/downloads/VirtualRegse.txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
15. It originated in various military forces around the world to mark targets on computer-
ized maps. Peter Goddard, The New Ad Fad, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 12, 2000, at 1.
16. Princeton Video Image, Inc., at http://www.princetonvideoimage.comlservice/in-
dex.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
17. CBS uses virtual advertising in entertainment programs, such as "CBS Evening
News," "48 Hours," and "The Early Show." Don Aucoin, TV & Radio; CBS Faulted for
Digital Inserts, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2000, at D12.
18. Theresa E. McEvilly, Virtual Advertising in Sports Venues and the Federal Lanham Act
§ 43 (a): Revolutionary Technology Creates Controversial Advertising Medium, 8 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 603, 606 (1998).
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vertisements to respective geographic markets, such as foreign markets.
Furthermore, adjusting the content of a televised event, with existing
bans on television advertising for alcohol and tobacco, renders the use of
advertisements more efficient for international broadcasts.' 9 The system
also allows previously unmarketed portions of the television screen to be
sold to advertisers who do not have to wait for breaks in the action to get
their image before the viewers. Virtual advertising contains elements of
individualized advertising in cyberspace, where the banner advertise-
ments are selected in accordance with information contained in a
"cookie" of the consumer's computer or to the search words that are
entered into a search engine as part of the content mix.2' In both scena-
rios, the user is subject to individualized commercials, which offer the
advertiser a more efficient means of reaching his target consumer mar-
ket. At the same time, it is a tool against "channel zapping," because the
viewer is exposed to advertisements during the sports coverage itself.
The advertiser is rewarded with a guaranteed audience, while the broad-
caster has a wonderful opportunity to increase revenues - provided the
advertiser and broadcaster first gain the permission of the program's
rights holder.2' The element of product placement is rendered more val-
uable. Some television executives even contend that the technology is a
means of reducing the amount of commercial breaks.
Virtual advertising may even make live attendance more attractive to
sport fans because the technology allows the playing field and surround-
ing areas to be cleared of advertisements while television viewers at
home are exposed to commercials. At the same time, however, team
owners lose control over their broadcasts. As much as they used to be
able to control the physical access of television teams to the stadium, the
outcome of the television transmission, the placement of advertising, and
their allocation during the broadcast, television transmissions are now
subject to digital alteration at any point in the chain of transmissions
throughout the country and even internationally. As much as the teams
19. Virtual advertisements enable the worldwide Formula One broadcasts, which heavily
depend on tobacco advertising, to continue and guarantee their future financial survival, even
after several countries enacted a ban on tobacco advertising. This affects, for example, all
races within the European Union. Watterson, supra note 6, at 8; Jimmy Bums, Virtual Adverts
Hit Harsh Reality, FiN. TiNEs, Apr. 25, 1997, at 14.
20. Dennis P. Wilkinson, Virtual Ads Make Sense, ADVERTISING AGE, June 14, 1999, at
36.
21. In Canada, broadcasters are restricted to 12 minutes of commercials every hour. Be-
cause the characterization of virtual advertising is unclear, regulators have yet to rule on vir-
tual advertising so it is not counted as part of that allotment. Chris Zelkovich, Virtual
Advertising, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 1, 1999, at 1.
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and leagues seek to control misuse by contractual terms in their license
and marketing agreements, the threat of alterations of the original
broadcasts remains, especially for secondary transmissions under the
compulsory license scheme.2' On the downside, there is also a potential
for a distracting application of the medium by inserting large animated
images or offensive product placement, for example, products flying
around the players during the action.-3
The costs of virtual advertisements are somewhat equivalent or rela-
tive to conventional advertising. For instance, in baseball a half-inning of
static virtual advertising is typically valued as equivalent to one thirty-
second spot in the same broadcast.24 However, the production costs of
the virtual advertisement have to be added. Because the advantages of
virtual advertising in light of the still high costs play out especially for
trans-border sports broadcasting, the necessity for clear legal standards
becomes crucial.
III. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT (SECTIONS 501(A), 106-122
OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT)
Section 501(a) of the Copyright Act of 19762 provides that the copy-
right owner can recover damages from anyone who infringes on one of
the exclusive rights. Copyright infringement must be considered if the
unauthorized deletion or substitution of existing advertisements by in-
serting virtual advertisements infringes the copyright owners' exclusive
rights provided under sections 106-122 of the Copyright Act. Since the
subject matter is television broadcasting, copyright infringement should
be examined if the special provisions in sections 501(c)-(e), 111(c),
119(a)(5), and 122 of the Copyright Act on secondary transmissions are
applicable.
A. Sport Broadcasting and "Work of Authorship" (Section 102(a) of
the Copyright Act)
The Copyright Act protects only "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression,"26 including "motion pictures and
22. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 122 (1999).
23. Jim Davies, Connected: Advertising Conjuring Ads Out of Thin Air Using Pinpoint
Technology Based on Military Tracking, Virtual Advertising Can Impose Images Tailored to
Particular Countries, Tweaking the Display to Complement the Market, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 11, 1999, at 6.
24. In Superbowl XXXIV a 30 second commercial cost $ 1.6 million.
25. Copyright Act § 501, 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1999).
26. Copyright Act § 102(a).
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other audiovisual works."'27 With regard to virtual advertising in sports
broadcasting, the first hurdle is to determine the rights in the broadcast
that could be subject to litigation and if the placement of virtual and
non-virtual advertisements in itself is part of the original expression of
the work of authorship. If not, any substitution, insertion or deletion
cannot constitute a violation of the rights provided in section 106 of the
Copyright Act.
First, the telecasts of a sporting event have to meet the requirement
of an "original work[s] of authorship."28 The requirement of originality
actually subsumes two separate conditions, that is, the work must possess
an independent origin and a minimal amount of creativity.2 9 Section
102(a) of the Copyright Act lists eight categories of "works of author-
ship" covered by the act, including such categories as "literary works,"
"musical works," and "dramatic works."3 The list does not include ath-
letic events and, although the list is concededly non-exclusive, such
events are neither similar nor analogous to any of the listed categories.3 '
Consequently, the underlying games of a sports telecast do not fall
within the subject matter of federal copyright protection because they do
not constitute "original works of authorship. ' 32 If it were, any team that
performs a unique combination or play could claim a copyright in it and
enjoin other teams from competing with the same plays or combinations;
after all, it would be impractical to include all participants - players,
fans, the league, stadium workers, etc. - as copyright holders.33
As for the telecasts' originality, courts have long recognized that
photographing a person or filming an event involves creative labor.3 4
But sporting events are not authored in any common sense of the word.
They do not rely on an underlying script;3 5 moreover, the thrill of a
sporting event is just the fact that there is no underlying predetermined
27. Copyright Act § 102(a)(6).
28. Copyright Act § 102(a).
29. See, e.g., Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F2d 486,490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
857 (1976); Withol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956); see also, MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON Copy rHT § 2.01 (1999).
30. Copyright Act § 102(a).
31. National Basketball Assoc. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997).
32. Id.
33. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 2.09[F].
34. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 805 F.2d 663, 668
(7th Cir. 1986); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); Time Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F.Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
35. Anne M. Wall, Sports Marketing and the Law: Protecting Proprietary Interests in
Sports Entertainment Events, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 77, 145 (1996).
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sequence of events.36 Even so, the elements of surprise, improvisation,
and wholly unanticipated occurrences create the attractiveness of a
sporting event. However, the creative element of the original work of
authorship that underlies a sporting event rests in unique selection of
sequences and the like. The many decisions that must be made during
the broadcast of a baseball game concerning camera angles, types of
shots, the use of instant replays and split screens, and shot selection simi-
larly supply the creativity required for the copyrightability of the tele-
casts. When a football game is being covered by four television cameras,
with a director guiding the activities of the cameramen and choosing
which of their electronic images are sent out to the public and in what
order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are
doing constitutes "authorship."37 These decisions by the director there-
fore create a work of authorship and hence a property right in the broad-
cast of the games, which reaches full copyright status at the moment of
transmission and simultaneous recording.38
Furthermore, the telecasts are audiovisual works, which under sec-
tion 102(a)(6) of the Copyright Act come within the subject matter of
copyright.39 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines an "audiovisual
work" as a work that consists "of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with ac-
companying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the [work is] embodied. °40 For
purposes of section 101, the statutory term "series" need not be inter-
preted to mean a rigid, predetermined sequence. 41 This is precisely what
a television broadcast of a sporting event consists of, in spite of its lack
of predetermination. The telecasts are, therefore, copyrightable works.
However, the copyright protection only extends to those components
of a work that are original to the author.42 Therefore, it does not extend
to the basic ideas or facts of the game, such as statistics and basic data, as
opposed to the described broadcast expression. Only the constituent cre-
36. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846.
37. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976). See also, National Ass'n of Broad. Stations v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 378 n.18 (D.C. 1982); Motorola, 105 F.3d at 847.
38. David E. Shipley, Three Strikes and They're Out at the Old Ball Game: Preemption of
Performers' Rights of Publicity Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 369, 371,390
(1988); The elements of this "fixation" in the sport broadcasting context are discussed infra.
39. Copyright Act § 102(a)(6).
40. Copyright Act § 101.
41. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 1982).
42. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Servs., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); Motorola,105 F.3d at 846.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
ative elements of a work of authorship constitute the original expression
of ideas that is protected by copyright.43 Notwithstanding, in the leading
case, Burrow-Giles Lithograpic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme Court
granted copyright protection to a photograph because it exhibited suffi-
cient originality for the arrangement of the setting, the light and shade
and the selection of the camera, costume.' The protection extends to
the fact that the game and the particular televised selection of the action,
and not the inserted commercials and station breaks, constitute the work
of authorship.45
The question arises as to whether advertisements as part of the
broadcasted event are part of the "original expression of authorship" of
this broadcasting. Generally, the author of the specific advertisement is
the owner of its copyright, not the broadcast station.46 However, the
placement of the advertising and the specific capturing by camera could
be part of the original expression of the broadcast. 47 While the arrange-
ment of facts in an alphabetical order lacks the minimum amount of cre-
ativity or originality, the arrangement of the advertisements in the
background of a television recording requires more artistic elements.48
First, the involved entities have to make decisions about the number,
size and style of advertisements and include respective terms in the mar-
keting contracts. Because the viewer will only accept a certain amount of
tasteful advertisements in a television broadcast before he switches
channels, a producer then has to make a choice about the placement of
such advertising in the broadcast. Nonetheless, especially with the possi-
bility of inserting advertisements subsequently, the contribution of the
43. Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 348; see also, Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512,
513 ; NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 29, § 2.08[B][1] ("a very modest quantum of originality
will suffice").
44. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61 (granting protection for a picture of Oscar Wilde); fol-
lowed by Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (upholding a copyright
in a circus poster); Time, 293 F. Supp. at 142 (for the protection of a home movie film ["the
selection of the kind of camera, the kind of film, the kind of lens, the area in which the picture
were to be taken, the time they were taken, and the spot on which the camera would be
operated {constituted sufficient originality}]"). See also, NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29,
§ 2.08[E][1][2].
45. National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726,732 (8th Cir. 1986).
46. The advertisement in itself is clearly copyrightable. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
29, § 2.08 [E][4].
47. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471,
1477 (l1th Cir. 1991) (finding the creative reportage of events, replete with moving images,
graphics, etc. to be copyrightable).
48. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Assoc. Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801
(D.C.Ga. 1985) (Arguments based on lack of originality failed to defeat validity of copyright
in telephone book infringed by defendant's solicitation of yellow pages advertising).
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original producer's selective interpretation is minimized. The intention
of how and where to place advertising certainly plays an important role.
However, it does not constitute an integral part of a television broadcast.
There is no other reason for the appearance of advertisements other
than the appearance itself, but it is also a contractual obligation for the
creator. Moreover, the intent rather undermines a non-creative element
of advertising and, therefore, weighs against copyrightability. Neverthe-
less, these criteria do not help for copyright analysis, because copyright
is not based on monetary or contractual considerations. A producer has
to make a creative choice about camera angles and the sequence of
images to be seen, even with regard to green walls, on which virtual ad-
vertising could be added later. The Seventh Circuit approached the issue
with respect to teletext by comparing it to subtitles on television: If sub-
titles were part of the performance intended to be seen, they should be
considered "related images" within the meaning of the statutory defini-
tion of an audiovisual work.49
After all, the placement of advertisements and their incorporation
into a television broadcast may not be an ingenuous thing to do, but it is
part of the viewer's overall artistic impression of the broadcast and
therefore should generally be considered copyrightable.
B. The Fixation Element and the Television Broadcast System
(Sections 111, 119, and 122 of the Copyright Act)
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act states that a work of authorship
needs to be fixed in a tangible medium of expression in order to obtain
statutory protection.50 The mere act of thinking or the underlying ideas
are not protected as long as they remain unfixed or intangible.5 1 As for
live broadcasts, such as the football games, the Copyright Act states that
a "work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted,
is 'fixed' if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission," and thereby explicitly includes sports broadcasts once
they are broadcast and simultaneously recorded.52 Under section 101 of
49. WGN, 693 F.2d at 626 ("[I]t is clear that United Video may not use it for that purpose
without WGN's permission, any more than if the publisher of a book leaves the inside covers
blank the book seller (or book wholesaler, to make the analogy more precise) may inscribe
the Lord's Prayer on them in order to broaden the book's appeal.") (citing National Bank of
Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F.Supp. 533, 543-44 (W.D.Tex. 1980)).
50. Copyright Act § 102(a).
51. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 254 (N.Y. 1968).
52. At the urging of the sports leagues, Congress afforded copyright protection to live
sports programming by devising an appropriate definition of "fixation" in Copyright Act
§ 101. "The committee was persuaded that... the content of a live transmission should be
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the Copyright Act, the simultaneous recording of a transmission suffices
for the element of fixation in a tangible medium of expression. 3 To
"transmit" is defined as "to communicate... by any device or process
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which
they are sent."54 This leads us into the complex regulation of primary
and secondary transmissions for television broadcasts, which is set forth
in sections 111, 119, and 122 of the Copyright Act.
Originally, these definitions of copyright in broadcasts were designed
for television stations and networks. After the introduction of cable tele-
vision, the Supreme Court rejected copyright protection for the original
broadcasts under the 1909 Copyright Act against retransmissions by
cable networks, because they did not "perform" within the meaning of
the statute.55 With rising sophistication of cable networks, Congress
eventually amended section 111(c)-(d) of the Copyright Act, which
granted cable networks a compulsory license to retransmit certain
broadcast signals.56 In return, a semiannual fee in the form of statutorily
prescribed royalties is collected and distributed by the Copyright Roy-
alty Tribunal to indemnify copyright owners of the sports broadcasts.57
The compulsory license program now covers retransmissions of distant
regarded as 'fixed' and should be accorded statutory protection if it is being recorded simulta-
neously with its transmission." H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976). "The bill seeks to resolve,
through the definition of 'fixation' in section 101, the status of live broadcasts- sports, news
coverage, live performances of music, etc.- that are reaching the public in unfixed form but
that are simultaneously being recorded." Id. at 52; see also, Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675
F.2d at 378 n.17-18; Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668.
53. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 847.
54. Copyright Act § 101. Specifically, Copyright Act § 111(f) defines a primary transmis-
sion as:
a transmission made to the public by the transmitting facility whose signals are being
received and further transmitted by the secondary transmission service, regardless of
where or when the performance or display was first transmitted" [as opposed to a]
"secondary transmission," [which] is the further transmitting of a primary transmission
simultaneously with the primary transmission, or nonsimultaneously with the primary
transmission if by a "cable system" not located in whole or in part within the boundary
of the ... states.
55. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see also, Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 708 (1984) (a state ban on alcohol advertisement conflicts with the
requirements of a cable operator's obligation to refrain from deleting commercial advertising
under the compulsory license system).
56. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5704; NIMMER
&NIMMER, supra note 29, at § 8.18[B].
57. Copyright Act § 111(d)(2). The first suit over the compulsory license was Eastern
Microwave v. Doubleday Sports, 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982); see also, PAUL C. WEILER &
GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND TH LAW 413 (2d ed. 1998).
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network programming for cable television services. After the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that a satellite carrier is like a cable system within the
meaning of section 111 of the Copyright Act and therefore subject to a
compulsory license for the retransmission of distant signals55 Congress
added section 119 of the Copyright Act for satellite carriers59. Addition-
ally, the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 extended the
compulsory license explicitly for satellite carriers to include retransmis-
sions of local broadcasts to rural areas in section 122 of the Copyright
Act.6" Nonetheless, the compulsory license in these cases applies only to
those carriers who exercise no "control over the selection of the primary
transmission," and "whose activities with respect to the secondary trans-
mission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other communica-
tions channels for the use of others," turning the secondary transmitter
into merely a passive figure ("passive carrier exemption"). 61 Moreover,
any retransmission under either type of broadcasts must be without any
deletions or editing of any material, including commercials, contained in
the original programming. 62
This compulsory license scheme plays an important role with regard
to the advertising provided, since technology enables cable-network
providers to edit the program itself and alter the content of commercial
breaks. This was precisely the scenario in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., where WTBS made use of a new tech-
nology that could insert different advertising in the programming trans-
58. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, 940 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1991); Satellite
Broad. & Communications Assoc. v. Oman, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1313 (BNA) (N.D. Ga. 1993),
rev'd, 17 F.3d 344 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 823 (1994).
59. Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, §§ 201-02.
60. Copyright Act § 122(a)(3) as amended by the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement
Act of 1999. The purpose of the Act is to promote competition among satellite and cable
industries in derogation of the exclusive property rights granted by the Copyright Act to copy-
right holders. Similar to sections 111 and 119 of the Copyright Act, section 122 requires strict
compliance with limitations, such as the prohibition to willfully alter the programming. 145
CONG. REc. H11769 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999); see also, 145 CONG. REc. H11811 (daily ed. Nov.
9, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin & Rep. Markey).
61. Copyright Act § 111(a)(3); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, §§ 8.18[E],
8.18[F], 12.04[B][3] (providing an overview on the compulsory license scheme).
62. See the general provisions of Copyright Act §§111(c)(3), (e)(1) for cable systems,
the specific prohibitions of Copyright Act § 119(a)(4) for satellite carriers and Copyright Act
§ 122(e) for satellite carriers in rural areas. Any secondary transmission that does not satisfy
all of the compulsory license requirements is an unlicensed and hence infringing transmission.
NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, §§ 8.18[E][9]; 8.18[F][3][c]; Cablevision Co. v. Motion
Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 641 F.Supp. 1154, 1163 (D.C. 1986), stay denied, 836 F.2d 599, 616
(D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988); see also, Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v.
Crown Publishers, Inc., 456 F.Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hubbard Broad., Inc., v. Southern
Satellite Sys., Inc., 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985) and discussion infra Part III.D.3.
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mitted to distant cable systems from that incorporated in the original
programming, for example substituting commercials and editing the
original broadcast. 63 The court's primary concern was whether the com-
pulsory license scheme covered the new technology of microwave links
and the attached opportunity to substitute commercials. 6' The court
found that Southern Satellite Systems did not exceed their compulsory
license by using the new technology and that the accompanying quality
improvement was consistent with the principle goal of the Copyright
Act; to make copyrighted work readily available to the public, while still
allowing the copyright owner to protect his or her interests as long as the
content remained original.65 Also, Hubbard failed to show that WTBS
had ever substituted commercials or even attempted to do so. 66 There-
fore, no infringement occurred.
This detailed legislation and the accompanying judicial authority on
retransmissions provides important information for construing the Copy-
right Act with regard to the alteration of virtual advertising even under a
non-compulsory license - which is the case in most sports broadcasting -
and will, therefore, have to be kept in mind. However, before turning to
the analysis of copyright violations in this context, it is necessary to iden-
tify the copyright owner in order to distinguish him from any potential
infringer.
C. Owner of the Copyright (Sections 201(a), (b) of the Copyright Act)
The threshold of any litigation for property rights is the determina-
tion of the ownership of the rights in question.67 Having determined that
there exists a copyright in a broadcast sporting event - and presumably
in the arrangement and capture of the advertisements as a part of the
overall work of authorship - the question now turns to who has the right
to place and sell the advertisements in connection with a sporting event?
The issue does not arise if the event, the television broadcast rights, and
the stadium signs' property rights are in one hand. A broadcast entity
that directs, produces and, therefore, creates a protectible work of au-
thorship is often required to transfer some or all of the copyrights in the
broadcast to the sports team or club as an initial condition of being au-
63. Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 397.
64. Id. at 399, 401.
65. Id. at 403-04.
66. Id. at 402.
67. Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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thorized to broadcast the games.6" The underlying reason is that the
clubs have a legitimate property interest in their games, which they can
sell and license exclusively to broadcasting companies that in turn value
them as affording advertising mediums.69 However, the legal challenge
erupts if several different entities are involved and the contract terms do
not address the issue or are invalid.
According to section 201(a) of the Copyright Act, the copyright in a
work vests initially in the "author" of the work.7° In general, the author
is the person that created the work. However, in the case of "works
made for hire" under section 201(b) of the Copyright Act, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the au-
thor and, therefore, the owner of the rights comprised in the copyright.7 '
Section 101(1) of the Copyright Act defines a work made for hire as a
"work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment. '' 72
The parties may expressly agree that the employee shall be deemed to
own the copyright in all works produced in the employment relation-
ship. 3 Likewise, the parties may expressly agree that all works produced
by the employee during the period of the employment relationship shall
belong entirely to the employer.
In professional sports, if the teams are part of a league like the MLB,
the NFL, or the NBA, the ownership rights will be distributed according
to the terms of their agreements. The underlying authorization is based
on the collective bargaining agreement of the respective organization
with the members of the league, which serves as a basis for the internal
rules, such as the League's Constitution, the bylaws, and the Uniform
Player's Contract.74 Externally, the collective bargaining agreement
serves as a basis for the collective marketing and broadcasting agree-
ments with regard to these games. All major team sports include terms
in their collective bargaining agreements and the uniform players con-
tracts that grant any rights in the games to the club or the respective
68. Shipley, supra note 38, at 392; Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad., 24 F.Supp. 490
(W.D.Pa. 1938).
69. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 24 F.Supp. at 492; Shipley, supra note 38, at 393.
70. Copyright Act § 201(a).
71. Id. § 201(b).
72. Id. § 101(1).
73. For the interpretation of a work for hire absent an agreement, see Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); NIMMER & NIMMR, supra note 29,
§ 5.03[B].
74. The Uniform Player's Contract is the standard form contract between individual play-
ers and their respective clubs. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 671.
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league, turning it into a work made for hire.75 The NFL, for example, is
the owner of the copyrights of the games involved on behalf of its mem-
ber clubs and the clubs as to their games.76 Since television marketing
generates most of the revenue in football, baseball and basketball, the
agreements with local, national, and superstations are crucial. The NBA,
for example, deals with national television exposure; however, the reve-
nues generated therefrom are shared among the teams. In baseball, the
league ordinarily permits each team control over arrangement for local
telecasts in its home city under the Federal Communications "Syndi-
cated Exclusivity Rules," which allow the teams to keep the local reve-
nue. The Syndicated Exclusivity Rules also prohibit retransmissions of
local broadcasts in order to protect the local markets. The underlying
purpose of this distribution scheme is to protect the unique competition
in professional sports nationwide and maintain its attractiveness to the
viewer.77 Some doubts arose in 1980s baseball, when baseball players
challenged their contracts claiming to be the owners of the copyright in
the baseball games.78 The players contended that the baseball games
were performed outside the scope of their employment and, therefore,
would not be encompassed by the work for hire doctrine.7 9 Hence, play-
ers claimed that the baseball clubs did not own the exclusive rights to the
televised performances of the players during major league baseball
games. The court disagreed since the parties did not expressly agree to
this respect, as is required by section 201(b) of the Copyright Act. More-
over, the Uniform Players Contract provided the opposite.80 Profes-
sional baseball today allows almost unlimited broadcasting over
superstations, while claiming a portion of the revenues for distribution
among the clubs.8' Most in-game advertising is sold directly through the
networks, such as Turner Network Television ("TNT"), TBS or NBC. It
75. Pamela R. Lester, Marketing the Athlete: Endorsement Contracts, SD58 ALI-ABA
385, 390 (1999).
76. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 621 F.Supp at 885, affd, 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Such
game programs were duly registered in the United States Copyright office and those registra-
tions were valid and enforceable"). Id. at 885.
77. Franklin M. Fisher, et. al., The Economics of Sports Leagues - The Chicago Bulls
Case, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 8, 9 (1999).
78. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 666.
79. Id. at 667-68.
80. Id. at 679. (In rejecting the player's arguments, the court left it to the players to attain
their objective by bargaining with the Clubs for a contractual declaration that they own a joint
or an exclusive interest in the copyright of the telecasts).
81. Chicago Prof'1 Sports Ltd. P'ship & WGN v. National Basketball Ass'n, 754 F.Supp.
1336, 1339-1445 (N.D. I11. 1991); see also, WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 57, at 583 (contracts
provide the exclusive broadcasting of the games by ESPN or Fox).
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is not clear, however, whether the original copyrights in the telecasts of
the various games are owned separately by individual clubs or jointly by
some combination of clubs. It is also unclear whether the copyrights in
the telecasts are owned exclusively by the clubs or jointly by the clubs
and the television stations or networks that record and broadcast the
games.
These issues have been addressed for the NBA in Chicago Profes-
sional Sports Limited Partnership & WGN v. National Basketball Associ-
ation.' Although the NBA has transferred the exclusive rights to
broadcast most of the games to TNT, this did not limit the individual
clubs to broadcast other contests on local over-the-air broadcast stations.
Both the contracts and the league's articles and bylaws reserve to the
individual clubs the full copyright interest in all games that the league
has not sold to networks.83 The question then turns to whether the copy-
righted game broadcasts stem from a single source or rather a joint ven-
ture.84 One theory viewed the NBA as a single firm producing the
product "games," and a group of potential competitors selling them. 5
Following a series of decisions, Judge Easterbrook found that the NBA,
when acting in the broadcast market, was closer to a single firm than to a
group of independent firms, calling it a "single bargaining employer."' 86
Following his opinion, the NBA is best understood as one firm when
selling broadcast rights to a network in competition with a thousand
other producers of entertainment.87 Therefore, the NBA, as an agent
acting on behalf of the individual club when selling the broadcast rights
collectively, is closer to being considered the owner of the copyright by
virtue of the collective bargaining agreement than the individual club.
Otherwise, the league would not be in a position to sell these rights in
the first place.
With regard to secondary transmission, section 501(e) of the Copy-
right Act provides that a network station holding a copyright or other
license to transmit or perform the same version of that work shall be
treated as owner of the work.8 Therefore, in the established licensing
82. 754 F.Supp. 1336
83. Chicago Prof. Sports, 961 F.2d at 671, vacated and remanded, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir.
1996). Following this series of decisions the Chicago Bulls and TNT eventually settled their
dispute with an intermediary solution.
84. Chicago Prof Sports, 95 F.3d at 596; WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 57, at 583.
85. Chicago Professional Sports, 961 F.2d at 672; Fisher, et. al., supra note 77, at 5 (provid-
ing a sound description of the genuine 'product' in the sports context).
86. But only for antitrust purposes, see Chicago Prof. Sports, 95 F.3d at 598.
87. Id. at 600.
88. Copyright Act § 501(e).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
chain for sports broadcasting, any legal or beneficiary owner of such a
compulsory or contractual license shall be treated as the owner of the
copyright with standing to sue.
D. Copying of the Owner's Rights (Section 106 of the Copyright Act)
The Copyright Act does not give the copyright holder control over all
uses of a copyrighted work; instead, it enumerates several "rights" that
are made exclusive to the copyright holder.8 9 "Copying" is the shorthand
reference to the act of infringing on any of the copyright owner's five
exclusive rights set forth in section 106 et seq. of the Copyright Act.90
The infringing act by substituting advertising could constitute the prepa-
ration of a reproduction, a performance or the preparation of a deriva-
tive work. In the absence of one or more of these enumerated results,
the claim of violation of the copyright law by unlawful distribution of a
work is barred.91 Courts have been unclear in defining the specific in-
fringing action in television broadcasts, even calling it the "right to make
changes." 92 However, the underlying theory mostly points towards the
preparation of a derivative work under section 106(2) of the Copyright
Act.93
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as "a
work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted."94 A derivative work consists of a contribution of original ma-
terial to a pre-existing work so as to recast, transform or adapt the pre-
existing work.95 It consists of editorial revisions, annotations, elabora-
tions, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original
89. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 393-94 (1968); Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 710;
WGN Continental Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1982).
90. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F.Supp. 808, 819 (D.Kan.
1989); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989). See also, NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 29, § 8.01[A].
91. Paramount, 724 F.Supp. at 821.
92. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 8D.04 [A][1] ("the license to reproduce and/or
perform is limited to reproduction and/or performance in the form in which the authors wrote
the work, so that a material departure from such form goes beyond the terms of the license,
and hence results in an infringement of the reproduction and/or performance rights"); Oddo v.
Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1984). Another court called the infringement 'unauthorized
revision,' see Nat'l Bank, 503 F.Supp. at 544.
93. Copyright Act § 106 (2); Paramount, 724 F.Supp. at 819.
94. Copyright Act § 101.
95. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 3.03.
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work of authorship.16 The alteration of television signals with virtual ad-
vertising is such a modification of the television broadcast as a whole.
However, a work will be considered a derivative work only if the mate-
rial that it has derived from a pre-existing work had been taken without
the consent of a copyright proprietor of such pre-existing work.97 While
advertisement as a part of the sport-broadcast is an original work under
the described circumstances and the insertion of virtual advertising con-
stitutes the preparation of a derivative work, the television broadcasts
are made with the consent of the copyright owner by virtue of compul-
sory or non-compulsory licenses. The author can always grant the right
to make changes to the work. In sports broadcasts, the leagues' and the
clubs' agreements with the broadcast stations include detailed terms
about the right to insert commercials. But these assignments or licenses
are silent with respect to the right to make changes in the work by using
virtual advertisement, except for the explicit rights to use virtual adver-
tising in certain games' broadcasts, such as Superbowl XXXIV. Also, the
broadcast agreements do not encompass the statutory compulsory li-
cense scheme for any number of retransmissions. Finally, sections
111(c)(3), 119(a)(4), and 122(e) of the Copyright Act impose limitations
on alterations for retransmissions under the passive common carrier ex-
emption. These detailed rules also provide helpful hints for interpreting
the effect of alterations on the copyrights with respect to non-compul-
sory licenses by virtue of analogy absent an agreement.
By taking into consideration these elements in the context of sports
television broadcasts, it has to be determined if the unauthorized inser-
tion of virtual advertising meets the legislative and common law stan-
dards for "copying" under sections 106, 111, 119, and 122 of the
Copyright Act.
1. Legislative History of the Passive Carrier Exemptions
Section 111(c)(3) of the Copyright Act provides that a cable system is
fully subject to the remedies provided for copyright infringement if the
cable system willfully alters the original transmission through changes,
deletions, or additions.9 8 Included in this prohibition are commercial
messages and station announcements during the program, so as to en-
sure a continuous ban on the so-called "commercial substitution." 99 In
96. Copyright Act § 101.
97. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 3.01 n.10.
98. Copyright Act § 111(c)(3).
99. 122 CONG. REc. H10727- 8 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976).
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adopting section 111(c)(3) of the Copyright Act, Congress concluded
that to allow cable television systems to alter the primary transmission
by substituting commercials would significantly alter the basic nature of
the cable retransmission service and make its function similar to that of a
broadcast station and hence constitute copyright infringement. 10 Fur-
ther, the placement of substitute advertising in a program by a cable
system on a "local" signal harms the advertiser, and, in turn, the copy-
right owner, whose compensation for the work is directly related to the
size of the audience that the advertiser's message is calculated to reach.
On a "distant" signal, the placement of substitute advertising harms the
local broadcast station in the distant market, because the cable system is
then competing for local broadcasting dollars without having compara-
ble programming costs.' 0' Congress, in prohibiting commercial substitu-
tion by cable systems, primarily sought to ensure the competitive
compatibility of the cable system and the local broadcast station while
also protecting the copyright owner.0 2 Cable systems, when retransmit-
ting local signals, would retransmit exactly what was received, and in
doing so would neither undercut the local broadcast station's ability to
generate local advertising revenues nor jeopardize the ability of creators
of programming to receive a fair return for their product based upon the
size of the audience that the advertiser's message was calculated to
reach. 0 3 In other words, the status quo relationship between local
broadcast stations and copyright holders would be protected and facili-
tated.1 4 Cable or satellite retransmissions enlarge a television station's
audience and increase the value of station advertising. As the 1975 Con-
gressional Hearings pointed out, the impact of cable retransmissions is
vital to college sports, because they depend on the distribution of those
100. H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 91 (1976) ("The cutting out of advertising, the running in
of new commercials, or any other change in the signal relayed would subject the secondary
transmitter to full liability"); see also, NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 8.18[C][1][b].
101. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 93-94, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5708. Consequently,
Congress "attempted broadly to proscribe the availability of the compulsory license if a cable
system substitutes commercial messages." Id. at 94; Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 404.
102. Final Report on the Inquiry into Professional Sports, H.R. REP. No. 1786, at 115
(1977).
103. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 94, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5708.
104. H.R. REP. No. 1487, at 92 (1976) ("Further, the placement of substitute advertising
in a program by a cable system on a 'local' signal harms the advertiser and, in turn, the copy-
right owner, whose compensation for the work is directly related to the size of the audience
that the advertiser's message is calculated to reach").
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revenues, 10 5 inasmuch as professional sports rely on advertising
revenue.10
6
The underlying intent points to the protection of the copyright hold-
ers' exclusive rights in the work against alteration while still promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts, as pro-
vided in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.1°7 Since the issues
with regard to virtual advertising arise in large part from the use of tech-
nology perfected after the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, these
goals of the Copyright Act will have to be kept in mind. In such a situa-
tion, courts looked to the "common sense" of the statute, to its purpose,
and to the practical consequences of the suggested interpretations "for
what light each inquiry might shed."'08 As the Supreme Court stated:
"When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous,
the Copyright Act must be construed in light of [its] basic purpose,
[which is to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.]' 1 0 9
2. Common Law
In applying these legislative standards, courts in the 1980s have been
remotely split on the question of "copying" under the theory of "com-
mercial substitution" in television broadcasts.
In the landmark case of Gilliam v. ABC Inc. the defendant bought
rights to three separate television programs produced by the British
Broadcasting Corporation."10 The plaintiffs-authors of the script for
these programs, known collectively as "Monty Python," held the copy-
right on the script and objected when the defendant edited the programs
105. Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1823 (1975) (tes-
timony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); see also, Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675
F.2d at 379 n.20. The NFL agreed with Fox on the exclusive rights in sports broadcasting for a
four-year package worth $1.66 billion. The NFL created a total revenue of $ 2.2 billion in
1998. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 57, at 585.
106. H.R. REP. No.1786, at 115 ("[Clable should be regulated in its own right and allowed
to grow, but this growth should not be based on its use of copyrighted material in a way which
would financially injure the copyright owner").
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also, Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 396; Capital Cities Cable, Inc.,
467 U.S. at 710; Eastern Microwave, Inc., 691 F.2d at 132 (2d Cir. 1982); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
108. Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 399; Eastern Microwave, Inc., 691 F.2d at 127; New York State
Comm'n on Cable Television v. Fed. Communications Coim'n, 571 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
109. Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 399 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp, 422 U.S. at 156).
110. 538 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1976).
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to such an extent that the script was materially altered by deletion, edit-
ing, and insertion of commercial breaks.'1 ' In view of the material
changes and the substantive editing of the original broadcast, the court
found that absent an express agreement as to what alterations could be
made to a television program, unauthorized changes in the work that are
so extensive as to impair the integrity of the original work constitute
copyright infringement. 112 Even though the defendant had a valid license
to prepare a derivative work, this permission to use the original work
"may not exceed the specific purpose for which permission was
granted."' 3 The rationale for this result lies in the need to allow the
proprietor of the underlying work to control the method of
exploitation.' 4
The first significant ruling involving only the unauthorized insertion
of advertising into an existing work was National Bank of Commerce v.
Shaklee Corp."5 This case involved a book with an original collection of
household hints, which was published by the defendant Shaklee." 6 In
the published version, Shaklee added a number of advertisements re-
lated to household items without the consent of the author." 7 The court
held that a licensee infringes a copyright by exceeding his license and
that an author should have control over the context and manner in which
his or her work is presented. 118 "[The] author has a right to protect the
integrity of his or her work and unauthorized changes in the work violate
the author's rights even when he has parted with the publishing
rights."" 9
In WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., a televi-
sion broadcasting company sought to enjoin a telecommunications com-
mon carrier from retransmitting its copyrighted television program into
the carrier's cable television system after stripping the vertical blanking
interval of teletext information.12 0 The original teletext portion was sub-
111. Id. at 17-18.
112. Id. at 22; Oddo, 743 F.2d at 634.
113. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20.
114. Id. at 21.
115. 503 F.Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
116. National Bank, 503 F. Supp. at 536.
117. Id. at 538.
118. Id. at 543 (acknowledging the lack of authority, the court relied on Gilliam, 538 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1976)). However, it did not specify the type of copyright - moral right, the right to
prepare derivative work, etc.
119. National Bank, 503 F.Supp. at 543; Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 364 N.E.2d
570, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Chesler v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 352 N.Y.S.2d 552, 555 (1973).
120. 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
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sequently inserted into the program alternatively as an integral part of
the news program or on a different channel and contained additional
information for the viewer, such as ballgame scores or weather re-
ports. 121 The defendant did not retransmit this information along with
the original news, but instead substituted teletext supplied with other
sources. 22 As a general rule, the court found that a copyright licensee
who "makes an unauthorized use of the underlying work by publishing it
in a truncated version" is an infringerY23 Absent an agreement with the
copyright owner, the carrier may not even delete commercials. 124 Section
111(c)(3) of the Copyright Act requires that any cable system that wants
to retransmit a broadcast signal without negotiating with the broadcast
station or copyright owner must transmit intact any commercials it re-
ceives from that station.'l 5
The district court in Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. did not follow the prior rulings in WGN v. United Video
and National Bank v. Shaklee.'26 Here, the defendant had placed com-
mercials for local businesses at the beginning of the producer-plaintiff's
motion-picture videocassettes.' 27 The court focused on the elements of a
copyrightable work and found that - unlike the holding in WGN - the
additions of advertisements would not always constitute an infringe-
ment.12  The unauthorized use of the protected work in a manner
outside the scope of any of the copyright holder's exclusive rights, there-
fore, is not an infringement of the copyright.'29 The "related images"
that the court in WGN relied upon did not encompass the advertisement
at the beginning of rental videocassettes containing motion pictures.130
Those advertisements were insignificant and, in fact, did not alter the
motion picture in any way.' 3' This was not a case where the substance of
the protected work was significantly altered and its quality and integrity
compromised by a licensee or grantee that oversteps his authority.' 32
121. Id. at 623-24.
122. Id. at 624.
123. Id. at 625 (citing Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20 ["any unauthorized editing of the underlying
work, if proven, would constitute an infringement of the copyright in that work similar to any
other use of a work that exceeded the license granted by the proprietor of the copyright"]).
124. Id. at 624.
125. WGN Cont. Broad., 693 F.2d at 624-25.
126. Paramount, 724 F.Supp. at 820.
127. Id. at 812.
128. Id. at 821.
129. Id. at 820; Twentieth Century Corp., 422 U.S. at 155.
130. Paramount, 724 F. Supp. at 820.
131. Id. at 820-21.
132. Id.
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While defendant's advertisement was an original work, the court did not
"recognize the addition of it to a videocassette in any way recasting,
transforming, or adapting the motion picture."'33 The result is not a new
version of the copyrighted motion picture.13 4
3. Discussion
While courts have been inconsistent in defining the nature of the in-
fringed right of section 106 of the Copyright Act, the bottom line is that
the alteration of advertisement constitutes a copyright infringement, if
the changes are substantial. The scope of protection is even broader for
television broadcasts: Sections 111(c)(3), 119(a)(4), and 122(e) of the
Copyright Act proscribe any willful alteration of a licensed retransmis-
sion if such a license falls within the scope of the statutory compulsory
license scheme. Congress' intent indicates that this protection applies to
the content and the advertising. Sections 111, 119, and 122 of the Copy-
right Act and most of the above-mentioned decisions were based on the
compulsory license scheme. However, with regard to contractual licenses
that cover the entire market in sports broadcasting and absent any
agreement to the alterations of the original programming by using vir-
tual advertising, the detailed rules serve as precedent and help construe
the application of the Copyright Act to unauthorized virtual advertising.
Applying the language of section 111(c)(3) of the Copyright Act in the
detailed framework for compulsory licenses, Congress implicates that
absent an agreement, willful alterations of television broadcasts consti-
tute a copyright infringement. Clearly, the element of willfulness will
have to be imputed in the scenarios at hand. Even if the license agree-
ments contained a term on commercial substitution in general, the
changes made with virtual advertising will have to be construed in light
of this legislation and the precedents.
Congress intended to protect the author's monetary interest in a rea-
sonable return for the creation when section 111 of the Copyright Act
was amended.135 This interest explicitly involved advertising. As with all
statutory licenses, they have to be interpreted narrowly, because statu-
tory licenses are a derogation of the exclusive rights granted and in turn
the limitations have to be construed broadly.' 36 Congress was also aware
of future technological development. Having these interests in mind, vir-
133. Id. at 821.
134. Id.
135. 145 CONG. RIc. H11811, 11812 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999) (statement of Rep. Coble).
136. 145 CONG. REc. H11769 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999) (text of conference report).
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tual advertising opens new alleys for the unauthorized substitution and
deletion of existing advertising and thereby keeps the author from re-
ceiving a financial return for the work he created. In Midway Manufac-
turing Co. v. Artic International Inc., the court held that a speeded-up
video game that was created by a licensee with the circuit boards that
were supplied by the licensor was a derivative work based upon a copy-
righted video game. 37 The preparation of this altered version by the li-
censee therefore constituted an infringement of these copyrighted
works.' 38 The court reasoned that the speeded-up version is a "substan-
tially different product from the original game and generated more li-
cense revenue per game, which was deprived from the copyright owner
without his consent.' 39 This amounts to a free ride of the violator on
someone else's creation. Section 111 of the Copyright Act was created to
protect this interest. Even if the specific scenario in section 111 of the
Copyright Act does not apply to all transmitters, the underlying ideas
promote the copyright protection of advertising against virtual altera-
tions under section 106(2) of the Copyright Act.
Virtual advertising can be inserted into an existing television pro-
gram after the work is completed or it may be inserted into pre-desig-
nated spots, such as green walls, with the consent of the author. The
unauthorized rearrangement, inserting, combining, or cutting of ele-
ments in an existing program distorts the original work, using the unique
adaptive occlusion process.' 40 Those changes take away some of the
original expression from the work by altering the overall arrangement
and selection of advertising in the background of a sports performance.
A significant change in the scenery of a broadcast, such as a large adver-
tisement on or next to the football or baseball field, constitutes a copy-
ing, since the selection of camera angles, the placement and size of the
advertisements constitute original and creative elements. Even if the
changes are not significant, there may still be an infringement.' 4'
"It is obvious that the commercial success of live television sports
and entertainment depends substantially on advertising.' 1 42 Advertising
137. 704 F.2d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 1013-14.
139. Id. at 1014.
140. See infra Part II.
141. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)
(Slight differences between picture, observable by close scrutiny, do not avoid infringement);
Raphael Winick, Intellectual Property, Defamation and the Digital Alteration of Visual Images,
21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTis 143, 155 (1997).
142. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 621 F.Supp. at 886, affd, 792 F.2d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1986).
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is normally inserted at a network control point.143 "Any live show, in-
cluding football games, requires at least two satellite transmissions, one
with a clean feed of the show itself to the control point and the other of
the dirty feed including the show and commercials to broadcast sta-
tions."'14 4 The sole purpose for the clean feed broadcast is to transmit
this signal from satellite so that the network control point could receive
it and insert the economically vital commercials. 45 With the adaptive
occlusion processing, this clear differentiation is watered down to a point
where any broadcast station, transmitter, or retransmitter or any cable
network is in a position to alter the content, needless to say the commer-
cials of a television broadcast. Unlike the scenario in Hubbard, the satel-
lite carriers and cable network providers today are in a position to
exercise control over the content and the selection of the broadcast by
using virtual advertising. 146 The ultimate beneficiary of subsequent inser-
tion of virtual advertising is the broadcast station. The loser is the first
advertiser, who paid to have his advertisement placed - either physically,
or even by using virtual advertising in the first place - and the consumer,
who is exposed to an ever-increasing stream of commercials, now even
as part of the game. The original copyright owner also loses control over
his work and its distribution. 14 7 Copyright law seeks to prevent such a
scenario. The right for the exploitation of a copyrighted work rests in the
owner. Therefore, any subsequent alteration should be banned if it
harms the interest of the original owner or the public.148 Therefore, the
unauthorized deletion or substitution of existing advertisements in a tel-
evision broadcast by inserting virtual advertising can constitute copyright
infringement.
IV. VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Another cause of action against unauthorized virtual advertising in
sports telecasts could be the player's right of publicity, if the virtual ad-
vertisement appears in a distorting manner in the background of the
player's performance during the game. The right of publicity was created
143. Id., 621 F. Supp. at 886.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 402.
147. Winick, supra note 141, at 155.
148. After all, any state statute and/or common law is preempted by the Federal Copy-
right Act, if they are applicable. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 848.
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in the sports world by a number of cases involving celebrities. 14 9 The
right of publicity protects an individual's right to control the commercial
exploitation of his or her identity. The present statutory or common law
in over thirty states recognizes a right to control the commercial appro-
priation of an individual's name, likeness, and reputation. 5 ' Sport celeb-
rities were the most prominent figures in advertising of the 1990s. In due
course, a player's good reputation is likely to be the subject of advertis-
ers' messages. However, there are limits as to the free use of a celebrity's
image, even under an existing advertising agreement. For example, if a
player is exposed in front of beer commercials that catch the eye of the
viewer, he is automatically affiliated with this product. In O'Brien v.
Pabst Sales Co., the plaintiff, a famous football player, alleged invasion
of his right of privacy when his picture was placed next to the defen-
dant's beer advertisement.':5 The court denied his allegations under the
evidence presented, stating that he had lost his right of privacy by con-
senting to widespread publicity, and the advertising did not falsely indi-
cate that the player used, endorsed, or recommended the beer
advertised.'Y2 Nevertheless, New York statutory law acknowledges a
right of privacy as a personal and non-assignable right not to have his
feelings hurt by unauthorized publications, and the common law even
adds the protection for a famous person's right of publicity. 5 3 Other
states agreed that a right of publicity exists that grants personal control
over commercial display and exploitation of the personality and the ex-
ercise of a person's talents.' 54 The Supreme Court upheld such common
law and/or state legislation.' 55
149. See generally, Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson, 280 N.W.2d (1979); All v. Playgirl, 447 F.Supp.
723, (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.Supp. 1277 (D.Minn. 1970).
150. David H. Bernstein, Current Developments in False Advertising and Right of Public-
ity, 1148 PLI/CoRP 133, 174 (Nov. 1999); Laura Lee Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Pro-
fessional Athlete's Right of Publicity, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 23 (1999); J. THOMAs McCARTHY,
McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrrlON §§ 11:14, 28:1 (4th ed. 1999).
151. 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941).
152. Id. at 170.
153. Halean Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(Famous persons "would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements"). See also, Pirone v. Macmillan Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990).
154. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 376 N.E.2d 582 (1978), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562,
569 (1977) (holding that state law could award damages to an entertainer who attempted to
restrict the showing of his act to those who paid admission, when a television station broadcast
his entire act (a 15 second "Human Cannonball" stunt)); Housh v. Pety, 133 N.E.2d 340, 341
(1956).
155. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579.
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In professional sports, the right of publicity is ordinarily transferred
to the clubs with regard to the players' appearances and their perform-
ances during the game. However, this does not affect the individual
player's right to exploit his or her personal image commercially outside
the playing field.'56 Today, players' associations exercise the group mar-
keting of certain publicity rights. The issue is whether certain virtual ad-
vertisements can violate the individual player's right of publicity under
state law in spite of and independent of these group-marketing agree-
ments. Within the NBA, no rules exist to prevent companies from sign-
ing NBA players to advertising contracts." 7 Players in all major sports
are free to enter into endorsement agreements in accordance with the
player's contracts that regularly provide the requirement of the written
consent of the club, which in turn shall not be withheld except in the
reasonable interests of the club or the sport.'58 Similarly, the FIFA seeks
to protect the integrity of the sport of soccer by a set of rules, parts of
which are the rules about virtual advertising. This legislation is embed-
ded into the European framework of keeping program and advertising
separate.159 Players and their performance should not be exploited by
businesses solely as objects of commercials by inserting virtual advertise-
ments during the player's performance. The line has to be drawn by the
governing authorities of the respective sport and - absent any rules - by
the judiciary. However, every player today is exposed to widespread
publicity, far excessive from the standard in O'Brien.6 ' The club and the
league largely control the publicity. With this in mind, it seems unlikely
that a court would not assume or imply the player's consent to the
advertisements.
After all, there exists no federal right of publicity. 6' Moreover, it
appears well settled that any potential individual player's publicity right
is preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act with regard to the
rights in the broadcast.' 62 Any such claims would interfere with the uni-
156. However, most professional sports leagues prohibit their athletes from endorsements
of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, see Lester, supra note 75, at 390, 393.
157. Robert N. Davis, Ambushing the Olympic Games, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 423,
427 (1996).
158. Lester, supra note 75, at 390.
159. See infra Part VI.
160. O'Brien, 124 F. 2d at 170.
161. Bernstein, supra note 150, at 182.
162. Under Copyright Act § 301, a state law claim is preempted when: (i) the state law
claim seeks to vindicate "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent" to one of the bundle of
exclusive rights already protected by copyright law under Copyright Act § 301 -styled the
"general scope requirement;" and (ii) the particular work to which the state law claim is being
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formity of the copyright system and the exploitation of the works by the
author. 163 Although game broadcasts are copyrightable while the under-
lying games are not, the Copyright Act should not be read to distinguish
between the two when analyzing the preemption of a claim based on
copying or taking from the copyrightable work.164 Especially with regard
to virtual advertising, any player's right of publicity based on distorting
advertising would be essentially equivalent to the right to prepare deriv-
ative work, which falls under the Copyright Act.'65 Even if the copyright
claim allegedly does not encompass the uncopyrightable elements within
the work, it has been held that section 301 of the Copyright Act preemp-
tion bars state law claims even with respect to both copyrightable and
uncopyrightable elements.166 Moreover, the Uniform Players Contract in
all major team sports, in connection with the collective bargaining agree-
ment, explicitly states that the clubs and not the players own the rights to
the names,167 photographs or electronic images, including television pic-
tures. However, such rights may be assigned to the players associa-
tion. 68 In spite of the discrepancy in interpreting preemption, it is safe to
say that preemption applies, if a falsity claim is based upon state law and
merely alleges that defendant prepared a derivative work from the plain-
tiff's original work and sold it under defendant's name. 69
applied falls within the type of works protected by the Copyright Act under §§ 102, 103-
styled the "subject matter requirement." Motorola, 105 F.3d at 848; Baltimore Orioles, 805
F.2d 663 at 674; distinguished by, Brown v. Ames, No. 98-20736 2000 WL 48992, at *6 (5th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2000); in support of a right of publicity, Shipley, supra note 38, 384-88, 402; Shelley
Ross Saxer, Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association: The Right of
Publicity in Game Performances and Federal Copyright Preemption, 36 UCLA L.Rnv. 861,870
(1989). The 9th Circuit rejected preemption in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988).
163. Brown, 2000 WL 48992, at *'6; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boat, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 162 (1989) ("One of the fundamental purposes behind the... Copyright Clauses of
the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property").
164. It has been argued, however, that even if one owns the copyright to a photograph or
other visual image, one does not necessarily also own the right to commercially exploit the
images of the persons appearing in that image; see Winick, supra note 141, at 179 (citing Bi-
Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 1985)); National Bank, 503
F.Supp. at 540; RESTATEmENT (THRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETION § 46 Cmt. 1 (1995); MCCAR-
THY, supra note 150, §§ 11:14 [B], [C].
165. Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F.Supp. 1134, 1138 (N.D.Il. 1997). However, a copy-
right is not a license to engage in unfair competition; see World Championship Wrestling v.
Titan Sports, Inc., 46 F.Supp. 2d 118, 126 (D.Conn. 1999); see infra Part VI.
166. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 849.
167. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675. In fact, the Major League Players Association
acts as the assignee of the individual publicity rights of all players; see Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959, 963 (10th Cir. 1996).
168. Lester, supra note 75, at 390-91.
169. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 6:27.
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Taking into consideration these problems in pursuing a cause of ac-
tion under state law, it seems more appropriate under federal law to
apply a cause of action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 170
V. FALSE ADVERTISING UNDER FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION
(SECTION 43(A)(1)(B) OF THE LANHAM ACT)
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was amended, effective November
1989, to expressly prohibit, among other things, the use of any symbol or
device which is likely to deceive consumers as to the association, spon-
sorship, or approval of goods or services by another person. 17 1 Due to
the broad language of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the elements of
such a cause of action are remotely unclear.' 72 However, courts have
established certain groups of unfair behavior in the marketplace that fall
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The Ninth Circuit has read the
amended language to encompass the so-called "false endorsement"
claims.' 73 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act even allows competitors to
invoke a cause of action for unfair competition to prevent others from
marketing altered versions of copyrighted works. 74 Furthermore, sport-
ing events in particular are often faced with "ambush advertising," an-
other type of false advertising. Since the judicial analysis often left the
public with little guidance with regard to the specific elements of false
170. Copyright does not affect liability under the Lanham Act, see World Championship
Wrestling, 46 F.Supp. 2d at 126.
171. Lanham Act § 43(a) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,
or false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion...
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepre-
sents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
172. Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham
Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 808 (1999).
173. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1080 (1993); Katherine C. Spelman, Advertising and Promotions under Federal and California
Law 1999, 552 PLI/PAT 271 (1999). In Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391,
1401 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit held that the use of basketball star Kareem Abdul-
Jabbar's former name, Lew Alcindor, in a television commercial for automobiles aired during
a national men's basketball tournament raised an issue of fact as to whether consumers would
believe Jabbar endorsed defendants' products.
174. See, e.g., Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
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advertising, commentators have tried to narrow down and define the ele-
ments of the specific violations and establish groups of violations. 75 The
following analysis focuses on critical elements and emphasizes the most
suitable types of false advertising as applied to virtual advertising.
A. General Requirements
To establish a federal cause of action for false advertising under sec-
tion 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must show either that the
allegedly infringing representation of fact is literally false, or that it is
likely to deceive or confuse consumers. 76 False advertising claims are
thus predicated on a statement or assertion that confuses customers. 7
Furthermore, "falsely suggesting the existence of affiliation with a well-
known business by usurping the latter's goodwill constitutes... unfair
competition.' 7  Specifically, to state a claim for false advertising under
the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendant has made a
false or misleading description or representation of fact; (2) in interstate
commerce; (3) in connection with goods or services; (4) in commercial
advertising and promotion; (5) when the description or representation
misrepresents the nature, qualities or geographic origin of the defen-
dant's or another person's goods, services or commercial activities; and
(6) that there is likelihood of injury to plaintiff in terms of declining
sales, loss of goodwill, etc.17 9
The traditional plaintiff under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has
been a competitor injured in its line of business as a result of false adver-
tising.180 Hence, a cause of action could be available not only for the
175. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:24; McEvilly, supra note 18, at 620-21; Wegman
Burns, supra note 205, at 864-67.
176. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 855 (citing Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir.
1995)).
177. Craig K. Weaver, Signposts to Oblivion? Meta-Tags Signal the Judiciary to Stop Com-
mercial Internet Regulation and Yield to the Electronic Marketplace, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REv.
667, 677 n.75 (1998).
178. ShowtimelThe Movie Channel v. Covered Bridge Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 693 F.Supp.
1080, 1089 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552, 1561 (M.D.Fla.
1993); Burger King v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1492 (11th Cir. 1983).
179. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27.24; Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates,
Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1992).
180. Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987);
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1109. False advertising claims can be brought by corporations as well as
individuals, see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,205
(2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act claim where uniform worn by
star of X-rated movie was confusingly similar to plaintiffs' trademark uniforms, falsely creat-
ing impression that plaintiffs "sponsored or otherwise approved the use" of uniform).
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copyright owner or licensee of the broadcast, but also for advertisers of
in-stadium advertisements, such as billboards or other fixed advertise-
ments that are being subsequently substituted without the assignment of
any copyright claims by the owner of the broadcast. Even if it can be
assumed that the parties using virtual advertising compete for the most
effective television commercials, most courts have held that the parties
need not always be in direct competition for the plaintiff to have stand-
ing under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'81 The Fifth Circuit stated: In
order for representations to constitute commercial advertising or promo-
tion they must be by a defendant who is in commercial competition with
plaintiff for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant's
goods or services.' 82 If a party advertises, he is necessarily involved in
commercial activity. As soon as both parties use the same advertising
channel, they are necessarily competitors. Therefore, standing can be es-
tablished fairly easily.
A claim of false advertising may be asserted against "all those alleg-
edly responsible for falsely describing and placing in commerce the ad-
vertised goods."'8 3 This includes advertisers as well as contributory
infringers.'8 4 However, the media is generally not liable for acting as pas-
sive carriers for false advertising.85 But this exemption involves only in-
nocent communicators of otherwise misleading or false advertising. A
broadcasting company that willfully inserts virtual advertisements with-
out the consent of the involved parties is to be considered in violation of
the Lanham Act. Just like the limitation of the passive carrier exemption
for willful alterations, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is applicable if
the defendant did not act innocently. 18 6
Just like any advertising in sports, virtual advertising implicates a
statement of affiliation between the advertised product or service and
the object of sponsorship. It implicates the sponsorship or other type of
181. McCarthy, supra note 150, § 27:32, p.27-53 ("with the possible exception of the 9th
Circuit"); Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993); see also, McEvilly, supra
note 18, at 618-19; Wegman Burns, supra note 205, at 838-39; Bernstein, supra note 150, at
134.
182. Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1996). Using this lan-
guage reveals that it is in fact difficult to separate the elements of false advertising.
183. Grant Airmass Corp. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
184. Bernstein, supra note 150, at 135.
185. Grant Airmass Corp, 645 F. Supp. at 1512; McCARTHY, supra note 150, §§ 27:52,
p.27-78; 27:70, p.27-105.
186. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:83 (quoting 134 CONG. REc. H10420 (daily ed. Oct.
19, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier on S.1883)).
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affiliation between the subsequently inserted or substituted advertise-
ment and the teams, clubs, the respective league or the sport in general.
These representations typically occur in the context of "false endorse-
ment" and "ambush advertising."
B. False Endorsement
Falsity may be established by proving that the advertising is literally
false as a factual matter, or although the advertisement is literally true, it
is likely to deceive or confuse consumers or viewers as to the sponsor-
ship or affiliation of the goods or services.',' This scenario is often called
"false endorsement."'188 Although a virtual advertisement in itself cor-
rectly represents the nature and origin of the advertised goods, the fal-
sity has to be established in connection with the sponsorship and
affiliation of the advertisement to the sporting event. The error occurs in
the viewer's mind, when he or she unknowingly denies the right to public
credit for the sponsorship of the event to the original advertiser, while
affiliating the virtual advertiser's goodwill with the sponsorship.' 8 9 The
attractiveness of sports advertising is based on the popularity of the
teams and the players. No other television events attract greater audi-
ences than the major sporting events. In turn, advertisers are willing to
pay large sums of money for their appearance in such an event. Even
though there is no direct affiliation or proof of a product's quality in
such an advertisement, the public associates the large sums paid with the
good quality of a product. This behavior generates a company's goodwill
that is attached to its products. 90 The goodwill of a manufacturer is the
187. Lipton, 71 F.3d at 474.
188. Lanham Act § 43(a) prohibits the imitation of a person's distinctive attributes with-
out authorization where the imitation misrepresents, expressly or by implication, the person's
association with or endorsement of a product. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106 (establishing a
likelihood of consumer confusion that Waits endorsed Doritos); Allen v. Men's World Outlet,
Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting summary judgment on Woody Allen's
Lanham Act § 43(a) claim where ad featured photo of look-alike with clarinet and ad copy
evoking "schlemiel" persona, falsely representing that products were associated with him).
189. See also, Playboy Enter., Inc, 839 F.Supp. at 1562. The trademarks were obliterated
from the photographs, and then defendant Frena attempted to take credit for plaintiff's work
by placing its own advertising with the photographs. Thus, plaintiff has been denied the right
to public credit for the success and quality of its goods. Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356,
357 (5th Cir. 1990).
190. Jacob Laufer, Good Faith and Fair Dealing with the American Consumer, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. Rnv. 167, 173-74 (1987); states that trademarks serve three basic purposes: 1)
to indicate origin; 2) to guarantee equal quality of all goods under that mark; and 3) as an
embodiment of goodwill - buyers will recognize high-quality products by its trademark and
the seller eventually will benefit from this recognition by increased sales. See also, William M.
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result of high-quality work combined with a strong effort in advertising,
which is all embodied in the affiliated trademark. The substitution or
deletion of an advertisement creates a false mental association in the
viewer's mind between the large expenditure on sponsorship and the
product. Furthermore, in-stadium advertisers have an interest in being
exposed over an entire season to achieve an ultimate and lasting mental
association for the viewer between the advertised product or service and
the sport broadcastings. This goodwill is wrongfully transferred to the
virtual advertiser resulting in a corresponding loss of goodwill for the
original advertiser. Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act was designed
to protect trademark owners and competitors from precisely this type of
free ride on a company's goodwill by false endorsement.
C. Copyrights and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Even though the Lanham Act is a trademark statute, it has been rec-
ognized that it applies to copyrights as well if they are used in connection
with any goods or services. 191 A violation of false advertising prohibi-
tions can arise in connection with the unauthorized use of copyrighted
materials in several ways. The unauthorized editing of a creative work in
connection with the original author's name can constitute a false repre-
sentation that this is the author's work when in fact it is a distorted ver-
sion of the author's talents. Also, the unauthorized reproduction or
distribution of a copyrighted work in connection with the true owner or
creator's name or mark can falsely imply that the copyright owner has
agreed to this use of its work.' 92 The situations before us involve an
overlap between copyright and protection by virtue of unfair competi-
tion; in addition to and independent of receiving copyright protection,
advertising matter may be protectible under false advertising law. The
scope and extent of protection of each area of law have to be distin-
guished accurately. 193
In Gilliam., the court held, notwithstanding the copyright infringe-
ment, that the editing by the defendant also misrepresented the origin of
the "Monty Python" show and therefore violated section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, stating that it:
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON.
265, 269 (1970).
191. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26.
192. McCARTHY, supra note 150, §§ 6:27; 27:82; 27:83.
193. Id. § 6:30.
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impaired the integrity of appellants' work and represented to the
public as the product of appellants what was actually a mere cari-
cature of their talents.... To deform his work is to present [an
artist] to the public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus
makes him subject to criticism for work he has not done. Thus an
allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a "gar-
bled," distorted version of plaintiff's work seeks to redress the
very rights sought to be protected by the Lanham Act.194
The general rule that can be deprived from this landmark case is where a
copyright licensee acts outside the scope of the license to make unper-
mitted editing resulting in a distorted travesty of the original work, use
of the author's name is a false representation. In effect, a work not cre-
ated by the author is falsely attributed to the author. 195 However, where
the unauthorized alterations are relatively minor and inconsequential
and lack the kind of distortion found in the "Monty Python" case, there
will be no violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.196 For example,
in one such case, the court said that the issue is whether the edited ver-
sion "departed so substantially from the original work that [plaintiff]
may be said not to be its author." The court distinguished the "Monty
Python" case as one in which the unpermitted editing resulted in an "ed-
ited version [that] simply made no sense."
It is against this background that commentators have argued that the
colorization of a motion picture without the permission of the author
may be found to confuse consumers into believing that those creators
approved of or created the altered version.' 97 Courts have acknowledged
that substantial alterations may violate unfair competition laws.' 98 None-
theless, similar to the copyright analysis, minor changes would not lead
consumers to confuse products or their affiliation with a certain source.
The changes need to be material in order to deceive consumers. 99 Oth-
erwise, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act would be construed as a general
moral rights statute, which does not enjoy federal protection."' 0 In addi-
tion, a broad interpretation of the unfair competition cause of action
194. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-5; Winick, supra note 141, at 172, 174.
195. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-5; MCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:83.
196. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:83; Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F.
Supp. 44, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Considine v. Penguin, U.S.A., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
197. Winick, supra note 141, at 174 n.143.
198. Under the doctrine of false designation of origin, see Stevens v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 148
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755,757 (Cal. 1966); Schatt v. Curtis Mgmt. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp. 902,913
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
199. Paramount, 724 F.Supp. at 821; Winick, supra note 141, at 175-76.
200. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26; McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27.0812][c][iii], [2][d].
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would undermine the standards that Congress intended to set with the
Copyright Act. The unfair competition claim merely gives competitors
other than the copyright owner or licensee legal standing. It would un-
dermine the copyright owner's rights in the work and its monopoly to
market and exploit the works, if a competitor with some financial inter-
est at stake is allowed to pursue these interests. Such a result causes an
unacceptable tension between competitor's rights and the rights of the
copyright holder.2° '
D. Ambush Advertising
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can be triggered in cases of "am-
bush advertising." Although section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is prima-
rily designed to protect consumers from confusion, it is well established
that it also protects commercial interests of competitors. 02 Consumer
confusion, however, is not the primary concern in ambush marketing
cases; the courts ultimately seek to protect legitimate business interests
and sponsorship agreements. Much similar to the false endorsement cat-
egory, ambush advertising is a type of marketing by a company that is
not an official sponsor of an event, but which centers its advertising cam-
paign around the event to induce customers to pay attention to the ad-
vertisement and appears to be one of the official sponsors.20 3 The
advertisement may only remind customers of the event, or it may go
further to create the misleading impression that the company is an offi-
cial sponsor regarding these goods or services or is affiliated with the
event. In any event, a misleading impression is created that may lead the
public to believe that the owner of the advertisement sponsored or oth-
erwise approved the use of the advertisement.20 4 Through advertising
and promotional campaigns, the ambushing company tries to confuse
consumers and to misrepresent the official sponsorship of the event. In a
broader sense, rather than such direct and intentional misrepresentation,
ambush marketing refers to a company's attempt "to capitalize on the
goodwill, reputation and popularity of a particular sport or sporting
event by creating an association without the authorization or consent of
201. Winick, supra note 141, at 176.
202. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:25, p.27-40; see also, S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580.
203. Davis, supra note 157, at 430; McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:66, p. 27-100.
204. Mastercard Int'l, Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1963,
1966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (following Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 205).
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the necessary parties. ' 2°5 Another type of ambush advertising may arise
when a company, which has a valid license from the event sponsor for a
defined market, uses the event to also promote goods or services outside
of its defined market. This, in effect, impinges on the rights of another
company who has exclusive rights in the invaded market.20 6 This scena-
rio applies to professional sports in a unique manner: All of the major
sports leagues prohibit non-sponsors from using league logos, official
team uniforms, hats and insignia in advertisements, but nothing prohibits
them from sponsoring individual teams. In an event where the market is
invaded by another non-exclusive sponsor, the company whose market
has been invaded may have standing to sue for false advertising." 7
Virtual advertising opens a whole new field of possibilities for these
types of ambush advertising.0 8 Virtual advertisements appear in the
background of the broadcast of the sporting event. They implicate that
the copyright owner of the game, the clubs and/or the owner of the origi-
nal advertisement approved the advertised products for just that loca-
tion. If this is not the case, the advertisements create the misleading
impression that the virtual advertiser invested large sums in sponsoring
the sporting event, which the category of ambush advertising under sec-
tion 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act seeks to prevent. In due course, the
virtual advertiser capitalizes on the reputation and goodwill of the sport-
ing event and gains a free-ride on the goodwill of the exclusive or official
sponsors.20 9 The sponsors spend enormous amounts of money to be
called the exclusive sponsor of major sporting events.210 "By diluting the
value of the corporate sponsorship, ambush marketing ultimately jeopar-
205. Lori L. Bean, Ambush Marketing: Sports Sponsorship Confision and the Lanham
Act, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1099, 1100 (1995).
206. See limitations for official sponsorship in Nat'l Hockey League v. Pepsi-Cola Ca-
nada, Ltd., 92 D.L.R. 4th 349, 369 (Brit. Columbia Sup.Ct. June 2, 1992).
207. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:66; Mastercard Int'l, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1965-66.
208. Goddard, supra note 15, at 1 (comparing the situation with ambush advertisements
in Mastercard Int'l, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1966; John A. Nagy, Today's Column Brought to Us By
(Your Ad Here), GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 28, 1997; Wayne Walley, SciDel's Virtual
Ads Stay Underfoot, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Nov. 27, 1995, at A2 (acknowledging the possibility
of ambush advertising). Advertisers argue that because teams control the sale of space to
both kinds of advertisers, "that doesn't happen," see William Power, Signs of the Times; Virtual
Promotions Give Sports Advertisers a State-of-the-Art Advantage, FORT WORTH STAR-TELE-
GRAM, Aug. 2, 1998, at B4 ; the fact is, however, that virtual advertising enables third parties
to alter and therefore control the broadcast signal, allowing ambush advertising; see Snel,
supra note 5, at 1D.
209. Bean, supra note 205, at 1100; Davis, supra note 157, at 430; Wall, supra note 35, at
144.
210. Davis, supra notel25, at 424.
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dizes the financial vitality of sporting events."21' "One popular indirect
ambush technique involves buying commercial time prior to and during
event broadcasts." '212 Virtual advertising goes beyond that by not only
lessening the quality of the original advertising or the sporting event it-
self, but also by lessening the value of the advertisements during com-
mercial breaks. These advertisers may seek to prevent virtual advertisers
from diluting the distinction between program and commercial breaks,
which may eventually generate the impression of an advertising channel.
Finally, if consumers are exposed to virtual advertising, this does not
necessarily mean that there are fewer commercials. In turn, sports
broadcasting is abused for commercial exploitation.21 3 Even though vir-
tual advertising does not always depict the typical scenario, in which an
advertiser seeks to create a mental association between the consumer
and the non-existing sponsorship by advertising in addition to the ex-
isting sponsorship advertisements, the scenario resembles ambushing in
an obtrusive manner. Not only can virtual advertisements be added to
the broadcast without the knowledge of the involved parties, for exam-
ple, other advertisers, virtual advertisers are also enabled to delete, or
even substitute the existing banners. Such anticompetitive behavior
should therefore be banned as well.
"Still, because the traditional consumer protection approach to sec-
tion 43(a) [Lanham Act] is irrelevant to sponsorship and licensing con-
tracts and because ambush marketing claims are relatively new, courts
have yet to establish an appropriate analysis to deal with the protection
of sponsorship agreements. '' 21 4 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act consti-
tutes an appropriate and useful basis to fill the gap between contract law
and copyright law in order to protect third party advertisers. After all,
official sponsors and licensees who spend millions of dollars to affiliate
themselves with an event and a trademark surely will not hesitate to en-
force their exclusive rights.
211. Bean, supra note 205, at 1100-01.
212. Id. at 1103. In order to counter Visa's advertisement of its wide acceptance at the
Olympics, American Express bought substantial advertising time on major networks. Id.
213. Jim Abbott, A Different Playing Field, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 1998, at D1.
214. Bean, supra note 205, at 1129.
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E. Impact of Consumer Protection
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was designed to protect consumers
as well as commercial interests from the effect of false advertising.
215
One dangerous element of virtual advertising is that it is part of a trend
in which the advertiser shapes the entertainment and information con-
tent of this society.216 The consumers' perception of reality in the shape
of a live or recorded television broadcast is ultimately diluted, distorted,
and cluttered. Consumers are "blanketed in a continuous fog of spon-
sored pitches. '218 The development begins to highlight the possibility to
touch content and change it.219 To prevent this blurring of reality by en-
gendering virtual images, the viewer could be informed of the existence
of virtual advertisements. Early on, some teams and broadcasting com-
panies ran disclaimers in their broadcasts to disclose that some advertise-
ments viewers would see were virtual substitutes or inserts. But this
practice has stopped. 2 The average consumer in today's age of digitali-
zation may even be well aware of the fact that he is constantly exposed
to advertising and hence does not need such a disclaimer. On the con-
trary, virtual advertisement puts television on better competitive footing
with the Internet, where viewers readily accept promotional messages as
part of the content mix. 22 However, the intrusion of the television
viewer's privacy deserves even more protection, because by virtue of a
remote control he is not capable of choosing the setup of his television
screen, like he is when surfing the World Wide Web.
The issue is if this topic is merely a question of morality or ethics222
or if the law should step in, as it does in Europe for certain situations.22
Even in the liberal American advertising market, this technology can
push commercialism just over the line, leading to a William Gibson or
215. Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers, Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1981); Coca-
Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987); see Wegman Bums, supra
note 205, at 833-34.
216. Paul Farhi, Finding Versatility in the 'Virtual Ad'; Sports Broadcast Stations, Advertis-
ers Warm Up to Billboards That Aren't Really There, WASH. PosT, Aug. 18, 1998, at Cl.
217. Virtual Advertising Comes up Roses For Sponsors Bowl Viewers to See Logos Not
Really There, FLA. TimEs-UNIoN, Jan. 1, 1999; Digital Deception; TV Can Insert Ads Into
Programs After They're Filmed, FRESNO BEE, Apr. 1, 1999, at B6.
218. Elliott, supra note 2, at Cl.
219. McEvilly, supra note 18, at 611.
220. Power, supra note 208, at B4; see also, James Hattori, et al., Computer Technology:
That's Entertainment, 2000, available at http://www.cnn.com/1999/SHOWBIZ/Movies/12/31/
entertainment.future/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
221. Wilkinson, supra note 20, at 36.
222. Goddard, supra note 15, at 1.
223. See infra Part VI.
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George Orwell-like alteration of reality.224 For sports fans it could even
affect the sanctity and credibility of the sport to have commercials
spread out along the sidelines, the walls, the air, or even on the playing
field.225 Virtual advertising generates more airtime for sponsors, squeez-
ing more money out for the network?2 6 Retransmissions of sporting
events generate even more revenue, whereas it also harms sports per-
formers, because they are degraded to objects of commercialism.22 7 This
scenario becomes even worse for the viewer and more offensive for the
performers in cases where the virtual advertisement is animated. Such a
use creates an annoying and distorting background to the action on the
playing field. 28 The courts will have to ask themselves if the consumer
will ultimately accept a television environment in which reality cannot be
distinguished from virtuality, content cannot be separated from advertis-
ing and advertising is ultimately encroached into athletics.2 29 As it
seems, television landscape has done so. The line is drawn, where a com-
petitor is involved and financial interests are at stake. The line is crossed
in cases where the virtual advertiser substantially alters, adds, or deletes
existing advertising, thereby causing harm to the competitor.
VI. VIRTUAL ADVERTISING IN EUROPE
Virtual advertising is not codified in most of the fifteen member
states of the European Union. No regulations were incorporated into the
1997 Television Without Frontiers Directive that regulates the television
broadcasting activities among the member states?230 However, the per-
manent council of the European Council for trans-national television
224. David Williams, See You at The Virtual Ballpark, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis,
TN), Apr. 13, 1999; William Gibson, Neuromancer, 1984, at *51 ("Cyberspace. A consensual
hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators . .
225. Zelkovich, supra note 21, at 1.
226. Dan Caesar, Hidden Ads are Adding up to Poor Sports, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Feb. 28,2000, at C5 ("...toying with reality for a profit motive is a device that should be left to
the movies and the video games, not something that is being presented as a legitimate live
event. A question arises: What's next?").
227. Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1823 (1975), at
817-825 (testimony of John 0. Coppedge on behalf of NCAA).
228. Dougherty, supra note 4, at E6.
229. Denise Gellene, The Cutting Edge; The New Age Ad; 'Virtual Billboards' May be a
Boom for Businesses, But Will Viewers Take to Them?, L.A. TiMEs, Sept. 16, 1996, at D1.
230. Council Directive 89/552/EEC, as amended by Directive 97/36/EEC, art. 10, 11, 13,
1997 O.J. (L 202) 60 et seq. ("[Directive on the] coordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in member states concerning the pursuit of televi-
sion broadcasting activities").
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recommended that the exclusively responsible broadcast station should
retain the ultimate control over the content of a transmission. They
should ensure the compliance with articles 7, 10 and 11 of the Conven-
tion. These provisions prohibit the certain uses of advertising, such as
surreptitious advertising or the use of subliminal techniques.131 It also
prohibits advertising during the program as opposed to the designated
commercial breaks. 32 The permanent council, therefore, recommends
that the presence of virtual advertising messages during the broadcast of
sporting events should be indicated to the viewers at the beginning and
the end of the program. Furthermore, in no case should virtual advertis-
ing messages transform the perception or the understanding of the
event, or be detrimental to its visibility.23
The Television Directive is valid law in all member states of the Eu-
ropean Union. Most countries incorporated the provisions verbatim into
national statutory law. Some countries even added special provisions for
virtual advertising. The new German Broadcast Treaty among its 16
states, which will be effective in April 2000, generally allows virtual ad-
vertising to replace existing advertisements at the venue in sport broad-
castings, provided its presence is indicated to the viewer at the beginning
231. Id.
232. The Directive includes the following terms for television advertising:
Article 7
member states shall ensure that broadcast stations under their jurisdiction do not
broadcast cinematographic works outside periods agreed with the rights holders.
Article 10
Television advertising and teleshopping shall be readily recognizable as such and kept
quite separate from other parts of the programme service by optical and/or acoustic
means. Isolated advertising and teleshopping spots shall remain the exception. Adver-
tising and teleshopping shall not use subliminal techniques. Surreptitious advertising
and teleshopping shall be prohibited.
Article 11
1. Advertising and teleshopping spots shall be inserted between programmes. Pro-
vided the conditions set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 are fulfilled, advertising and teleshop-
ping spots may also be inserted during programmes in such a way that the integrity and
value of the programme, taking into account natural breaks in and the duration and
nature of the programme, and the rights of the rights holders are not prejudiced.
2. In programmes consisting of autonomous parts, or in sports programmes and simi-
larly structured events and performances containing intervals, advertising and teleshop-
ping spots shall only be inserted between the parts or in the intervals....
Article 13
All forms of television advertising and teleshopping for cigarettes and other tobacco
products shall be prohibited.
233. Recommendation by the Permanent Committee of the European Council for Televi-
sion Without Frontiers, 12th Session, March 1997.
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and the end of the respective program. The United Kingdom permits the
use of electronic imaging systems under similar prerequisites." 4 In addi-
tion, the United Kingdom provisions prohibit virtual advertising if the
use results in a discernible degradation of picture quality and restricts
the licensee's right to insert virtual advertising while providing him with
a right to refuse to carry virtual advertising. Spain goes even further by
requiring the consent of all parties involved for the substitution of ex-
isting advertisements through virtual advertising.
The Netherlands, Italy, France, Greece and Denmark did not adopt
any legislation on virtual advertisement. Therefore, the respective statu-
tory or common law rules on telecommunication, competition, and ad-
vertising are applicable. While the directive requires these countries to
adopt the minimum standard as it is set forth in articles 7, 10, 11 et seq.,
the interpretation of the existing law eventually exceeds these standards.
This has to be kept in mind for any sports broadcast to and from these
countries.35
In general, the European countries take a more restrictive approach
towards virtual advertising, yet they realize its advantages. Whereas, for
the European Soccer community it is a useful means to render the use of
existing advertisements more efficient, the Latin American countries ex-
ercise a much more liberal approach. Consequently, the FIFA has
adopted fairly restrictive regulations for the broadcasts of its members'
games3 6 Notwithstanding, the use of virtual advertising is crucial for the
survival of the Formula One in Europe in light of the ban on tobacco
advertising.237 However, the limitations are fairly strict; generally, only
physically existing advertisements can be replaced by virtual advertise-
234. Code of Programme Sponsorship, which is published by the Independent Television
Commission (ITC). Rule 13.5 of this Code requires compliance with the ITC Sponsorship
Guidance Note on "Virtual Advertising."
235. Norway, as a non-member of the EU, also has no specific regulation on virtual ad-
vertising. For television advertising during sporting events in general, it adopted an even
more restrictive approach under the 1992 Broadcasting Act by allowing advertising in sports
broadcasts only in 'natural breaks' or the designated breaks, such as half-times. Virtual adver-
tising may well be not allowed at all. However, this restriction only applies to Norwegian
broadcast stations and broadcasts in Norway only, since Norway is not a member of the EU.
The broadcast is also targeted at EU member states would lead to the application of the
above-mentioned rules.
236. FIFA Regulations for the Use of Virtual Advertising § 6, available at http://www.
fifa2.comfifahandbooklVa/downloads/VirtualRegse.txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2000); How-
ever, it is not necessary to point out the existence of virtual advertising to the viewers.
237. Article 13 Television Without Frontiers Directive (1999), available at http://
vw.nomos.de/nomos/zeitschr/zumlpdf/zum1099t.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).; However,
Formula One was able to negotiate an extension until 2006 for the ban to come into full effect,
because it depended on tobacco advertising more than any other industry.
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ments. Under no circumstances is a broadcast station entitled to insert or
substitute virtual advertisements without the consent of the rights hold-
ers." 8 The underlying object for these restrictions is the principle of sep-
aration between program and advertising, which furnished the heated
legal discussion. 39 After all, the present standard for the use of virtual
advertising in Europe is still far from being uniform.
VII. CONCLUSION
The complex legal problems that arise out of the unauthorized use of
virtual advertising could ideally be avoided by including explicit terms in
the marketing agreements between the leagues, the individual clubs, the
owners of the venue, sports marketing and broadcasting companies and
advertisers. Such terms should proscribe the insertion, substitution, and/
or deletion of existing virtual and non-virtual advertisements without the
consent of the parties involved. Under the compulsory license program,
an explicit agreement on advertising is replaced by the specific rules of
sections 111(c)(3), 119(a)(4), and 122(e) of the Copyright Act, which
prohibit any unauthorized, willful alteration of the content and the com-
mercial advertising of the original transmission. Even though these pro-
visions do not explicitly include virtual advertising, the legislative intent
and the history indicate their application. If no agreement exists and sec-
tions 111, 119, and 122 of the Copyright Act do not apply, common law
offers a promising remedy.
Having in mind the specific rules for the alteration of secondary
transmissions, sections 501, 106(2), and 201(a)(6) of the Copyright Act
are applicable concurrently. Although the placement of advertisements,
the unique selection of camera angles, lighting, and other decisions by
the director of a sports broadcast do not require substantial amounts of
creativity or originality, they do meet the minimum standards of creativ-
ity required to constitute an audiovisual work of authorship. For this rea-
son, anyone who materially alters this unique selection of images in a
sports broadcast transmission without or in excess of a valid license is
preparing an unauthorized derivative work and is therefore a copyright
infringer. The scenario applies to substantial alterations of the unique
selection of advertisements in a sports broadcast by inserting virtual ad-
238. It is unclear, however, who owns the rights - the broadcasting company, the owner
or tenant of the in-stadium advertisement, or the holder of the television rights.
239. This principle is based on Art. 10, Section 1 Television Without Frontiers Directive;
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Neue Werbeformen und der Grundsatz der Trennung von Werbung und
Prograrnm, ZErrscHmur FOR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT 672, 1999, available at http://
www.nomos.de/nomos/zeitschr/zumlpdf/zumlO99t.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
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vertisements. If such alterations were allowed, the original copyright
owner would lose control over his or her work and its distribution, tak-
ing away the owner's exclusivity provided by section 106 of the Copy-
right Act. This result is consistent with Congress' underlying intent to
protect the copyright owner from intrusions that violate his or her exclu-
sive right to commercially exploit the work and receive an equivalent
benefit for the creative endeavor. Part of the constitutional guarantee
"to promote the progress of science and useful arts" 240 is to guarantee
the author the right to exploit his achievement financially, by using ad-
vertising and especially if advertising is part of the overall impression. If
the author would not get a financial return for the work, he or she would
be deprived of an incentive to create works.241 Even though the accom-
plishment to insert an advertisement and select the camera angles and
images is not substantial, the adjacent financial interests at stake play an
overwhelmingly important role in the copyright of sports broadcasting.
The Copyright Act protects these interests on a case-by-case basis, inso-
far as some of the original expression is taken by another person, de-
pending on the impact of the alteration on the overall impression of the
work.
In summary, the explicit statutory scheme for compulsory licenses
bars any alteration of the original broadcast, including virtual advertis-
ing. In the cases that do not fall within this scheme, copyright protection
should only extend to alterations by virtual advertising to that part of the
broadcast that meets the requirement of a modicum of intellectual labor
involved in a sport broadcast. An example of this would be if the in-
serted or substituted advertisement distorts the overall impression or the
individual arrangement of advertising in the background of a sports
broadcast.
In cases where this alteration affects the overall impression of the
sports broadcast by changing or even diluting the entire sports perform-
ance, there may even be an unfair competition claim under section
43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act. The analysis of this claim for "false ad-
vertising" focuses even more on consumer protection, while also protect-
ing competitors. This cause of action is, therefore, not only available for
the copyright holder, but also for competing advertisers. Plaintiffs can
allege "false endorsement" or "ambush advertising" under the general
240. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
241. See Brown, No. 98-20736 2000 WL 48992 at *5, n.4 ("... major objective of the
Copyright Act to support and encourage artistic and scientific endeavors"); Zacchini, 433 U.S.
at 576.
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unfair competition. In these scenarios, the public is misled by the misrep-
resentation of the virtual advertiser, who creates the false mental associ-
ation in the viewers mind that he is officially authorized to advertise in
the designated spot. In turn, the authorized advertiser suffers direct fi-
nancial damage, because he did not receive the contractual benefit of
television exposure that he paid for, and/or the goodwill is diminished
and conferred to the virtual advertiser. Both situations equally affect fair
competition if the alteration is substantial. The seriousness of harm is
based on the effect on the consumer and on competing advertisers. In
the worst case scenario, the technology can mislead the public, defame
the persons depicted, deprive the original artists of control over (and
compensation for) subsequent changes to their work, and destroy the
delicate credibility and objectivity of all visual images.242 Generally, un-
authorized substitution using virtual advertising implicates unfair market
behavior to the disadvantage of the original owner of the advertising.
Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act was designed to prevent such
behavior in the advertising market.
Transmitters should be aware of liability under U.S. common law es-
pecially for broadcasts of U.S. sporting events in Europe.243 Virtual ad-
vertisers, who use the technology to insert advertisements into
broadcasts from other countries, are subject to liability under the Lan-
ham Act where the plaintiff has standing, is able to prove all of the sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act elements, and shows an impact on U.S.
commerce.2 1 On the other hand and in light of the increasing number of
international sporting events, broadcast stations, the drafters of market-
ing and broadcasting agreements and courts should be aware of the strict
standards in Europe. Many of these countries prohibit the use of virtual
advertising on the playing field during the game action. Broadcast sta-
tions are often required to give notice to the viewer of the use of virtual
advertisements. The underlying policy seeks to protect the integrity of
242. Raphael Winick, supra note 141, at 155.
243. Steele et al. v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,286 (1952) ("Congress has the power
to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the United States, al-
though some of the acts are done outside the territorial limits of the United States"). The
United States government has the power to enforce the Lanham Act beyond the territorial
limits of the United States under the following conditions: 1) the acts impact U.S. commerce;
2) the defendant is a citizen of the U.S.; and 3) "application of the act would not interfere with
the laws of a foreign nation."
244. Gordon Breach Sci. Publishers v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 905 F.Supp. 169, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991);
McEvilly, supra note 18, at 626; see also, Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633,
641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
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the sport and the consumer from exposure to a stream of undetectable
alterations of reality by blurring the line between program and
advertising.
The American advertising environment does not meet these high
standards of consumer protection in Europe. However, the law provides
sufficient remedy to protect the rights holders. Beyond the point of sub-
stantial alterations by virtual advertising, the existing statutes and princi-
ples of copyright law and the law of unfair competition can effectively
protect and balance the competing needs of copyright owners, advertis-
ers, broadcast stations, players, and the public. Up to this point, only a
defined set of contractual terms or specific legislation for all sorts of digi-
tal alterations in television transmissions can ensure that the conflicting
interests are fairly protected in the digital age.
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW PERSPECTIVE
CITIUS, ALTIUS, FORTIUS?
A STUDY OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE
IN SPORT
JACK ANDERSON*
"Nothing should be punished by the law that does not lie beyond
the limits of toleration."
-Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals
I. INTRODUCTION
This article intends to examine what role, if any, the criminal law
should have in regulating and sanctioning violent behaviour "beyond the
touchline."' The principal focus will be on the crime of assault. Gener-
ally, that which is done by consent is no assault at all, though this is not a
license to inflict serious harm. However, what role does consent play in
modem contact sports where physical aggression of a kind that would
otherwise be deemed illegal, is permitted? In short, contact sports, or
what were once called "manly diversions," have long received an exemp-
tion from the lower thresholds of consent. Accordingly, this article will
address three broad issues; the origins of this "sporting" exemption, its
justification under criminal legal theory and its actual application. In dis-
cussing these objectives, focus will be on the Anglo-Irish experience of
this area of the law. Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn as to the rela-
tionship between violence, sport and the criminal law not only as to the
effects of criminal violence in sport but also as to its causes.
II. MANLY DIVERSION: R. v. CoNEY
It is suggested that an ideal starting point in contemporary legal atti-
tudes to violence in sport is provided by the infamous prize-fighting case
of R. v. Coney.2 The judgments in this case contain many insights into
* Professor of Law at University of Limerick, Ireland.
1. The English barrister Edward Grayson, now President of the British Association of
Sport and the Law, first used the phrase.
2. The Queen v. Coney, 8 Q.B. 534 (1882).
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the birth of modern criminal law's approach to sporting violence. In
brief, the judgments suggest that even sporting activities as manifestly
violent as gloved boxing, may be permitted as "manly diversions," so
long as public order and safety is not threatened.3 These policy consider-
ations apart, Coney is also an enlightening initial reference on the con-
troversial question of so-called "sporting consent." The judgments in
Coney may provide an answer as to why levels of force that would nor-
mally be criminal assaults are deemed lawful once inflicted in the course
of a game.
The facts of the case are straightforward. On June 16, 1881, at the
close of the Ascot races, two men, Mitchell and Burke, were seen fight-
ing each other in a ring, formed by ropes surrounded by posts, in the
presence of a large crowd.4 The combatants were assisted by their
"seconds" Parker and Symonds.5 In addition, three named prisoners,
Coney, Gilliam and Tully and five other persons were seen amongst the
crowd.6 They were also charged in an indictment containing a number of
counts for unlawful assaults, riot and rout.7 At trial, all counts except the
seventh and eighth were given up by the prosecution.8 The seventh count
charged all prisoners, except Burke, with a common assault upon him.'
The eighth count charged all prisoners, except Mitchell, with a common
assault upon him.' °
In defence of Coney and the other spectators, two principal argu-
ments were forwarded. Firstly, that it was questionable whether the com-
batants were guilty of assaults upon each other and secondly, that it was
incorrect to state that the defendants were aiding and abetting the fight
given that they took no active part in the fight or its management.1' The
initial argument centred on the proposition that the offence of aiding
and abetting could only have been committed where it was a criminal
activity that was being encouraged by the party charged.' 2 It followed
that in order for an assault to have been committed, it was necessary that
the act had been executed without the consent of the alleged victim.' 3
3. Id. at 539-40.
4. Id. at 535.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 534-35.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 536.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 539-40.
12. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 539.
13. Id.
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Thus, counsel for the defendants argued that since Burke and Mitchell
consented to their fight, an assault could not have occurred. 4
As regards the second defence, witnesses supplied evidence that the
named prisoners did not participate in any way in the fight, its organisa-
tion or in any of the betting activity that surrounded the occasion.' 5 In
fact, one witness said that the crowd was so tightly packed that it would
not have been possible for Coney to push his way out! 6 It was claimed
that the prisoners' attendance at the fight was merely passive in nature.' 7
At trial, the chairman directed the jury that prizefights are illegal and
all persons who go to such an event to see the combatants strike each
other, and who are present when they do so, are guilty in law of an as-
sault on the grounds of aiding and abetting.'8 In this, the chairman added
the words of Justice Littledale in R. v. Murphy to his direction "[i]f they
were not casually passing by, but stayed at the place, they encouraged it
by their presence, although they did not say or do anything."'"
The jury found that Burke and Mitchell were clearly guilty of assault
on each other as combatants, as were Parker and Symonds, who directly
aided the management of the fight.2" The jury also found that Coney,
Gilliam and Tully were guilty of assault, but only in consequence of the
chairman's direction of law.2' The jury could not hold, as a matter of
fact, that Coney and the others were aiding and abetting.22
The chairman asked the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal as
to whether his direction to the jury on this matter was correct3' Eleven
judgments were handed down and on a clear eight to three majority the
conviction of the spectators was quashed.24 The Court was of the opinion
that mere voluntary presence at such an event could not be translated
into aiding and abetting a criminal activity.' Nevertheless, in this in-
stance, it is not so much the debate on active, as opposed to passive
presence, at a criminal event that is important. It is the nature of this
particular criminal event that interests us, i.e., the sport of prize fighting.
14. Id. at 538-39.
15. Id. at 539.
16. Id. at 535.
17. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 535.
18. Id. at 537-38.
19. Id. at 537 (citing R. v. Murphy, 172 Eng. Rep. 1164, 1165 (1833)).
20. Id. at 536 (holding all duly sentenced to six weeks imprisonment with hard labour).
21. Id.
22. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 536.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 534.
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To this end, it is well to note the reasons why the court was unanimous in
holding that prize fighting was illegal and what these, essentially policy,
concerns can contribute to the modem judicial view of aggressive sport-
ing activities.
Justice Cave, after reviewing relevant authorities such as Matthew v.
Ollerton,26 R. v. Perkins 7 and R. v. Lewis28 was of the opinion that in
agreeing to fight in the fashion that they did, Burke and Mitchell were
clearly guilty of assault.2 9 He continued,
The true view is, I think, that a blow struck in anger, or which is
likely or is intended to do corporal hurt, is an assault, but that a
blow struck in sport, and not likely, intended to cause bodily
harm, is not an assault, and that, an assault being a breach of the
peace and unlawful, the consent of the person struck is immate-
rial. If this view is correct a blow struck in a prize-fight is clearly
an assault; but playing with single-sticks or wrestling do not in-
volve and assault; nor does boxing with gloves in the ordinary
way... .30
What Justice Cave meant by boxing in the "ordinary" way is open to
question, though presumably he intended it to encapsulate sparring as
regulated by the Queensbury rules. In addition to this brief review of
"sporting consent," Justice Cave also dismissed the trial judge's direction
to the jury with alacrity, observing, "[w]here presence may be entirely
accidental, it is not even evidence of aiding and abetting. Where pres-
ence is prima facie not accidental it is evidence, but no more than evi-
dence, for the jury."'" In affirmation, Justice Cave referred to authority
such as R. v. Atkinson,32 R. v. Borthwick,33 and R. v. Perkins34 where
similar issues were considered and in particular to two "duelling" cases
of R. v. Young35 and R. v. Cuddy. 6
26. 90 Eng. Rep. 438 (1724).
27. 172 Eng. Rep. 814 (1831).
28. 174 Eng. Rep. 874 (1844).
29. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 539.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 540.
32. 11 Cox C.C. 330, 333 (1869) (indicting persons for serious rioting; held that mere pres-
ence among the rioters did not render the person liable).
33. 99 Eng. Rep. 136 (1779).
34. 172 Eng. Rep. 814 (1831) (finding Perkins guilty of assault as a combatant in a prize-
fight, as were certain spectators directly involved in the management of the fight, one who
acted as Perkins' second, one who collected the money i.e., a bookmaker, and one who kept
the ring clear).
35. 10 Cox C.C. 371 (1871).
36. 174 Eng. Rep. 779 (1843).
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In the particular "duelling" cases referred to above, Young concerned
the indictment of the prisoners for the murder of Mr. Mirifin, who was
killed in a duel by a Mr. Elliot.37 Young assisted in the preparation of the
duel and was deemed a principal of the second degree.38 In Cuddy, the
prisoner was charged with aiding and abetting a Mr. Munro in the mur-
der of a Colonel Fawcett, whom Munro had shot in a due. 39 Wilams, in
directing the jury stated "[w]hen two persons go out to fight a deliberate
duel, and death ensues, all persons who are present on that occasion,
encouraging or promoting that death, will be guilty of abetting the prin-
cipal offender."4 Applying this "active participation" test, Cave distin-
guished Murphy and held that the present conviction ought not to
stand.4'
Stephen, Lopes, North, Huddleston, and Denam, agreed with Cave
that the trial judge's reliance on Murphy was incorrect and that mere
presence at a prize fight did not automatically sustain a charge of aiding
and abetting.42 Similar to Cave, they distinguished between deliberate
presence at the event and mere casual attendance.43 However, unlike
Cave, these judgments did not consider, at any great length, the issue of
the combatant's consent to the fight. On the majority side, this issue
seems to have been left to Cave and Hawkins.
Hawkins eloquently reviewed the status of consent in criminal assault
[a]s a general proposition it is undoubtedly true that there can be
no assault unless the act charged as such be done without the con-
sent of the person alleged to be assaulted, for want of consent is
an essential element in every assault, and that which is done by
consent is no assault at all.. .. 4
Hawkins continued with reference to R. v. Guthrie4 s and R. v. Billing-
ham46 that "it is not in the power of any man to give an effectual consent
to that which amounts to, or has a direct tendency to create, a breach of
the peace; so as to bar a criminal prosecution. '47
37. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 541.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 542.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 543.
42. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 549-50, 552, 557-58, 561, 567.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 553.
45. 11 Cox C.C. 522 (1870).
46. 172 Eng. Rep. 106 (1825).
47. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 553.
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Again, applying the "moralistic" test that a man may compromise his
own civil rights but not the public interest, Hawkins was clear:
that every fight in which the object and intent of each of the com-
batants is to subdue the other by violent blows, is, or has a direct
tendency to, a breach of the peace, and it matters not, in my opin-
ion, whether such fight be a hostile fight begun and continued in
anger, or a prize-fight for money or other advantage.4
8
At first instance, it would seem to supporters of the sports of boxing
and martial arts that such a holding renders their sports illegal. Indeed,
this feeling is exacerbated by Hawkins's immediate reference to R. v.
Ward49 as support for his proposition that every fight containing an ele-
ment of a violent trade of blows is illegal." In the stated case, "the pris-
oner was tried for the slaughter of a man whom he had killed in a fight to
which he had been challenged by the deceased for a public trial of skill in
boxing. No unfairness was suggested, and yet it was held that the pris-
oner was properly convicted."'"
Hawkins did admit however, "[t]he cases in which it has been held
that persons may lawfully engage in friendly encounters not calculated to
produce real injury or to rouse angry passions in either, do not in the
least militate against the view I have expressed."52 Thus, it would seem
that boxing as practiced under the Queensbury rules, martial arts, and
indeed contact sports in general, were exceptions to this rule on the
grounds that they are neither breaches of the peace, nor are they calcu-
lated to be productive thereof. In short, such sports can be deemed so-
cially acceptable on the grounds that they are not designed to produce
mischief.
Nevertheless, even under the colour of a friendly encounter, where
the parties really have as their object the intention to beat each other
until one of them is exhausted or subdued by that force, and so engage in
a conflict likely to end in breach of the peace, each is liable to be prose-
cuted for assault.53 According to Hawkins, it is a matter of fact for the
jury to decide whether the circumstances of the fight are socially accept-
able or not.5
4
48. Id. at 553.
49. 12 Cox C.C. 123 (1872).
50. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 554.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. R. v. Orton 14 Cox C.C. 226, 227 (1878) (holding that it appeared to be an organised
boxing match, but the severity and intensity of the punishment inflicted was such as to go
beyond that which would be expected in a gloved boxing match of fixed duration).
54. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 558.
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On this dubious thread of policy does the legality of boxing hang.
The legality of this sport is defined in entirely negative terms, i.e., it is
not prize fighting which is illegal because it disturbs the peace and may
incite rioting and social disorder. As Papworth argues:
it does not seem possible to distinguish [as Hawkins attempted to
do] between those fights which are assaults and thus deserving of
the sanction of the criminal law and those which are not assaults
on the basis of the intention of the parties, when in truth, both
prize fighters and boxers seek the same end; 'to hurt the opponent
more than he is hurt himself.'55
Papworth is forced to conclude that "the apparent immunity of boxing
from the sanction of the law defies rational explanation,"56 and that all
one can surmise is that boxing remains "outside the ordinary law of vio-
lence because society chooses to tolerate it."57
In conclusion in Coney the dissenting judgments, agreed xvith the
view that in no way could one consent to that which is clearly an illegal
act and contributes to a disturbance of the peace, thereby threatening
public order and safety.58 As Matthew stated simply on the matter,
"[t]here is, however, abundant authority for saying that no consent can
render that innocent which is in fact dangerous."59 Moreover, it is pre-
cisely on these grounds of public protection that Chief Justice Lord
Coleridge, Pollock, and Mathew took a firmer line on the prisoners' at-
tendance at the fight. The learned judges took the view that the best way
to rid society of this vicious practice was to punish those who sustain it
with their support. 60 As Chief Justice Lord Coleridge remarked:
[i]n such a case as this the spectators really make the fight; with-
out them, and in the absence of any one to look on and en-
courage, no two men, having no cause of personal quarrel, would
meet together in solitude to knock one another about for an hour
55. Neil Papworth, Boxing and Prize Fighting: The Indistinguishable Distinguished?, 2
SPORT & L. J. 5, 8 (1994) (citing R. v. Brown, 2 WKLY. L. REP. 556, 592 (1993)).
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Brown, 2 WK.y. L. REP. at 592). For a select bibliography on the legality of
boxing see: Edward Grayson, Boxing Clever, 142 N.L.J. 48 (1992); Steve Greenfield & Guy
Osborn, A Gauntlet for the Glove: The Challenge to English Boxing Contracts, 6 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 153 (1995); Kelly Howard, Regulating the Sport of Boxing - Congress Throws the
First Punch, 7 SEroN HALL J. SPORT L. 103 (1997); Neil Papworth, Parliament and the Boxing
Bill, 4 SPORT & L.J. 24 (1996); Mike Seabrooke, Going to Hell in Your Own Way, 142 N.L.J.
438 (1992).
58. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 534.
59. Id. at 547.
60. Id at 534.
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or two. The brutalizing effects of prize-fights are chiefly due to
the crowd who resort to them ...
To this end, fellow dissenter, Mathew, noted:
a prize-fight, which is an assault, and therefore contrary to the
law, takes place in public, in order that it may be witnessed by
spectators. The spectators by their presence lend themselves to
the purpose of the combatants, and countenance and encourage
them in a violation of the law. They therefore aid and abet.62
It must be noted, though, that Manisty representing the majority took
great care to dismiss this view:
[i]t is said that if the ruling of the chairman is not upheld a great
impetus will be given to prize fighting. I do not share in that ap-
prehension. It is well settled law that every person who by his
presence or otherwise encourages a fight, be it prize or an ordi-
nary fight, is guilty of a criminal offence, that is to say, of an as-
sault or manslaughter, as the case may be, but it is for the jury in
each particular case to say as a matter of fact whether the accused
did by his presence or otherwise encourage the combatants to
fight... Suppose that the fight in question had resulted in the
death of one of the combatants, then, if the direction given to the
jury was right, every person who was in the crowd was in point of
law guilty of manslaughter... I cannot believe such is the law of
England.63
The question that now needs to be addressed is whether or not that pro-
position and the principles underlying it, namely that there is recognition
of a limited level of sporting consent, is the current law of England.
III. THE PROBLEM OF "SPORTING" CONSENT
The essence of Coney is succinctly stated by McCutcheon
"[a]pplications of force which would normally be criminal assaults are
lawful when inflicted in the course of a game. The traditional explana-
tion has been that the law recognises the consent of the participants as
providing a defence. '64 To this effect, Coney reaffirmed earlier decisions
such as R. v. Bradshaw65 and R. v. Moore66 as regards the legal limits to
which sports participants can consent to bodily harm within the course of
61. Id. at 569.
62. Id. at 548.
63. Coney, 8 Q.B. at 562-63.
64. Paul McCutcheon, Sports Violence, Consent and the Criminal Law, 45 N. IR. LEGAL
Q. 267, 267 (1994).
65. 14 Cox C.C. 83 (1878).
66. 14 T.L.R. 229 (1898).
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their sport. (In fact, it could be argued that Coney extended the principle
first enunciated in these cases by including non-fatal violence.) In the
former case, the accused during a football game struck an opponent in
the stomach with his knee, resulting in the eventual death of the oppo-
nent.67 Bramwel's seminal direction to the jury is well-held as the source
of criminal law's involvement in sport, much of which merits lengthy
quotation:
[I]f a man is playing according to the rules and practice of the
game and not going beyond it, it may be reasonable to infer that
he is not actuated by any malicious motive or intention, and that
he is not acting in a manner which he knows will be likely to be
productive of death or injury. But, independent of the rules, if the
prisoner intended to cause serious hurt to the deceased, or if he
knew that, in charging as he did, he might produce serious injury
and was indifferent and reckless as to whether he would produce
serious injury or not, then the act would be unlawful. In either
case he would be guilty of a criminal act and you must find him
guilty; if you are of a contrary opinion you will acquit him.6 s
Given the evidence, the jury acquitted the footballer on the manslaugh-
ter charge, after representation had been given by an umpire that no
unfair play had occurred.6 9 Twenty years later, in Moore, a similar fac-
tual scenario led to a guilty verdict.70 Resonant of Bramwell, Hawkins
directed the jury that "[n]o one had a right to use force which was likely
to injure another, and if he did use such force and death resulted, the
crime of manslaughter had been committed."'71
In the above cases, Bramwell and Hawkins were faced with three
questions. 72 Firstly, did the victim consent to the act?73 Secondly, was the
act of a nature that the victim could effectively consent to it?74 And
thirdly, what threshold of consent should apply herein?75 Both lordships
were of the view that, in sport, the victim would have consented to
whatever the rules permitted and that it was reasonable to suggest, given
67. Bradshaw, 14 Cox C.C. at 84.
68. Id. at 85.
69. Id. at 84.
70. Moore, 14 T.L.R. at 230.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Moore, 14 T.L.R. at 229.
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the formulated rules of the recognised sport of football, that these rules
were of a nature that they could be effectively consented to.76
Thirdly, while evidence that the accused was acting within the rules
would be of obvious benefit to the accused,77 it was clear from the judg-
ments, Bramwell in particular, that it was immaterial whether the ac-
cused broke the rules or not if the accused "intended to cause serious
hurt to the deceased, or if he knew that, in charging as he did, he might
produce serious injury and was indifferent and reckless as to whether he
would produce serious injury or not, '78 or, as Hawkins suggested, "[n]o
one had a right to use force which was likely to injure another. '79
Therefore, it is submitted that the above cases imply that the criminal
law's intrusion into the sporting sphere is founded on the basis that de-
liberate and/or reckless tackling causing injury, particularly in breach of
the playing laws of that particular game, creates a prima facie offence. It
seems, from the above, that the threshold of "sporting consent" in as-
sault is breached where intention or knowledge that the act was likely to
cause serious injury is proven.
This basic proposition has been implicitly reaffirmed in more recent
cases, beginning with the Court of Appeal decision of R. v. Donovan,80
where it was stated firmly, "[i]f an act is unlawful in the sense of being in
itself a criminal act, it is plain that it cannot be rendered lawful because
the person to whose detriment it is done consents to it. No person can
license another to commit a crime."' 81 This view was reiterated in the
Attorney General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980).82 In this case, two youths
of 18 and 17 decided to settle an argument by a fistfight.83 One of them
sustained a bleeding nose and bruises to his face and it was held that the
other was guilty of assault occasioning bodily harm as:
it is not in the public interest that people should try to cause or
should cause each other actual bodily harm for no good reason
76. It follows that, in the unlikely instance of a recognized game having rules that permit-
ted an unacceptably dangerous act, a court could hold that the act was unlawful, notwithstand-
ing the victim's consent. See generally JOHN SMITH, SMITH AND HOGAN'S CRIMINAL LAw, 410-
11 (9th ed., 1999).
77. In later judgments, it is also acknowledged that players consent to actions, and can be
reasonably held to act, outside the rules of the game but within the "spirit" of the game. The
spirit of the game is taken to include the incidental norms of play Le., incidents though strictly
prohibited by the rules, regularly occur in the ordinary course of play.
78. Bradshaw, 14 Cox C.C. at 85.
79. Moore, 14 T.L.R. at 230.
80. 2 K.B. 498 (C.A., 1934).
81. Id. at 507.
82. 2 All E.R. 1057 (1981).
83. Id. at 1058
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... [I]t is immaterial whether the act occurs in private or in public;
it is an assault if actual bodily harm is intended and/or caused.
This means that most fights will be unlawful regardless of
consent.
84
In this, the court added the reminder, "nothing which we have said is
intended to cast doubt upon the accepted legality of properly conducted
games and sports," (this being justified in the public interest).8 5
This exception is not confined to organised games. There is also what
one could call a "horseplay" exception, in that consent by boys to such
activities may be a defence to a charge of inflicting serious bodily harm if
there is no intention to cause injury, as per R. v. Jones.8 6 It is suggested
that there is an element of recognition in this case that schoolboys have
always behaved in such fashion and probably always will.87 In fact, a
genuine belief of consent in these circumstances, even if unreasonably
held, may negative recklessness, as per R. v. Aitken."8 In this case, mem-
bers of the RAF set fire to each other's clothes as part of over-exuberant
celebrations.8 9 The injuring parties, who were initially court-martialed,
were held to have genuinely believed that the victim, who suffered se-
vere burns, had consented to the acts. 90 Presumably, similar reasoning
would apply to unorganised games such as "tackle."
IV. No LICENSE FOR THUGGERY: RECENT ENGLISH CASE LAW
In any event, contemporary English case law is no less insistent that
the inherent violence of sport cannot go unhindered. Chief Justice Lord
Lane observed in R. v. Lloyd, that while "forceful contact was allowed
by the rules [of rugby union and semble the Law] ... [t]he game was not,
84. Id. at 1059. SMITH, supra note 76, at 410 (questioning this definition and, in particular,
they have difficulty with the use of "or should cause" and "and/or." They suggest that these
words imply that the act done to the other with consent is an assault, though it is not intended
to cause harm, if in fact it does. Smith and Hogan refer to Case and Comment: Manslaughter,
42 CRiM. L. Rnv. 570, 571 (1995) where both the defendant and the plaintiff engaged in vigor-
ous sexual activity. The victim consented and did so lawfully. During the activity, a ring that
the accused was wearing injured the victim and resulted in her death. The defendant was
charged with manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act. Judge J was of the opinion that
it would be incorrect to treat as criminal, activity which would otherwise amount to an assault
merely because an injury was caused).
85. Id.
86. Case and Comment: Inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm, 34 CRIM. L. REv. 513 (1987).
87. Id.
88. 1 WKLY. L. REP. 1006 (1992).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1018.
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however, a licence for thuggery." 91 Admittedly, the consistent sentiment
expressed by Lord Lane markedly contrasts to the more sporadic prece-
dents of the earlier criminal courts. Indeed, it wasn't until the late 1970s
that a burgeoning of this type of prosecution was witnessed on these
islands.
In fact, R. v. Billinghurst92 was the first successful prosecution of a
rugby footbaler for assault occasioning actual bodily harm for incidents
occurring on the field of play. 93 This case centred on an amateur rugby
game in South Wales where, during the course of a rather rugged en-
counter, the accused broke his opponent's leg.94 The victim was a prison
officer whose principals were not content to lose his services in such a
manner without an attempt to let similar offenders realise the potential
consequences of such behaviour.95 Therefore, by the time David Bishop,
a Welsh international player, punched an opponent on the ground, away
from the ball, during a club rugby match in South Wales in 1986, an
incident which, because of the intensity of the violence therein attracted
a considerable amount of publicity, neither he nor his club could claim
that they were unaware of the legal consequences.96 In the case itself,
Mr. Bishop pleaded guilty to common assault for the "off the ball" inci-
dent and was duly convicted and sentenced to one month imprisonment,
varied to one of twelve months suspended by the Court of Appeal. 97
Despite the notoriety of the above case involving an internationally
renowned player, this ignorance of the penal repercussions of the crimi-
nal law remained and a litany of sports prosecutions arising from on-
field violence littered the jurisdiction in the 1980s. Rugby Union, in par-
ticular, contributed to this increase and included R. v. Gingell, where a
conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm was successful, leading to a
sentence of six months, which was overturned and reduced to two
months imprisonment.98 Furthermore, in 1986, in R. v. Johnson, the ac-
cused bit the ear off of an opponent in a police rugby union match and
was, quite rightly, charged with the infliction of grievous bodily harm
with intent contrary to §18 of the Offences Against the Person Act,
91. Case and Comment: Violence, 36 CriM. L. REv. 513, 514 (1989).
92. Case and Comment: Assault, 22 CRIM. L. REv. 553 (1978).
93. Id. at 553.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. John Goodbody, Rugby International Jailed for Punch, TIwrs (London), Sep. 2, 1986.
98. Case and Comment: Sentence, 25 CRIM. L. REv. 661 (1980).
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1861.99 Johnson was subsequently convicted and sentenced to six months
custodial imprisonment, confirmed on appeal.1"'
These prosecutions were not confined to the rugby field, and in 1988,
in Swindon Magistrates' Court the accused, Chris Kamara, a profes-
sional soccer player, broke the jaw of a fellow professional soccer player
after a match. Subsequently, in R. v. Kamara,'0 ' Mr. Kamara pleaded
guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to §20 of the Offences
Against the Person Act, 1861, and was fined a total of £1500, including
compensation and costs.10 2 It is interesting to note that on February 6,
1997, the Irish Times reported that Bradford had decided to initiate legal
action against Huddersfield defender Kevin Gray, following his poten-
tially career ending tackle on Bradford's record signing of the time,
Gordon Watson.' 3 The criminal proceedings against Gray were insti-
gated after a meeting, on that date, between Bradford chairman Geof-
frey Richmond, club directors and manager Chris Kamara, whose
familiarity with the criminal courts was no doubt invaluable in the
circumstances. 0 4
1988 had also seen, in Wood Green Crown Court, the case of R. v.
Birkin.'05 In this instance, the accused had run after and struck an oppo-
nent who had 'late' tackled him.'0 6 The accused duly pleaded guilty to
assault occasioning actual bodily harm and was sentenced to eight
months imprisonment, reduced on appeal to six months.0 7 Similar pros-
ecutions for what could be dubbed 'assault in retaliation' can be found in
R. v. Davies,' though there seems to be a thin line between such a
conviction and an acquittal based on the loosely defined defence of 'acci-
dent', successfully pleaded in R. v. Rees.'0 9 It is interesting to note that
in the later cases the resulting injury had tragic, fatal consequences.
Arguably however, the most specific and significant contribution to
the position of sport viz the criminal law, in recent times, can be found in
99. PC Who Bit Player Loses Appeal, TIMEs (London), Oct. 15, 1986.
100. Id.
101. John Goodbody, Kamara Fined £ 1200 in Pitch Assault Test Case, TiMtEs (London),
Apr. 15, 1988.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Case and Comment: Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm, 35 Crim L. REv. 854
(1988).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 855.
108. Case and Comment: Assault, 38 Crim L. Rnv. 70 (1991).
109. Edward Grayson, Sport and the Law, in ALL E.R. ANN. RFv. 362, 365 (1992).
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R. v. Brown."' In Brown, where the law on consent was fully reviewed,
the House of Lords confirmed that the existing law on the area indicated
that, whereas consent negatives liability for minor harm, the victim's
consent does not provide a defence where actual bodily harm is inten-
tionally or recklessly caused, unless the case falls within a range of spe-
cial "socially acceptable" categories, including lawful sports and
games."' In the latter context, Lord Mustill's dissenting speech is most
authoritative and well worth citing at length, his Lordship taking the
view that:
Some sports, such as the various codes of football, have deliberate
bodily contact as an essential element. They lie at a mid-point
between fighting, where the participant knows that his opponent
will try to harm him, and the milder sports where there is at most
an acknowledgement that someone may be accidentally hurt. In
the contact sports each player knows and by taking part agrees
that an opponent may from time to time inflict upon his body (for
example by a rugby tackle) what would otherwise be a painful
battery. By taking part he also assumes the risk that the deliber-
ate contact may have unintended effects, conceivably of sufficient
severity to amount to grievous bodily harm. But he does not
agree that this more serious kind of injury may be inflicted
deliberately."'
The present law of England, as stated by Lord Mustill in Brown, is
that no one can consent to serious bodily harm and the participant can-
not, therefore, consent to the fact that he might be seriously injured."' It
suffices to say that, from a practical point of view, this view of "sporting
consent" has been strongly question regarding its functional applicability
to the nature of sport. Indeed, in 1994, the UK Central Council of Physi-
cal Recreation ("CCPR") similarly queried the above principle, and
their response is worth citing at length:
This raises a crucial question for sport. Does a player who walks
on to a pitch be it cricket, football or rugby, for example, consent
to the fact that he may be injured but not to the fact that he might
be seriously injured? Is it right that no one can consent to the risk
110. 2 WKLY. L. REP. 556 (1993).
111. Id. at 592-93.
112. Id.
113. Additionally, see the support this approach has received in the UK Law Commis-
sion's Consultation Paper dealing, infra, with violence in sport entitled: "Consent and Of-
fences Against the Person, Consultation Paper No. 134." This report was published on
February 23rd, 1994, and is reviewed in detail by Alexander Radley, A Study of Consent to
Violence in Sport with Particular Reference to the Law Commission Paper No. 134, 3 SPORT &
L. J. 47 (1995).
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of serious injury? If a rugby tackle is made within the rules of the
game (i.e., not too high and not too late) but nevertheless is an
extremely hard tackle and the opponent sustains a serious injury
as a result of the tackle, the question has to be, did the opponent
consent to that tackle? Hard tackles in rugby are not only en-
couraged but applauded. Any player must, we submit, therefore
consent to being tackled hard by walking onto the pitch. If we
assume that the tackler did not intend to injure his opponent but
did intend to tackle him as hard as he possibly could and if a court
held that he applied more force than was strictly necessary and
was therefore reckless as to whether his opponent was injured,
(notwithstanding the fact that the rules not only permit hard tack-
ling [but] actively encourage it) the tackler would not perhaps be
able to rely on the defence of consent." 4
To this end, the CCPR argues that the line of lawful consent in sport
should be drawn on the grounds of what they term the "lawfulness" of
the activity in question i.e., that a player consents to the risk of injury,
perhaps even serious injury, provided the rules of the sport in question
are adhered to."' This, the CCPR suggests, addresses the problem that
arises in many sports where a particular skill of that game carries an
almost unavoidable sense of risk, for example, fast bowling in cricket." 6
As the law stands, a bowler who continues to bowl in this fashion and
injures the batsman would risk criminal liability, given that the consent
threshold is one of injury and not serious injury.117 However, if the line
was drawn at "lawfulness," the batsmen would be seen to have con-
sented to the risk of injury, even serious injury, provided the bowler was
bowling within the rules and, also, what one could term the "spirit" or
"culture" of the game i.e., what was an accepted and expected part of the
game." 8
The CCPR's argument is that the criminal law should be wary, if not
reluctant, to interfere "beyond the touchline" and, when it does so, as it
clearly must from time to time, it should do so from the proper perspec-
tive i.e., the norms and values of that sport." 9 The CCPR submits that
the essential (and practical) problem for the law as it now stands is, that
114. Central Council of Physical Recreation, The Law Commission: Consultation Paper
No. 134 Criminal Law - Consent and Offences against the Person; A Response on the Issues for
Sports and Games, 3 SPORT & L. J. 4 (1995).
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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in assessing whether the player's conduct is criminal, conformity to the
rules of the game is merely persuasive in nature. 120 Unsurprisingly, the
CCPR is of the opinion that this is clearly wrong and to be avoided for it
may result in an undesirably interfering role for the criminal law in sport,
paradoxically threatening the spontaneity, the athleticism and genuine
competitiveness that it seeks to protect. 2 ' As the CCPR put it simply
and conclusively in its reply to the UK Law Commission report of 1994,
If the courts are to decide whether an activity is lawful by means
of objective criteria and not by means of the rules of a particular
game, then there is also a danger that the offending player would
not be tried by reference to what was acceptable to his sport but
by reference to the opinions on the sport in question by a judge
and jury who may never have played his sport. 2
V. IRISH CASE LAW
Ireland has seen some development in this area of the law, particu-
larly as regards the sport of Gaelic football." The most serious incident
to date occurred in April, 1999, when a Galway footballer was jailed for
nine months. 24 McCutcheon points out, between 1987 and 1992 four
other similarly-based cases were referred to the Director of Public Pros-
ecutions.'2 More recently, a number of prosecutions have been noted
and on February 19, 1998, the Irish Times reported that a player had
pleaded guilty to assault occasioning actual bodily harm to an opponent
during a North Dublin, Gaelic football, under-21 final in 1995.126 The
Dublin Circuit Criminal Court heard that the incident which led to lat-
ter's jaw being broken occurred near the end of a game played amid
intense hostility between the rival supporters and that there had been
frequent crowd incursions onto the playing field and that this atmos-
phere had ultimately contributed to blows being struck between the
players.' 27
In addition to criminal cases, more and more civil actions are being
initiated for football assaults, although the old "omerta" tradition of
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Jack Anderson, Violence, Sport and the Law: An Application to Gaelic Games, 7
SPORT & L. J. 51 (1999).
124. Footballer Gets 9 Months for Injuring Player in Junior Match, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 9,
1999, at 6.
125. McCutcheon, supra note 64, at 271.
126. Sentence on GAA Player Adjourned, Irish Times, Feb. 19, 1998, at 4.
127. Id.
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"tell 'em nothing" still pervades and there is a certain social reluctance
among those involved in sport to invoke or at least co-operate with the
legal process. The law is not seen as a credible sanction for such assaults
and it is interesting to note that in two recent assault cases taken in Ire-
land for violence in sport, both were unsuccessful on the grounds of mis-
taken identity, both judges expressing their exasperation at the
uncooperative attitude of the parties involved including the refereeing
officials. One notes a case taken by an aggrieved footballer in the Navan
District Court in June, 1997 where the defendant was cleared of assault
occasioning actual bodily harm in a Meath senior Gaelic football match
in October, 1996 on the grounds of mistaken identity. 2 Similar grounds
of mistaken identity led to the dismissal of a claim in damages brought
by Donegal Gaelic footballer against an opponent who it was alleged
broke the victim's jaw in the match in question.2 9
Given these developments, it is argued that the games organising
body, the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) will have to reflect on a
number of issues, notably, the provision of a comprehensive insurance/
compensation scheme for injured players, a reorganisation of the current
disciplinary structures and possibly a consideration of the continuing sus-
tainability of the amateur status of the GAA at all levels. In fact, in
many of the recent cases mentioned above, reference was made to the
inadequacy of the GAA's current compensation scheme for injured play-
ers. This insurance-based injury scheme allows for payment of up to
£25,000 once medical evidence of injury is submitted but it is a notori-
ously dilatory system. Apparently, it is extremely difficult to secure
compensation from the fund for the player as aggravated by the fact that
the amounts paid may not suffice the payment of all medical bills, partic-
ularly in the case of serious injury. In addition, there is no compensation
outside of medical expenses, therefore time off work is at the players'
own expense, and it is regularly the case that players depend on the
fund-raising of team-mates to get by. Surely this is not acceptable and it
may be time for the GAA to introduce a comprehensive, "no-fault"
scheme of compensation as operated by an independent body. As one
leading hurler who himself suffered a serious injury has remarked, if the
GAA does not act soon they may end up facing a nightmarishly enor-
mous compensation bill such as given in the Ian Knight case.130
128. GAA Referee and Linesman Criticism in Assault Case, IRISH TiMES, Jun. 26, 1997, at
9.
129. GA.A Footballer Loses for Damages Against Garda, IRISH TixMs, Nov. 14, 1997, at 7.
130. Philip Reid, Absence Makes Dunne's Heart Grow Stronger, IRISH TimEs, May 17,
1999, at 55. The Knight case refers to English soccer and ex-footballer Ian Knight's claim for
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VI. RECENT IRISH DEVELOPMENTS
In the early 1990s, the Law Reform Commission (LRC) undertook a
review of the law on offences against the person. Many of its recommen-
dations were adopted in the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act,
1997.11' The provision significantly overhauled this area of the law. In
particular, it abolished the common law offences of assault and battery
and repealed the relevant provisions of the Offences Against the Person
Act, 1861.132
The LRC Report on Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person devoted
a brief section to the issues of sports violence and it presents a useful
summary as to the issues involved in this area of the criminal law.133
Generally, as regards violence in sport, the Irish LRC was of no doubt
that criminal liability should continue to attach to acts of violence com-
mitted in the course of sporting activities. 3 The LRC was not minded to
recommend the extension of a general exemption to persons engaged in
contact sports.135 Nevertheless, the LRC was of the opinion that the
criminal law should be viewed as the "policeman of last resort" in these
circumstances. 136 Borrowing heavily from a similar review by the Cana-
dian Law Reform Commission, the Irish LRC was of the opinion that
the curbing of sporting violence in the long term is better served by ad-
ministrative and educational measures from the sporting bodies
themselves.137
The LRC's report also specifically reviewed the question of "sport-
ing" consent. The LRC's brief analysis of this area of the law was quite
similar to that which has been enunciated in the English courts. Accord-
ing to the Commission, a participant in a sport may be regarded as con-
senting to any contact in accordance with the rules of the game, and/or
any contact of an accidental nature, arising incidentally in the course of
£1.5 million in the Sheffield High Court in the UK for an "over the top" tackle during an FA
Cup match in 1987. At the time, the claim was the largest made for alleged recklessness on the
pitch; it was settled after a day of trial for an estimated £500,000. (reported as Ex-football Star
Claimns £1.5n Over Tackle That Ended Career, IRISH INDEP., Oct. 14, 1997.)
131. LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON NON-FATAL OFFENcns AGAINST THE PER-
SON, 1994, Cmnd. 45, at 272. (hereinafter LRC).
132. A brief background to the 1997 Act is given in an Explanatory Memorandum that
accompanied its publication. Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997 (Explanatory
Memorandum issued by the Department of Justice, February, 1997).
133. Id. at 272-75.
134. Id. at 274-75.
135. Id. at 275.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 272-73.
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it.138 In short, if the requisite intent or recklessness is absent and the
contact is within the rules and the spirit of the game, the fact that the
force used is likely to cause injury will be irrelevant. 39
In an overall sense, the LRC justified this somewhat laissez-faire atti-
tude to violence in sport on two grounds. Firstly, on the grounds of pub-
lic policy, where the justification of the self-regulation of sport is
tolerated, as "[p]articipation in sports promotes fitness and good health,
discipline, teamwork and self-control.' 140 Secondly, the Law Reform
Commission quite rightly alluded to the fact that the criminal law is a
rather blunt instrument when it comes to regulating violence in sport. 4 '
If a person suffers a severe injury as a result of taking part in a contact
sport, the Law Reform Commission was of the opinion that as the victim
undertook that risk of injury as part of a lawful sporting activity, it would
then be unjust to prosecute the injuring partner. 42 The LRC felt that the
individual concerned would, in effect, be a 'scapegoat' for the sport as a
whole and unjustly targeted. 43 The LRC stated that it would be far bet-
ter if, on seeing that there was no possibility of prosecution, public de-
bate would be generated as to whether or not the sporting activity in
question, which frequently resulted in serious harm, should be
proscribed.'"
VII. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the approach of the Irish LRC towards the issue
of violence in sport is quite reasonable. Contact sports are exempted
from the usual scope of consent to assault not only on the public policy
grounds that they are good for the health of society, but also, because
their methods of self-regulation are for the main part satisfactorily
drawn. This exemption is not however a license for thuggery, and where
138. Id. at 273.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 274.
141. Id. at 275.
142. Id.
143. A similar view is taken in the United States, see generally Don Eugene-Nolan Gib-
son, Comment, Violence in Professional Sports: A Proposal for Self-Regulation, 3 L. REFORM
COMMISSION OF CAN. 425, 439-440 (1981); RICHARD B. HoRRoW, SPORTS VIOLENCE: THm
INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW MAKING AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1980); GOvERN-
MENT AND SPORT: THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES (Arthur T. Johnson & James H. Frey eds.,
1985); and Karen Melnik, Giving Violence a Sporting chance: A Review of Measures Used to
Curb Excessive Violence in Professional Sports, 17 J. LEGIS. 123 (1990).
144. LRC at 274-75. (With similar reasoning the LRC rejected that idea that boxing
should be singled out in specific legislation.)
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the inflicted injury is clearly intentional and reckless to the extent that it
is beyond the rules and norms of the game in question, the criminal law's
threshold of toleration will be breached. This seems to be the accepted
position both in the English and Irish courts. It is also the well-estab-
lished view in many other parts of the common law world, notably
Canada. 145
Finally, and as stated earlier, the history of contact sports is rooted in
injury, violence and mishap. Indeed, it is submitted that contact sports
provide an outlet for physical contact of a kind not normally tolerated by
society is, to a large extent, the raison d'etre of these sport's popularity.
The criminal law has given the public reasonable scope to pursue these
activities and only when this exemption is abused to the extent that it
threatens general public behavioural standards, will the courts act.
Sporting bodies should be careful not to abuse this privilege. They
should ensure that they have a strict, consistent and transparent discipli-
nary code. And to borrow a phrase from one of the most popular contact
sports on these islands, rugby union, if sports authorities do not properly
use their power of self-regulation to combat excessive violence in their
sports, they may lose it, to the criminal courts.
145. R. v. Green, 16 D.L.R. 137 (1970); R. v. Maki 14 D.L.R. 164 (1970); R. v. Cey 48
C.C.C. 480 (1989).
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COMMENTS
TITLE VII: AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY FOR
GENDER INEQUITY IN
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
I. INTRODUCTION
The quest for gender equality in college athletics is a road that has
been heavily traveled. For well over twenty-five years, women have pur-
sued equal opportunities on the playing field.' The main avenue utilized
in achieving that goal has been the application of Title IX of the Educa-
tion Act of 19722 (hereinafter Title IX) to collegiate athletic programs.3
While this legislation has allowed women to make great strides in their
quest for athletic equality, which has frequently resulted in increased
participation opportunities for women, it has not fully remedied the
problem of gender inequity. Accordingly, while the use of Title IX has
effectively increased opportunities for women and eliminated a portion
of the existing gender bias, it has not eliminated all of the gender ineq-
uity present in collegiate athletic programs. As such, Title IX should not
be the only available remedial option for female athletes facing
discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 (hereinafter Title VII) pro-
tects individuals from employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex and national origin.5 If colleges and universities are
defined as employers of the scholarship athlete, as they should be, pro-
tection under Title VII becomes available.6 Accordingly, a female ath-
lete who does not receive the same privileges of "employment" as a male
1. Daniel Mahony & Donna Pastore, Distributive Justice: An Examination of Participation
Opportunities, Revenues and Expenses at NCAA Institutions 1973-1993, 22 J. SPORT & Soc.
IssuEs 127, 127 (1998).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
3. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1994).
5. EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, FILING A CHARGE OF JOB DISCRINMINA-
TION (1999) [hereinafter EEOC].
6. Protection under Title VII is not predicated on being an employee; it is available to any
individual. However, this comment will focus on disparate treatment females receive regard-
ing fringe benefits of employment as college athletes. Accordingly, Title VII will be discussed
in the context of an existing employer-employee relationship.
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athlete should have the ability to file a discrimination claim using Title
VII because her employment rights will have been violated.
Although, at first glance, Title IX seems an adequate remedy to the
problem of gender discrimination in college athletics, it has not been
completely effective thus far. As stated, Title IX has primarily been used
to effectuate a positive change in the number of female participants in
collegiate athletic programs. Title VII, however, can be effective in bal-
ancing the benefits received between male and female college athletes.
Title VII provides a new avenue that can be taken in the pursuit of gen-
der equity. When applied to college athletics, Title VII would undoubt-
edly rejuvenate the quest for gender equality; it would provide a new
and useful method for achieving the goal.
This comment will primarily address the viability of a Title VII claim
in the area of college athletics. First, however, the comment will discuss
the impact of Title IX on college athletics thus far, and the disparate
treatment female athletes continue to experience. Next, Title VII will be
discussed, specifically the requirements for filing a Title VII claim. Em-
phasis will be placed on the idea that under Title VII, an employer-em-
ployee relationship exists between the scholarship athlete and the
educational institution. Next, the benefits of using Title VII to remedy
gender inequity in college athletics will be discussed. Finally, the com-
ment addresses potential ramifications of applying Title VII to college
athletics.
As stated by Robert Frost, at times taking the road less traveled is
what makes all the difference. 7 By applying Title VII to college athletic
programs, a world of difference can be made regarding gender inequity.
II. GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
A. History
Historically, female athletes have not dominated college athletic pro-
grams. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, opportunities for women inter-
ested in participating in college athletics were quite limited.8 It is
estimated that in 1969, only about 16,000 women competed in college
athletics.9 Although opportunities for women increased slightly, women
still accounted for less than 20% of athletes at National Collegiate Ath-
7. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, reprinted in TiiREE BoOKs 119 (1916).
8. Daniel Mahony, Collective Reaction to Injustice in Intercollegiate Athletics, 23 J. SPORT
& Soc. IssuEs 328, 329 (1999).
9. R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, The Status of Women in Intercollegiate Ath-
letics, in WOMEN, SPORT AND CuLTum 111, 112 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole eds., 1994).
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letic Association (hereinafter NCAA) member institutions during the
1970s.10 Additionally, female athletes did not receive financial assis-
tance in the form of scholarships until the mid-1970s, and then only ap-
proximately ten thousand dollars per year was spent directly on college
athletics for women."
In contrast, opportunities for male athletes in the 1970s were numer-
ous. In 1973, approximately 165,000 men competed at NCAA member
institutions, accounting for more than 90% of participation.' 2 Division I
schools spent more than $1.5 million per year on male athletic pro-
grams. 3 It is clear by looking at this comparison that the "opportunities
and resources spent on men's college sports were significantly larger
than what was afforded the women.""'
Although there was clearly disparate treatment of female athletes in
the 1960s and 1970s, an analysis of more recent NCAA data indicates
that change has occurred in the distribution of athletic resources at
NCAA member schools.'" In 1994, there were over 160,000 female col-
lege athletes.'6 As compared to 1973, women have approximately 57%
more opportunities to participate at NCAA schools.' 7 In addition, the
amount of money used to fund women's collegiate athletics increased
dramatically during the same period of time."8 Although disparate treat-
ment still exists, primarily in the area of benefits received by female ath-
letes,' 9 positive changes have occurred." Participation opportunities
have increased, and there has been a rise in the funding available to
female athletic programs.2' These changes are due, in large part, to the
application of Title IX to college athletics.
10. Mahony, supra note 8, at 332.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 332-33.
15. Id.
16. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 9, at 112.
17. Mahony, supra note 8, at 330.
18. Id. at 331.
19. Felice Duffy, Twenty-Seven Years Post Title IX: Why Gender Equity in College Athlet-
ics Does Not Exist, 19 QUmNnPIAc L. REv. 67, 68 (2000).
20. Mahony, supra note 8, at 330.
21. Id. at 329.
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1. Title IX Defined
Title IX "forbids discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational
program or activity receiving federal funds."'22 In pertinent part, the
statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance .... "I
Congress enacted Title IX in response to a finding of "pervasive dis-
crimination against women with respect to educational opportunities."24
Case law dictates that "Title IX was passed with two objectives in mind:
to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices,
and to provide individual citizens effective protection against those prac-
tices."'25 Although the statute does not identify athletes directly, it had
an immediate impact on collegiate athletic programs "because differ-
ences in opportunities and resources provided strong evidence of dis-
crimination. ' 26 As interpreted by the courts, Title IX was "designed to
remedy gender discrimination against the underrepresented athletes-
either men or women." 27
Those challenging Title IX identified its potentially disruptive effect
immediately.2 8 In 1984, those in opposition won a major battle. The
court in Grove City College v. Bell29 held that "Title IX applied only to
those specific programs that received federal funds, and not to an entire
institution."3 This decision had a very limiting effect on the potential
impact of Title IX "because the majority of college athletic departments
did not receive direct federal aid."'"
Fortunately for female athletes, the "program-specific approach" was
rather short-lived.32 In 1988, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act, which, in effect, "reestablished the institutional approach for
Title IX.,,33 This required all programs at educational institutions, in-
22. Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Sexual Violence Against Women: Defining the Limits
of Institutional Responsibility, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 55, 74 (1998).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
24. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (1St Cir. 1996).
25. Id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
26. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
27. Keley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237, 243 (D. Ill. 1993).
28. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
29. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
30. Id. at 573-74; Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
31. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 129.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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cluding athletics, receiving federal funds to comply with Title IX.3" This
change led to widespread litigation concerning Title IX's effect on the
inequities present in college athletics.35
2. Title IX Applied
While both men and women have filed cases alleging gender discrim-
ination under Title IX, the majority of cases focus on the application of
Title IX to remedy the disparate treatment that female athletes re-
ceive.36 There can be no argument that, since its passage in 1972, women
have used Title IX to their advantage. The opportunities for women to
participate in college athletics, the funding for female programs, and the
number of scholarships available for female athletes have all increased in
the past twenty years.37 However, while some feel "[t]here is little doubt
that the passage and the threat of enforcement of Title IX resulted in a
vast improvement in the sporting opportunities and resources available
to girls and women in... institutions of higher education in the U. S.,5"
3 8
Title IX's application to college athletics has not solved all problems
stemming from gender inequity. "Despite Title IX's many victories over
the last several years, equality for female athletes remains an unmet goal
at most schools. ' 39 Gender inequality still runs rampant within college
and university athletic programs.4 °
B. Present Discrimination
The previous section addressed the ways in which Title IX sparked
positive change in the quest for gender equality in college athletics. At
first glance, Title IX provided a more than adequate remedy for gender
inequity. However, despite some improvement, gender equity in inter-
collegiate athletics has not been achieved.4' While it is undisputed that
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The application of Title LX to college athletics is quite detailed and complex; accord-
ingly, an entire comment could be dedicated to the application of Title LX alone. However,
because the primary focus of this comment is the proposed application of Title VII to college
athletics, Title IX is only discussed in a general sense.
37. Mahony, supra note 8, at 329.
38. Annelies Knoppers, Politics, Public Policy and Title IX, in WoMiEN, SPORT AND CUL-
ruR, supra note 9, at 97, 103.
39. Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road
Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 Duicn J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 51, 68
(1996).
40. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 139.
41. Id.
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Title IX has been a catalyst for reform of college athletic programs, it has
not eliminated the disparate treatment female athletes endure.42 "In
1997, it was estimated that 80% to 90% of the athletic programs of...
post-secondary educational institutions were not in compliance with Ti-
tle IX."' Arguably, female athletes still face gender inequity. The gen-
der inequity that continues to exist is best evidenced by examining the
following five aspects of male and female athletic programs.
1. General Participation
In 1995, there was a national average of 8.35 college sports teams per
university for men and 8.04 college sports teams per university for wo-
men.4 4 On its face, that statistic seems to indicate that gender inequity,
in terms of participation opportunities, is almost nonexistent. However,
the previous statistic fails to indicate that the average number of male
athletes participating in college athletics, per institution, was 245, while
the average number of female athletes was only 143.4 1 Further support
that athletic participation levels are still disproportionate can be found
by looking at, for example, the male/female athlete to student ratio at
Louisiana State University (hereinafter LSU). Currently, the student
population at LSU is 51% male and 49% female; however, the popula-
tion participating in the athletic program is 71% male and 29% female.46
In addition to the previous statistics, a trend has developed amongst
educational institutions that indicates the discrepancy that exists be-
tween male and female participation rates. To facilitate Title IX compli-
ance, and ensure that the sports offered and participation opportunities
provided for male and female athletes are comparable, many universities
eliminate men's non-revenue sports teams, instead of increasing oppor-
tunities for women.47 "This trend is likely to continue because the court
held in Kelley v. University of Illinois4s that using this strategy (eliminat-
ing men's opportunities while maintaining the same number of female
opportunities) was a legally appropriate way to achieve Title IX compli-
ance. ' 49 Male athletes have almost twice the number of participation
42. Mahony, supra note 8, at 329.
43. Duffy, supra note 19, at 68 (citing NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETc AssoCIATION,
NCAA GENDER EQuIry STUDY (1997)).
44. Id. at 92 (citing Brian Metzler & Carol Rowe, Poor Sports, BOULDER NEWS, Apr.
1997, at 4).
45. Id.
46. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878 (5 h Cir. 2000).
47. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 139.
48. 832 F. Supp. at 237.
49. Id. at 244; Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 142.
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opportunities as female athletes." Accordingly, educational institutions
would rather decrease the male opportunities than increase female op-
portunities to equal the opportunities available to both sexes." This
remedy, while legally appropriate under Title IX, is not an effective solu-
tion. Moreover, it demonstrates the disparate treatment female athletes
receive regarding participation opportunities.
2. Recruiting and Scholarships
"In 1992, twenty years after the enactment of Title IX, on average,
less than 20% of recruiting funds went to women in college athletics,
25% of the total operating budgets went to women, and institutions allo-
cated only 20% to 42% of athletic scholarships to women. '5 2 These per-
centages remain accurate today.53 Overall, female athletes receive
approximately $184 million less in athletic scholarships than do male ath-
letes, and male athletes "have more than three times the financial re-
sources in the areas of recruiting and operating expenses. 5 4
A recent survey published by The Chronicle of Higher Education in-
dicates that over one hundred colleges or universities currently allot a
disproportionate percentage of their scholarship and recruiting budgets
to female athletes.5 For example, Miami University had a total scholar-
ship budget of $3,215,937 as of June 2000.56 Of that, $1,025,262, or 32%,
was allotted to females.5 7 However, 45% of the athletes at Miami Uni-
versity are females. 58 Accordingly, the budgetary allocation of scholar-
ships for female athletes is disproportionate. 9
In the area of recruiting budgets, as of June 2000, Miami University
allotted $268,006, or 72% of its total recruiting budget to male teams,
while only $103,887, or 28%, was allotted for recruiting female ath-
50. Duffy, supra note 19, at 92. The discrepancy between male and female participants is
most likely attributable to college football programs. Admittedly, there is no female
equivalent to men's football. Thus, the athletic opportunities for females at the college level
are still considerably unequal to those of men.
51. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 139.
52. Duffy, supra note 19, at 92.
53. Id. at 68.
54. Id.
55. Facts and Figures, THE CHRON. oF HIGHER EDUC., at http://chronicle.com/
search97cgi/s97_cgi, May 21, 1999 (last visited June 29, 2000).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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letes.6° Clearly, Title IX has not effectively eliminated gender inequity
in the area of recruiting and scholarships.
3. Operating Expenses: Travel Expenses and Per Diem Allowance;
Equipment and Supplies
Analyzing operating expense budgets for intercollegiate athletic pro-
grams reveals that gender inequity is widespread. The Chronicle of
Higher Education reported that over two hundred educational institu-
tions spent less than half of their athletic operating expense budgets on
female athletes.61 While in some cases the numbers are only slightly dis-
proportionate, there are examples of extreme inequity.62 For example,
at the University of Arizona, 75% of the operating expense budget is
spent on male athletes, while only 25% is spent on female athletes.63
Additionally, when the overall operating expense budgets are broken
down, and specific benefits are analyzed individually, evidence of gender
inequity is again present. For example, although on a per capita basis
travel expenses and per diem allowances for male and female athletes
may appear equal, it can still be argued that the two genders are treated
differently.64
Department policies differ in terms of the number of people on a
team, length of time on road trips, number of total road trips, and
road trips that require overnights. Male teams traditionally have
more overnight trips. . . and more overnight stays . . . The fact
that women comprise only 36% of college athletes makes this
practice discriminatory, despite equal individual allowances per
trip, because universities spend only 36% of the budget on wo-
men's travel.65
Another area where discrimination is prevalent is the provision of
equipment and supplies. Title IX does not mandate that budgetary allo-
cation to each gender be exactly identical.66 Rather, the legislation only
requires that the equipment provided to both male and female teams be
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Duffy, supra note 19, at 95.
65. Id. (citing RIcHARD TELANDER, FROM RED INK TO RED RosEs (1994); NATIONAL
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, TITLE IX AND MEN'S MINOR SPORTS: A FALSE CoNFLicr (1997);
Anne Bloom, Financial Disparity as Evidence of Discrimination Under Title IX, 2 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 9 (1995)).
66. Bloom, supra note 65, at 14-15.
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of the same quality.6 7 Accordingly, it is acceptable that universities fail
to provide women's programs that require expensive equipment (such as
gymnastics and ice hockey),6 8 yet still provide programs such as men's
football (which requires a significant amount of equipment), as long as
the quality of equipment that all athletes receive is the same.6 9 A male
program that requires expensive equipment will likely be implemented
or maintained, whereas a female program requiring costly equipment
will not.7" This provides evidence of the preferential treatment that male
athletic programs receive.
Additionally, it is important to note that most prominent men's
teams are sponsored by equipment companies, and these teams receive
equipment that is not factored into the universities' equipment budg-
ets.7 It is likely that even at universities that provide an equal equip-
ment budget for both men's and women's teams, the women are still
subject to an unequal distribution of equipment.7"
4. Practice and Competitive Facilities
"Traditionally, men get more and better time on the practice and
game fields."73 University athletic directors often justify this practice by
arguing that men's sports receive significantly more spectators, and pro-
duce more revenue, than do women's athletic events.74 However, "it
could be argued that ... acceptance of college sports for women has
been slow,"7 5 because "the fact remains that athletic departments gener-
ally have not been successful at making women's sports into major reve-
nue producers and profit making entities."76
If women's sporting contests are never given the "prime time" play-
ing time, it is impossible to judge how many spectators would attend a
given event, and how much revenue would be produced.77 Accordingly,
unequal use of facilities, for both practice and hosting athletic competi-
tions, demonstrates another area in which female athletes face disparate
treatment.
67. Id.
68. Duffy, supra note 19, at 94.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 94.
73. Id. at 97.
74. Id.
75. Mahony & Pastore, supra note 1, at 131.
76. Id. at 133.
77. Duffy, supra note 19, at 97.
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5. Publicity
"Disparity in coverage of male and female athletes by the athletic
sports information departments is common. '7 8 To justify this, athletic
directors use an argument similar to the one presented in the facilities
context: women's sports do not generate public interest, and therefore, it
is an inefficient use of resources to allocate funding and personnel to
cover female athletic events.79 "However, the sports information direc-
tors are actually in a position to affect these policies by conditioning re-
leases of information about major men's sports on the publication of
women's sports. Media coverage is ... in the control of the department
and should be considered when assessing gender equity."80
As evidenced by the preceding examples, it is obvious that despite
some of the increases in opportunities for female athletes facilitated by
the application of Title IX to college athletics, gender inequity is still
present. "Most schools still offer more scholarships for male athletes
and spend considerably more money on male sports.""' Even though
many "advances have been made in the past twenty-five years, women
are still struggling to enforce the intent of Title IX, and proportionality
at most schools is still a dream." 82 The former Advocacy Director for
the Women's Sports Foundation, Kathryn Reith, believes that the quest
for gender equality has become somewhat stagnant.83 Reith has stated
that "the process has stalled," and that "we are sort of stuck at [a] level
of discrimination that [the educational institutions] are comfortable
with."84 One possible way to revitalize the movement for gender equal-
ity within college athletics is to use a new avenue to effectuate change.
That avenue is Title VII.
III. TITLE VII AS A VIABLE REMEDY FOR GENDER DISCRnNATION
IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
A. Objective of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.s
78. Id. at 98.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Mahony, supra note 8, at 329.
82. Id. at 329-330.
83. Susan Morse, Women and Sports, 2 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 195, 198 (1992).
84. Id.
85. EEOC, supra note 5.
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Title VII provides, in material part: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin." 6 Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer to discriminate in
any area of employment, "including hiring, firing, promotion, layoff,
compensation, benefits, job assignments, training ... or any other terms
of employment."'
Title VII was enacted by Congress "to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities."8 8  In interpreting Title VII, "[c]ourts have prohib-
ited both the disparate treatment of individuals and the use of policies
that have a disparate impact on protected classes. Even those employ-
ment policies that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation have
been declared unlawful."8 9 Congress intended Title VII to offer compre-
hensive protections and, in short, eliminate discrimination in the
workplace. 90
B. The Elements of a Title VII Claim
There are two primary requirements necessary to sustain a Title VII
claim. First, the individual bringing the claim must be a member of a
protected class.91 The classes which receive protection under Title VII
are those based on sex, race, color, religion or national origin.92 Second,
the alleged discriminating party must be an employer covered under Ti-
tle VII.93 All private employers, state and local governments, and edu-
cational institutions that employ fifteen or more individuals are covered
by Title VII.94 Accordingly, a female scholarship athlete filing a claim
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1994).
87. EEOC, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
88. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75,75 (1984) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
89. Id.
90. Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities: The Case for the
Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2613, 2622-23 (1998).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
92. EEOC, supra note 5.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
94. Id. It should also be noted that the question of whether the defendant in a Title VII
action is a covered employee is greatly debated. Employers will often claim that its workers
are independent contractors and that the fifteen employee requirement is not met. See Ort-
ner, supra note 89, at 2647. However, in any Title VII case brought against a college or uni-
versity, it would be implausible to argue that the college or university did not have fifteen
employees. Accordingly, that issue will not be addressed as part of this comment.
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against her university under Title VII would have no difficulty meeting
these two initial requirements.
In any action brought by a scholarship athlete under Title VII at-
tempting to remedy the disparate treatment females receive with regard
to privileges or fringe benefits of employment, the college or university
would likely move for summary judgment." In so doing, the college or
university may claim that the relationship between the scholarship ath-
lete and the educational institution is not one of employment, and there-
fore, not governed by Title VII.96 The prospective plaintiff would have
to show that a scholarship athlete is, in fact, an employee of his or her
school and, therefore, Title VII is applicable.97
In the past, scholarship athletes have had difficulty convincing courts
that they are employees for the purposes of Workers' Compensation
Acts.98 However, the policy of Title VII is different from that of work-
95. Thomas Archer, The Structure of a Title VII Action Against a College for the Enforce-
mient of NCAA Proposition 48, 2 SPORTS LAW. J. 111, 113 (1995).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Several cases have addressed the issue of whether an athletic scholarship is, in effect,
an employment contract that creates an employer-employee relationship between the educa-
tional institution and the athlete. One of the first cases to address this question was Van Horn
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). Van Horn was a
student athlete killed in a plane crash while traveling from an intercollegiate football game.
After his death, his widow and minor children applied for death benefits, asserting that Van
Horn was an employee of his university. The Industrial Accident Commission ("IAC") de-
nied the award. Upon review, the Van Horn court held Van Horn had made a prima facie
showing of an employment contract and remanded the case for further consideration by the
JAC. The Van Horn court reasoned that because Van Horn's athletic prowess and member-
ship on an athletic team were factors in his receipt of an athletic scholarship, the scholarship
could constitute an employment contract. Id. at 169.
After Van Horn, the NCAA went on alert and began implementing language and policies
that would lessen the resemblance between the athletic scholarship and an employment con-
tract. ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HimR: THE
EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA's AMATEUR MYTH 80-81(1998). In 1983, the
NCAA received support for that principle with the decision of Rensing v. Board of Trustees,
444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983).
Rensing was an Indiana State University football player who was paralyzed during spring
football practice. In denying his workers' compensation claim, the Rensing court held that
intercollegiate sports are clearly distinguished from professional sports and that financial in-
ducements in the form of scholarships and financial aid based on athletic ability cannot be
considered an employment contract. SACK & STAUROWSKY, at 85.
After the Rensing decision, several other courts held that, in the context of workers' com-
pensation, the athletic scholarship does not constitute an employment contract. Coleman v.
W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Graczyk v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd.,
229 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Townsend v. California, 237 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987). However, these cases all incorporate the specific principles of workers compensa-
tion law into the analysis of whether a scholarship athlete is a university employee. When
[Vol. 11:107
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY FOR GENDER INEQUITY
ers' compensation. The decisions in the context of workers' compensa-
tion focus on the definition of employee contained in workers'
compensation statutes. 99 However, the definition of employee contained
in Title VII is much broader than the definition contained in workers'
compensation statutes.' 0 Accordingly, the analysis of the courts under
the workers' compensation framework does not apply to employer-em-
ployee questions in other legal contexts. 10' Scholarship athletes have a
much stronger argument that the relationship between the educational
institution and the scholarship athlete is one of employment when ana-
lyzed under Title VII.' °2
Perhaps the most effective argument a scholarship athlete could
make is that the athlete's acceptance of a scholarship, in exchange for
participation on an athletic team, is the formation of a contract between
the educational institution and the athlete. 0 3 Such a conclusion is easily
reached when the three basic elements of contract law are applied to the
relationship between the scholarship athlete and the educational
institution.
For a contract to exist, the elements of offer, acceptance, and consid-
eration must be present. 04 In the context of college athletics, all three
elements are easily satisfied. First, it is clear that when an educational
institution recruits a scholarship athlete, the college or university is of-
fering the athlete an opportunity to attempt to participate in an athletic
analyzed in the context of Title VII, an entirely different conclusion must be reached. Under
Title VII, a scholarship athlete would be an employee of the educational institution.
99. For example, the state of Wisconsin workers' compensation statute defines employees
as "[e]very person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, all
helpers and assistants of employers, whether paid by the employer or employee, if employed
with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer.... ." Wis. STAT. § 102.07(4)(a)
(1999).
100. Title VII defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer." 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
101. Charlotte M. Rasche, Can Universities Afford to Pay for Play? A Look at Vicarious
Liability Implications of Compensating College Athletes, 16 Rv. LrrIx. 219, 235 (1997).
102. Archer, supra note 95, at 113.
103. Courts have recognized that contractual relationships are created by scholarship
agreements. In Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972), the court
determined that the agreement signed between the scholarship athlete and the university cre-
ated a contractual relationship under which each party was required to fulfill their respective
obligations. Id. at 382. Additionally, other courts have addressed the issue of a contractual
relationship existing between a student and a university. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d
410 (7'1 Cir. 1992); Ward v. Wash. State Univ. 695 P.2d 133 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
104. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs §52 (1981).
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program. 10 5 Second, the athlete demonstrates his or her acceptance of
the educational institution's offer by signing the NCAA National Letter
of Intent. °6 This letter contractually binds the athlete to compete at the
respective university.10 7 Finally, consideration is found in the scholar-
ship itself.' 8 Athletes receive varied benefits ranging from full tuition,
room and board, to smaller benefits in the form of tuition reduction.0 9
Regardless of the benefit, the element of consideration is met.
It is apparent that the colleges and universities intend for scholarship
athletes to be contractually bound to the institution."' Colleges and
universities recruit scholarship athletes for their superior athletic abili-
ties. Stated differently, they are "hired for a specific purpose.""' Schol-
arship athletes are required to sign letters of intent indicating the
educational institution to which they are committing their services.'
Moreover, scholarship athletes receive compensation. The procedure
entailed in distributing the athletic scholarship is a valid basis for con-
cluding that the scholarship athlete is indeed under contract as an em-
ployee of the educational institution."13
Still, courts have been reluctant to alter the dynamics of collegiate
athletics by holding that such a contract creates an employee-employer
relationship." 4 The existence of the contract has been recognized;" 5 the
employment relationship stemming from the contract has not.116 Until
courts are willing to accept that the athletic scholarship is an employ-
ment contract, it will be necessary for scholarship athletes to prove their
105. David W. Woodburn, College Athletes Should Be Entitled to Workers Compensation
For Sports Related Injuries: A Request to Broaden the Definition of Employee Under Ohio
Revised Code Section 4123.01, 28 AKRON L. Rnv. 611, 630 (1995).
106. Id.
107. Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 379.
108. Woodburn, supra note 105, at 631.
109. Orion Riggs, The Facade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-College Athletics,
5(3) KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 143 (1996).
110. Id. at 139.
111. Id. at 143.
112. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2000-01 NCAA DIvIsION I MAN-
UAL ART. 13.02.9 (2000) [hereinafter MANUAL]. The letter of intent is signed by the athlete
after the recruitment process. It is analogous to the standard contract; the university makes
the athlete an offer, the athlete accepts the offer by signing the letter of intent, and both
parties then provide consideration, namely the educational institution providing the athlete
the opportunity to participate and the athletes actual participation.
113. Riggs, supra note 109, at 143.
114. Id.
115. Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 379.
116. Riggs, supra note 109, at 143.
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employment status in accord with the methods traditionally used in the
context of Title VII.
1. The Employer-Employee Relationship
The existence of an employer-employee relationship is one of the
most debated elements of a Title VII claim. Title VII defines an em-
ployee as "an individual employed by an employer."" 7 This language is
quite ambiguous. Accordingly, the judiciary developed three tests used
to determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists: (1) the
common law test; (2) the economic realities test; and (3) the hybrid
test."
8
a. The Common Law Test
The common law test focuses on whether an employer had the right
to control the details and means by which work was completed and the
result accomplished by the work." 9 The Supreme Court has defined the
test as the following:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's
right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished. Among other factors relevant to this inquiry are
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools;
the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign addi-
tional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of pay-
ment; and the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants
120
Although this list is not determinative, it illustrates many factors the
courts consider when using the common law test to determine if an em-
ployer-employee relationship exists.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(f) (1994).
118. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond Economic Realities: The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38
B.C. L. REv. 239, 247-48 (1997).
119. Id. at 248.
120. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (quoting Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1988)).
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b. The Economic Realities Test
The economic realities test asks whether an individual is "economi-
cally dependent for his livelihood on the business to which the person
performs a service.' 1 21 There are five factors used to make that determi-
nation: (1) the extent of the employer's supervision and control over the
worker; (2) responsibility and cost for orientation and equipment; (3) the
length of job commitment and/or expectations; (4) the kind of occupa-
tion and skill required; and (5) the method of payment and benefits. 122
c. The Hybrid Test
The test courts use most often is the hybrid test.123 The factors usu-
ally considered by courts under the hybrid test are: (1) the type of occu-
pation; (2) the skill required; (3) whether the individual or the employer
furnishes the equipment with which the work is done; (4) the length of
time the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment; (6) the man-
ner in which the work relationship can be terminated; and (7) the inten-
tion of the parties.' 4
2. The Employer-Employee Relationship in the Context of College
Athletics: The Athlete Control Test
When comparing the preceding three tests, it becomes evident that
five factors are common to each test.'25 These same five factors also
apply to the relationship between the educational institution and the
scholarship athlete because they address the more fundamental aspects
of the relationship. Accordingly, when determining whether a scholar-
ship athlete is an employee of his or her university, a fourth test, which
will be termed the "Athlete Control Test," should be applied.
The Athlete Control Test will analyze the following five factors: (1)
the degree of control the university exercises over the scholarship ath-
lete; (2) opportunities the scholarship athlete creates for an educational
institution's profit or loss; (3) the university's investment in facilities
used by the scholarship athlete; (4) permanency of the relationship be-
121. Kimberly Hayes, On the Clock Versus on the Books: The Appropriate Method for
Counting Employees Under Title VII, the ADEA and Other Labor Laws, 44 BuFF. L. Rnv.
963, 986 (1996).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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tween the university and the scholarship athlete; and (5) the scholarship
athlete's required skill.126
a. Degree of Control
The educational institution has a great degree of control over the
scholarship athlete. 27 This is evidenced by the emphasis that is placed
on athletics as opposed to other aspects of student life. During the play-
ing season, most aspects of the athlete's life are dictated by the athletic
program.
i. Athletics v. Academics
Some scholarship athletes are athletes first, and students second.
Their first priority is the athletic program in which they participate. For
example, at Creighton University, the athletic department encouraged a
scholarship athlete to register for courses such as Marksmanship and
Theory of Basketball, even though such courses did not count towards a
university degree. 2 Additionally, the same scholarship athlete was pro-
vided with a secretary to read his assignments and prepare and type his
papers. 2 9
Unfortunately, this is just one of many examples where the scholar-
ship athlete is expected to put his athletic responsibilities ahead of his
academic responsibilities. Although instances such as the one described
above are probably more prevalent at schools with larger athletic pro-
grams, it is plausible to assume that the academic integrity of athletes is
compromised at almost every educational institution where a scholarship
athlete is expected to make a positive contribution to his or her athletic
team. Conduct by athletic departments similar to the conduct of Creigh-
ton University is evidence that a scholarship athlete's existence is con-
trolled to a great degree by the educational institution.
ii. Athletics v. Work Study
In addition to fulfilling all of the athletic requirements mandated by
the coach and the school, the scholarship athlete's life off the playing
field is also controlled to a great degree. 3 ° For example, during both the
academic semester and the summers between school years, scholarship
126. Id.
127. Riggs, supra note 109, at 144.
128. Ross, 957 F.2d at 412.
129. Id.
130. Riggs, supra note 109, at 144.
20001
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
athletes' employment decisions are strictly regulated.131 During the ath-
letic season, student athletes are not allowed to hold full or part-time
jobs.132 During the off-season, a scholarship athlete must remit his or
her earnings to the educational institution, and the earnings are then
applied against the athlete's scholarship. 33 During the summer, when
the scholarship athlete should be allowed a break from the confines of
the scholarship agreement, the NCAA still controls the employment op-
portunities a scholarship athlete can accept.13 4 Accordingly, even when a
scholarship athlete is not at practice or playing in a game, his or her
choices and decisions are limited.
b. Opportunities for Profit or Loss
"Although the concept of amateurism is firmly embedded in college
athletics, college athletics has become big business.' 35 This is evidenced
by the $1 billion dollar television contract between Columbia Broadcast-
ing System (hereinafter CBS) and the NCAA. 3 6 Additionally, Notre
Dame University and National Broadcasting Company (hereinafter
NBC) have a $38 million contract that grants NBC exclusive broadcast-
ing rights for Notre Dame athletic contests. 37 These contracts, how-
ever, are not the only evidence of the money involved in college
athletics.
In 1996, both Virginia Tech and the University of Texas earned $8.3
million by playing in the Sugar Bowl.'38 That same year, the University
of Nebraska and the University of Florida each earned $8.8 million for
playing in the Fiesta Bowl.139 These figures seem outrageous; however,
considering the increased involvement of corporate sponsors and televi-
sion with intercollegiate athletics, they are not outlandish. 40
When the contracts are considered together with the amount of reve-
nue that colleges and universities generate from athletic programs each
year, it is clear that there is a direct correlation between an educational
institution's yearly profits or losses and the athletic program. The ath-
131. Id. at 139-40.
132. Id. at 139.
133. Id. at 139-40.
134. Id. at 140.
135. Rasche, supra note 101, at 220.
136. Woodburn, supra note 105, at 611.
137. Id.
138. Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship
Athletes Are An Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 167, 180 (1996).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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letic program could not exist, and certainly could not produce a profit
for the college or university, without the scholarship athletes. Therefore,
the scholarship athlete has a substantial effect on the yearly profits of the
college or university.
c. Facilities
The educational institution also controls the athletic facilities used by
scholarship athletes. Educational institutions are the primary providers
of facilities, equipment, and supplies for their athletic teams. Whether
the athlete is participating in a practice session or playing in an athletic
contest, he or she is undoubtedly using equipment and playing in a facil-
ity controlled by the college or university.
Additionally, as stated earlier, athletic departments exercise total
control over scheduling and uniforms. Athletes have no control over
which teams use which practice and playing facilities throughout the ath-
letic season, or which equipment they practice with, or which uniforms
they wear. The athletes have no control or decision making power with
respect to equipment and facilities.
The lack of control over equipment and facilities is analogous to the
traditional employer-employee relationship. In the conventional em-
ployment setting, employees perform their job responsibilities in facili-
ties provided and regulated by the employer. Employees seldom create
their own training and work schedules; that task belongs to the employer
as well. Finally, employers typically require employees to wear a uni-
form or conform to a specific dress code. Just as the traditional em-
ployee is mandated by the employer's rules regarding facilities and
equipment, so too is the scholarship athlete.
d. Permanency of Relationship
In the case of college athletics, the employer-employee relationship
has the potential to last four years. While it is true that some athletes
enter professional sports before completing four years of college, and
the scholarship itself is only a one-year renewable agreement,' 4 ' those
facts do not change the overall average duration of the relationship.
Many athletes participate in college athletic programs as scholarship ath-
letes for at least four years. The duration of the relationship is con-
trolled by the college or university. 42 According to the NCAA Manual,
an athlete's scholarship can be terminated by the educational institution.
141. Riggs, supra note 109, at 144.
142. Ukeiley, supra note 138, at 190.
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Section 15.3.4.1 of the NCAA Manual... expressly provides the uni-
versity with this authority. The Manual states:
Reduction and Cancellation Permitted. Institutional financial aid
based in any degree on athletics ability may be reduced or can-
celed during the period of the award if the recipient:
(a) Renders himself or herself ineligible for intercollegiate
competition; or
(b) Fraudulently misrepresents any information on an applica-
tion, letter of intent or financial aid agreement; or
(c) Engages in serious misconduct warranting substantial dis-
ciplinary penalty; or
(d) Voluntarily withdraws from a sport at any time for per-
sonal reasons; however, the recipient's financial aid may not be
awarded to another student-athlete in the term in which the aid
was reduced or cancelled.' 43
Accordingly, if a scholarship athlete engages in any activity that ei-
ther results in a declaration of ineligibility, or is considered misconduct
in the eyes of the educational institution, the athlete's scholarship may
be reduced or canceled. Again, this situation is analogous to a tradi-
tional employee-employer relationship.
In the conventional employment setting, there are certain violations
of an employment contract which, if committed by an employee, could
result in the employee's termination. The same is true for the scholar-
ship athlete. If an athlete were to engage in unlawful conduct, his or her
scholarship could be withdrawn. 144 Just as in the traditional employment
context, it is clear that the scholarship athlete does not control all aspects
of the duration of the employment relationship.
e. Required Skill
Undoubtedly, college athletes must possess a high level of skill in
their respective sports, enabling them to compete at the college level.
Only the most skilled athletes receive scholarships. Accordingly, tre-
mendous talent and highly specialized skill in a particular sport is a pre-
requisite for obtaining an athletic scholarship. Colleges and universities
seek the most talented players, in hopes of creating a winning team, as
demonstrated by the amount of time that colleges and universities spend
on recruiting, practicing, and coaching college athletes. 45
143. MANUAL, supra note 112, at art. 15.3.4.1(a)-(d).
144. Id.
145. Archer, supra note 95, at 120.
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Similar skill is required in the traditional employment context. Em-
ployers also seek and actively recruit employees with the most skill in
hopes of creating a productive work force. Just as being skilled in a par-
ticular trade or profession is crucial to being hired by an employer, being
skilled in a particular sport is a fundamental aspect of receiving an ath-
letic scholarship.
Based on the preceding analysis and application of the proposed
Athlete Control Test, it is appropriate to characterize the relationship
between a scholarship athlete and an educational institution as that of an
employer and employee. Scholarship athletes contract with the college
or university and agree to provide a service in return for an economic
benefit. Throughout the duration of the contract, a large majority of the
athlete's athletic and non-athletic decisions are made for him or her.
Scholarship athletes do not make their own choices; they are mandated
to perform certain tasks at specific times. Just as an employee satisfies
his or her job requirements in order to avoid termination, a scholarship
athlete must fulfill his or her responsibilities to the educational institu-
tion in order to avoid losing his or her scholarship.
As demonstrated, the scholarship athlete can prove he or she is an
employee of the educational institution. As such, the scholarship athlete
can proceed with a Title VII claim against the college or university.
3. Necessary Elements of Proof for a Title VII Claim
There are two types of discrimination that have been recognized
under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 46 Disparate
treatment is intentional discrimination based upon an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 47 A claim of disparate treatment
requires proof of a discriminatory motive.' 48 Disparate impact is dis-
crimination caused by a neutral employment policy that has a dispropor-
tionate impact on a class of protected persons.149 A disparate impact
claim does not require proof of a discriminatory motive.'50 Because a
disparate treatment claim has the most viability in terms of the gender
inequity present in college athletics, only this type of claim will be dis-
cussed in detail.
146. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, MAJOR IssuEs iN THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION 6 (1983).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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To prove intentional discrimination under Title VII, a female athlete
would likely use the disparate treatment model. The disparate treatment
model, first set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,151 and most
clearly articulated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 52 is used when an individual or several individuals are treated dif-
ferently because of their race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. The
disparate treatment model is useful because it sets forth an evidentiary
framework to be followed by plaintiffs, defendants, and courts in cases
involving alleged intentional discrimination for which there is no direct
evidence.
If the plaintiff only has circumstantial evidence that the employer in-
tentionally discriminates against employees, the plaintiff must proceed
under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. 5 3 However, a
plaintiff may also present direct evidence of discrimination, if it is availa-
ble, to establish that an employer intentionally discriminated against em-
ployees. 54 Direct evidence and the disparate treatment model "are
simply different evidentiary paths by which to resolve the ultimate issue
of defendant's discriminatory intent."' 55
The burden-shifting analysis in the disparate treatment model re-
quires plaintiff to meet all elements of a three-part test. First, the plain-
tiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination.'56 Second, the
defendant must offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the dis-
crimination. 57 Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the reason of-
fered by the defendant is actually pretext for discrimination. 5
A prima facie case of discrimination is proven when an individual
shows that: (1) they belong to a protected class; (2) they have performed
the job satisfactorily; (3) they have suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion; and (4) the employer treated similarly situated employees more
favorably.159
151. 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973).
152. 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
153. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. When using the disparate treatment
model, the availability of direct evidence of disparate treatment shifts the burden of proof. Id.
at 802. However, in most circumstances, the female athlete will not have direct evidence of
discrimination. Accordingly, this comment will only address the use of the disparate treat-
ment model with circumstantial evidence.
154. Id.
155. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 707 (6th Cir. 1985).
156. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 804.
159. Davis v. McCormick, 898 F. Supp. 1275, 1286 (D. Ill. 1995) (citing Hughes v. Brown,
20 F.3d 745, 746 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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Once the prima facie case of discrimination is established, the burden
then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the disparate treatment. 160 The reason will be considered
nondiscriminatory if it has its basis in anything not prohibited by Title
VII.
After the employer has offered a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action, the plaintiff may challenge the offered rea-
sons by showing that they are simply pretext for discrimination.' 6' Pre-
text is defined as a false or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the
actual or strong reason or motive.' 62 It can be established by proving
that: (1) the employer's explanation has no basis in fact; or (2) the em-
ployer's explanation was not the real reason; or (3) that the stated rea-
son is insufficient to warrant the disparate treatment. 63
4. Application to College Athletics
The preceding burden structure is seemingly ideal for the female
scholarship athlete who, as an employee of her college or university, is
subjected to disparate treatment resulting from the educational institu-
tion's policies and budgetary allotments within the athletic department.
To further demonstrate the compatibility between a female athlete's dis-
crimination claim and the use of Title VII, the preceding burden struc-
tures will be applied to the context of college athletics. The following
analysis of the facts in Pederson v. Louisiana State University" will
demonstrate how Title VII can be used to remedy an instance of discrim-
ination at an educational institution.
LSU has offered competitive athletics for female athletes since
1977.165 In the years following 1977, LSU had eight female athletic
teams.' 66 "In 1979, women's fast pitch softball was added, but was
dropped following the 1982-83 season, with no credible reason given."'167
In 1995, LSU decided to add two intercollegiate varsity women's sports,
fast pitch softball and soccer.' 6 Soccer was scheduled to begin competi-
tive conference play in the fall of 1995; competitive conference play for
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (6'" ed. 1990).
163. Davis, 898 F. Supp at 1286.
164. 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
165. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp 892, 901 (D. La. 1996).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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softball was scheduled to begin in 1997.169 However, in January 1996,
neither the facilities nor the recruiting for either team was complete.170
Additionally, although eleven scholarships were allocated for each team,
only two partial softball scholarships had been awarded, and "less than
the full compliment of soccer scholarships [had] been awarded.' 17 1
The plaintiffs in the case asserted a claim for unequal treatment of
female athletes. 17  Included in the claim were assertions of "unequal
pay to coaches, lesser quality facilities and other related grievances."' 173
Additionally, testimony in the case revealed that administrators at
LSU had an "archaic" attitude towards female athletics. 7 4 In fact, the
Pederson court found that LSU "persisted in a systematic, intentional,
differential treatment of women."' 75 The court stated that:
LSU perpetuated antiquated stereotypes and fashioned a grossly
discriminatory athletics system in many.., ways. For example,
LSU appointed a low-level male athletics department staff mem-
ber to the position of "Senior Women's Athletic Administrator,"
which the NCAA defines as the most senior women in the athletic
department. LSU consistently approved larger budgets for travel,
personnel, and training facilities for men's teams versus women's
teams. The university consistently compensated coaches of wo-
men's teams at a rate far below that of its male coaches .... LSU
arguably acted with deliberate indifference to the condition of its
female athletics program. 76
The facts and findings in Pederson illustrate that gender inequity was
present at LSU, and that female athletes were subject to discrimination
based on their sex.177 Accordingly, a female scholarship athlete at LSU
169. Id.
170. Pederson, 912 F. Supp at 902.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 904.
173. Id. It must be noted that the plaintiffs in Pederson were not varsity athletes. Rather,
they were women who believed they would qualify to participate on either the soccer or soft-
ball team if said teams were implemented by LSU. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Pederson
would not likely meet the definition of employee, as discussed earlier in this paper, and there-
fore, they would not have been well served to proceed under Title VII. However, the facts of
the case, and the discriminatory practices at LSU, could easily have been used as evidence of
discrimination by a female scholarship athlete at LSU to prove a case of discrimination under
Title VII. Accordingly, although the facts of the case have been set out as specific to the
Pederson plaintiffs, they will be used to demonstrate how a Title VII claim would have been
beneficial to an existing female scholarship athlete at LSU.
174. Id. at 881.
175. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 881 (5t' Cir. 2000).
176. Id. at 881-82.
177. Id.
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could have filed a suit under Title VII based on the legal theory articu-
lated in this comment.
a. Application of the Disparate Treatment Model to the
Facts of Pederson
Assuming that a female scholarship athlete at LSU proved her status
as an employee of the university by use of the Athlete Control Test dis-
cussed earlier, she would undoubtedly be able to satisfy the necessary
elements of proving a prima facie case of discrimination.
As stated earlier, a female scholarship athlete could establish her
prima facie case of discrimination using either direct evidence or circum-
stantial evidence. Although it is possible that a plaintiff facing discrimi-
nation under the facts of Pederson would have direct evidence of
discrimination, the following application of the disparate treatment
model will assume that only circumstantial evidence is present.
First, as a female, the LSU scholarship athlete is a member of a pro-
tected class. Second, assume that the athlete is fulfilling her athletic re-
sponsibilities in a satisfactory manner. Third, the athlete suffered an
adverse employment action (disparate treatment) as shown by the find-
ings in Pederson. As stated, the court found that LSU intended to treat
female athletes differently "on the basis of their sex by providing them
unequal athletic opportunity."' 78 Presumably, evidence of disparate
treatment must have been present for the Pederson court to make such a
determination. Fourth, the similarly situated male athletes receive far
better treatment in terms of budgetary allotment, scholarships, and
fringe benefits of participation in the college or university athletic pro-
gram. This finding is also supported by the language of the Pederson
court.
179
The next step under the disparate treatment model is for the accused
employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged
discrimination. The court states that LSU had "not even attempted to
offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the blatantly differ-
ential treatment of male and female athletes, and men's and women's
athletics in general; they merely argue archaic values do not equate to
intentional discrimination."'8 ° Although LSU did not offer a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason to defend the claim of a Title IX violation,
they would be required to do so if defending a claim under Title VII.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 881.
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While it is difficult to anticipate every counter argument that LSU, or
any other educational institution, could offer, it is safe to assume that
LSU would offer a nondiscriminatory reason that it believed to be legiti-
mate, such as budget constraints or lack of interest in female athletics.
Finally, the female scholarship athlete at LSU would need to prove
that this legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by LSU was sim-
ply pretext for discrimination. The reasons potentially offered by LSU,
or any other educational institution, are pre-textual. LSU intentionally
denied female athletes the same privileges of employment received by
men because female programs were not the money makers and generally
did not bring the institution national recognition.' 8 ' LSU acknowledged
that it had "archaic" views concerning the female athletic program. 82
Accordingly, the Pederson court correctly held that LSU intended its dis-
criminatory practices. The scholarship athlete would have successfully
demonstrated pretext on the part of LSU.
As demonstrated, a female scholarship athlete at LSU could satisfy
her evidentiary burden and show that discriminatory practices at LSU
resulted in the disparate treatment toward female athletes. As stated, a
disparate treatment analysis focuses on whether the accused employer
had a discriminatory motive. The facts and findings in Pederson make it
clear that a discriminatory motive existed. Based on the preceding appli-
cation of the disparate treatment model to college athletics, it can be
concluded that a female athlete subjected to disparate treatment or im-
pact by her college or university should succeed with a Title VII claim
and be afforded the available remedies.
5. Remedies Available Under Title VII
When there is a finding of employment discrimination under Title
VII, several remedies exist, including hiring, reinstatement, reasonable
accommodation, promotion, back pay, front pay, or other actions that
will make the wronged individual whole.'83 The majority of these reme-
dies are inapplicable to the employer-employee relationship created by
the athletic scholarship. However, under Title VII, the court does have
rather broad discretion in awarding remedies.
A court would be justified in ordering an educational institution to
modify its current practices or to implement new policies to eliminate
disparate treatment of female athletes. Such an award would not afford
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. EEOC, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
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the specific plaintiff any direct monetary relief in the form of damages,
front pay, or back pay (differing from most remedies given under Title
VII); however, the nature of the relief would still be monetary and the
female athlete would still benefit from the award.
For example, if a court ordered an educational institution to restruc-
ture its budgetary allocations so that men and women receive equal
funding, the change would affect the economic structure of the college or
university. Additionally, if an educational institution were ordered to
provide new facilities or equipment for the female teams, those provi-
sions would certainly be costly. Although the athletes would not person-
ally receive damages for being treated disparately, the female athletes
would still benefit from the relief awarded.
The obvious benefit from this type of relief award is twofold. First,
awards that order educational institutions to implement new policies to
remedy disparate treatment achieve the ultimate goal of balancing the
resources available for male and female athletes. Second, the threat of
forced economic restructuring may deter colleges and universities from
promoting gender inequity in their athletic department practices.
Accordingly, the relief available under Title VII may serve to effec-
tively eliminate the disparate treatment female athletes receive in their
share of the benefits of participating in college athletic programs. Al-
though Title IX is capable of providing female athletes with a similar
remedy, the use of Title IX to effectuate such change has become stag-
nant. Title VII cannot offer any additional remedy when compared to
Title IX, but the use of Title VII could plausibly be the catalyst needed
to re-ignite the quest for gender equity.
V. POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF APPLYING TITLE VII TO
COLLEGE ATHLETICS
The successful application of Title VII to college athletics brings with
it acceptance of the idea that a scholarship athlete is an employee of his
or her educational institution. That finding would undoubtedly disrupt
the current structure of the NCAA and college athletic programs. Al-
though a distinction is made between the definition of employee under
Title VII and other statutes, such as workers compensation, defining the
scholarship athlete as an employee in any context would prompt scholar-
ship athletes to file other claims for which a finding of an employment
relationship is necessary. While it cannot be stated that athletes will suc-
ceed with claims other than Title VII, it certainly can be stated that the
NCAA will encounter more lawsuits.
2000]
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If Title VII were successfully applied to college athletics, the door
would be open to a whole new host of litigation. However, that should
not deter the use of Title VII in the context of college athletics. As evi-
denced by the earlier analysis of the Pederson case, Title VII has the
potential to remedy many of the gender inequities that are present in
college athletics. When Title IX was initially introduced, it too presented
many potential ramifications for educational institutions, but it has, in
many regards, helped female athletes in their quest for gender equality.
If applied correctly, Title VII has the potential to be just as successful, if
not more so, than Title IX, and effectively eliminate gender inequity in
the area of athlete benefits in college athletic programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it is impossible to assert with absolute certainty that the
application of Title VII will fully remedy the gender equity problems
that exist in college athletics, there is a viable argument that Title VII
can accomplish what Title IX was intended to do, and yet has often
failed to do. It is time to move past the stagnancy resulting from Title
IX; it is time to apply Title VII to college athletic programs.
This comment focuses on the viability of Title VII as an additional
resource female scholarship athletes can use to remedy gender inequity
in college athletics. Title VII is not being offered as a substitute for Title
IX. However, a new problem-solving method is needed if female ath-
letes are going to achieve the gender equity they deserve.
The largest hurdle the scholarship athlete must overcome when at-
tempting to use Title VII is the establishment of the employer-employee
relationship between scholarship athletes and universities; however, this
hurdle is not insurmountable."l When analyzed using the proposed
Athlete Control Test, a scholarship athlete qualifies as an employee of
the educational institution under Title VII. Accordingly, the scholarship
athlete should be afforded the protections offered by Title VII.
184. The ordinary athletic scholarship does indeed create an employer-employee rela-
tionship. For a variety of unarticulated reasons-foremost among them the fear of
unchartered waters-it is not surprising that the courts have tended to refuse (under
workers' compensation statutes) to hold that amateur athletes are really employees. It
is an uncomfortable and unsettling realization that scholarship athletes are really em-
ployees, but it is a conclusion that an honest appraisal compels. And it is a conclusion
from which a number of beneficial consequences will undoubtedly flow, contributing to
the reform of a system much in need of constructive change.
Archer, supra note 95, at 117 (quoting RAY YASSER ET" AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERI-
ALS (3d ed. 1994)).
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There is no question that female athletes have more opportunities
and athletic privileges than twenty-five years ago. However, that fact
should not serve as a barrier to a continued quest for equality. Female
athletes are still subject to disparate treatment, and although Title VII
has never been applied in this context before, it provides a new avenue
to effectuate change. While both Title IX and Title VII exist as methods
of eliminating gender inequality, it is often taking the road less traveled
that makes all the difference. 185
KRsTi L. SCHOEPFER
185. FROST, supra note 7, at 119.

PROTECTING UNIVERSITIES' ECONOMIC
INTERESTS: HOLDING STUDENT-ATHLETES
AND COACHES ACCOUNTABLE FOR
WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF NCAA RULES
The role of intercollegiate athletics at major colleges and universities
has undergone a dramatic change since the inception of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") in 1906.1 Amateur athletics
have become a very big commercial enterprise. Each year, collegiate
athletics generates millions of dollars in revenue for universities.' The
NCAA negotiates billion dollar television contracts, conducts national
championships, and markets many products bearing its name For ex-
ample, the Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS") recently agreed to
pay the NCAA six billion dollars over an eleven-year period for the ex-
clusive rights to the Division I Men's Basketball Championship.4
This increased commercialism has led the NCAA and its member in-
stitutions to a very difficult balancing act between maintaining academic
integrity and amateurism, while striving to generate large revenues in
order to operate a self-financing athletic department. Many coaches,
politicians, and journalists argue that the NCAA and its member institu-
tions are exploiting the student-athlete in order to generate large
amounts of revenue.5 However, many of these same commentators do
not want to hold student-athletes accountable for their own willful viola-
tions of NCAA rules and regulations.
Despite what many individuals believe, most NCAA Division I ath-
letic programs actually lose money.6 Membership in Division I requires
a college or university to sponsor at least fourteen varsity sports, most of
which do not generate revenue.7 Thus, when a student-athlete know-
ingly or willfully violates NCAA rules and regulations, it may not only
1. The History of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/history.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2000).
2. Kyle Parks, Marketing Madness Series: The Final Four: St. Petersburg, ST. PETERSBURG
TirmaFs, Mar. 28, 1999, at lB.
3. Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete
for Participating in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 SPORTS L. J. 25, 31 (1996).
4. The NCAA News, NCAA, CBS Reach 11-year $6 Billion Agreement, http:l/
www.ncaa.orglnews/19991206/active/3625nOl.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2000).
5. Abby Haight, Bringing the Future Into Focus, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 31, 2000,
at C7.
6. Jeffrey Selingo, In College Sports, Is Bigger Better?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct.
31, 1997 at A55.
7. Id.
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jeopardize the student-athlete's eligibility, but it may also subject the
university to costly NCAA investigations and sanctions.8 Recent exam-
ples of academic fraud, gambling scandals, and prohibited contact with
sports agents, have caused great harm to universities' reputations and
economic standings, while the offending athlete walked away
unscathed. 9
This article argues that student-athletes are adults and should be held
accountable for their willful disregard of long-established NCAA rules
and regulations. Schools invest significant time and money into student-
athletes in the form of recruiting, scholarships, uniforms, equipment, and
travel." The university must have a means of protecting its investment
from athletes who have no regard for established rules and coaches with
a win-at-all-costs attitude. However, the question remains as to the best
method with which to hold coaches and student-athletes accountable for
violating rules that cause the university to be exposed to NCAA
penalties.
The analysis is set forth in six parts. Part I explains how coaches and
athletes blatantly violate established NCAA rules for their own benefit
at the expense of the university. Part II discusses the legal relationship
embodied in the contractual relationship between the student-athlete
and the university in the National Letter of Intent, the Financial Aid
Agreement, and the Student-Athlete Statement. Part III will examine
any valid legal claims a university may have against a student-athlete
through its contractual relationship. Part IV will examine if it is in the
university's best interest to pursue a legal claim against a student-athlete.
Part V will discuss the drafting of coaches' contracts and recommend
possible changes in the structuring of the contract in order to hold
coaches accountable for their involvement in violations. Part VI will
explore alternative ways a university can protect its reputation and eco-
nomic interest. This section will examine possible non-legal solutions
along with any consequences that may accompany these
recommendations.
8. Anita M. Moorman & Mary A. Hums, Potential Student-Athlete Liability for NCAA
Violations: Can They or Should They Be Held Legally Accountable?, 9 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF
SPoRT 163, 164 (1999).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 163.
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I. THE PROBLEM
Much has been written recently concerning the unethical conduct of
student-athletes, coaches, and sports agents." Recent examples of stu-
dent-athletes receiving extra benefits from sports agents, or boosters and
coaches establishing a system of academic fraud to maintain athlete eligi-
bility, have had a detrimental impact on unsuspecting universities. 2
However, little has been done to hold coaches and athletes accountable
for their role in these actions.'3
The cost of the University of Minnesota's investigation into academic
fraud in men's basketball was almost $1.9 million.' 4 Not taken into ac-
count in this total was the $1.5 million buyout of former coach Clem
Haskins' contract or the cost of hiring a replacement coach.' 5 Further-
more, the NCAA has yet to impose penalties upon the university for the
cheating scandal, which may include financial sanctions.' 6
The scandal also caused harm to the university's reputation. 7 Ac-
cording to Representative Peggy Leppik, Chairwoman of the Higher Ed-
ucation Finance Committee in Minnesota, '[t]here is no doubt that
significant harm has been done to the university's reputation in the eyes
of both the public and the Legislature."' Although the investigation im-
plicated Haskins' involvement in the scandal, he received a $1.5 million
buyout and escaped accountability for his role.19 In addition, at least
eighteen former men's basketball student-athletes escaped accountabil-
ity, leaving the athletic department with the difficult task of paying the
bill.20
11. LSU Wins Appeal, Can Participate in SEC Tournament, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1999, at
14C; Curt Rallo, A 'Black Eye' For Boilermakers: Purdue to Appeal NCAA Penalties to Bas-
ketball Program, SoUTH BEND TRm., July 1, 1999, at Bi.
12. Mark Asher, Irish are Assessed Penalties; Probation a First for Notre Dame, WASH.
POST, Dec. 18, 1999, at D1; Jay Weiner, Haskins' Sweet Deal Leaves Sour Taste: The New
Findings About the Coach's Role Have Some Wondering Why He Was Able to Leave with $1.5
Million, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Nov. 20, 1999 at Al; Porter Admits Taking Money From
Agent, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Feb. 29, 2000 at Cl.
13. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 169.
14. Mary Jane Smetanka, U Inquiry Costs Nearly $2.2 Million: The Total is Higher than
Expected, but the NCAA is Pleased with the Report's Thoroughness, STAR TRiB. (Minneapo-
lis), Feb. 24, 2000, at lA.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. A Sample Of Reaction to the U Story, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Nov. 20, 1999, at
12A.
18. Id.
19. Weiner, supra note 12, at Al.
20. Smetanka, supra note 14, at IA.
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Another example of an athlete causing economic harm to a univer-
sity was Marcus Camby's involvement with sports agents.2 ' Camby, who
admitted receiving cash and expensive jewelry from sports agents, sub-
jected the University of Massachusetts to NCAA violations.2 2 The Uni-
versity of Massachusetts was stripped of its 1996 regional championship
and forced to return $151,000.00 in tournament money.23 However,
Camby escaped accountability.24 In 1996, Camby signed a three-year, $8
million contract after being selected as the second overall draft pick by
the Toronto Raptors.1 Subsequently, Camby signed a six-year, $40 mil-
lion contract with the New York Knicks.2 6
The above examples are only two of numerous examples of coaches
and student-athletes escaping accountability while the university suffers
harm to its reputation and to its wallet. Moreover, unethical conduct of
student-athletes and coaches is not going to disappear. In an atmos-
phere populated by players craving money, gamblers looking for a
chance to get rich, and unscrupulous agents looking to secure future cli-
ents, problems will continue to persist.
II. LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STUDENT-ATHLETE AND
THE UNIVERSITY
In order to understand the legal relationship between the student-
athlete and the university, it is important to examine their contractual
relationship.27 Traditional contract doctrine can function to hold stu-
dent-athletes accountable for their willful violations of NCAA rules and
regulations. This accountability begins by recognizing the reasonable
obligations placed on student-athletes that arise from the contractual re-
lationship between a student-athlete and the university.
A. Overview of Modern Cases
Many cases have examined the potential contractual relationship be-
tween a student-athlete and a university in situations where student-ath-
21. Joe Burris, Would-be Agent Suing Camby, B. GLOBE, Feb. 18, 1999, at D3.
22. Id.
23. Reports Name Vegas Lawyer in Auburn Eligibility Scandal, USA TODAY, Mar. 13,
2000, at 10E.
24. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 164.
25. Id.; Reports Name Vegas Lawyer in Auburn Eligibility Scandal, supra note 23, at 10E.
26. Shawna Richer, Knicks' Camby Marvels at Raptors' New Digs: Knick Forward Reflects
on the Turmoil of His Lasts Days in Toronto, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 22, 1999, at
S3.
27. Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent:
A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1283-84 (1989).
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letes alleged a breach of contract by their university.28 Although these
suits were brought by student-athletes, a similar analysis can be used to
examine a possible claim brought by a university. In analyzing the rela-
tionship, many courts have acknowledged that the university-student re-
lationship is contractual in nature, especially when financial aid is a part
of the agreement. 9
Taylor v. Wake Forest University represented "the first major court
decision to hold that a contract exists between the student-athlete and
the university."3 In Taylor, a student-athlete football player alleged that
the university wrongfully terminated his scholarship after he refused to
participate in team practices due to his poor academic performance.3'
"Taylor's grade point average at the end of his first semester of his fresh-
man year was 1.0 on a 4.0 scale."' 32 As a result of his low grade point
average, Taylor was ineligible to play football during the spring semester
of his freshman year.33 However, after improving his grade point aver-
age enough to regain his athletic eligibility, Taylor refused to participate
in football during his sophomore year.34 The university then terminated
Taylor's scholarship, citing his failure to comply with his contractual obli-
gations.35 Taylor continued to attend Wake Forest University and
sought to recover the $5,500.00 he would have incurred during the last
two years of college.36
The trial court granted summary judgment for Wake Forest Univer-
sity and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.37 Affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court stated that
Taylor failed to comply with his contractual obligations. The appellate
court stated:
As long as his grade average equaled or exceeded the require-
ments of Wake Forest, he was maintaining his scholastic eligibility
28. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 165.
29. Id.; Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1283-84.
30. Daniel Nestel, Athletic Scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the University
and the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIo ST. L. J. 1401, 1403 (1992).
31. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 381 (N.C. App. 1972), cert. denied, 192
S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1992)
32. Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University's Educational Obli-
gation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REv. 743, 770 (1991).
33. Id. Wake Forest University required a 1.35 GPA after the first year, a 1.65 after the
second year, and a 1.85 after the third year.
34. Id.
35. Id.; Nestel, supra note 30, at 1403.
36. Robert N. Davis, The Courts and Athletic Scholarships, 67 N.D. L. REv. 163, 175
(1991).
37. Id.
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for athletics... When he refused to do so in the absence of any
injury or excuse other than to devote more time to studies, he was
not complying with his contractual obligations.38
A second prominent case that discussed the contractual relationship
between a student-athlete and a university is Begley v. Corporation of
Mercer University.39 In Begley, a student-athlete brought a breach of
contract claim against the university for revoking his scholarship when it
discovered his high school grades did not meet the NCAA require-
ments. 40 The court granted Mercer University summary judgment, stat-
ing that Begley's grades violated a provision in the scholarship
agreement.4' More significantly, the court reaffirmed the belief that an
athletic scholarship created a contractual relationship between the ath-
lete and university.42
Finally, a third and more recent decision implies that a court would
not have any difficulty in viewing a scholarship agreement as an enforce-
able binding contract. 43 In Ross v. Creighton University, the student-ath-
lete claimed that the university failed to properly educate him.44 The
court concluded that it was impossible to enforce a claim that the univer-
sity failed to provide 'adequate' educational services because a court was
incapable of determining the quality of education.45 Although this case
did not directly address whether the scholarship was a contract, the court
concluded that the relationship between the university and a student-
athlete is, in part, contractual.46 Furthermore, the court concluded, "[a]
contract between a private institution and a student confers duties upon
both parties which cannot be arbitrarily disregarded and may be judi-
cially enforced. 47
The decisions in Taylor, Begley, and Ross have consistently used a
contractual analysis to define the parties' respective rights and responsi-
bilities to resolve disputes.48 The Taylor and Begley decisions endorse
the proposition that the athletic scholarship creates a contractual rela-
38. Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 382.
39. 367 F. Supp 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
40. Nestel, supra note 30, at 1403.
41. Id. at 1403-04.
42. Id. at 1404.
43. Davis, supra note 36, at 191-92.
44. 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7Th Cir. 1992).
45. Davis, supra note 36, at 191-92.
46. Ross, 957 F.2d at 413.
47. Id. at 416 (quoting DeMarco v. University Health Sciences, 352 N.E.2d 356, 361-62
(1976)).
48. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 165.
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tionship between the university and the student-athlete. 49 Therefore, a
university may try to use contract analysis as a mechanism to hold a stu-
dent-athlete accountable when he or she willfully violates NCAA rules
and regulations.
B. Elements of the Contractual Relationship
The essential elements of a contract are straightforward." In its sim-
plest terms, the formation of a contract requires an offer, acceptance,
and consideration.5 ' These same basic elements can be used to examine
the more complex contractual relationship between the student-athlete
and the university.
There are numerous documents containing statements that may po-
tentially form a contract between the student-athlete and the univer-
sity.52 The primary documents that may establish a contractual
relationship between the student-athlete and the university are the Na-
tional Letter of Intent, the Financial Aid Agreement, and the Student-
Athlete Statement. 3 In order to understand the contractual relationship
these documents may create, it is important to understand the role each
plays.
The National Letter of Intent program is administered by the Col-
legiate Commissioners Association. 4 The purpose of the National Let-
ter of Intent program is to provide certainty in the recruiting process.5
Participating institutions agree to provide a prospective student-athlete,
who is admitted to the university and is eligible for financial aid under
NCAA rules, athletic aid for one academic year in exchange for the
prospect's agreement to attend the university for that academic year. 6
In addition, participating universities agree to not recruit any prospec-
tive student-athlete who has signed a National Letter of Intent with an-
other university.57
Under the National Letter of Intent program, the university's athletic
director sends a written offer to the prospective student-athlete, offering
49. Nestel, supra note 30, at 1404.
50. Davis, supra note 36, at 165.
51. Id.
52. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 165.
53. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1290-91.
54. National Letter of Intent, available at http://www.national-letter.org (visited Mar. 25,
2000).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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a "scholarship in exchange for the student-athlete's commitment to at-
tend the institution and participate in intercollegiate athletics.""8 The
National Letter of Intent must first be executed by the school's athletic
director or authorized representative and, then, by the prospective stu-
dent-athlete and the student's parent.59 After executing the National
Letter of Intent, the prospective student-athlete is committed to the uni-
versity, generally, but not to a particular program.6" In addition, the pro-
spective student-athlete is only allowed to sign one National Letter of
Intent.6'
The National Letter of Intent contains a penalty if the prospective
student-athlete does not attend the named institution, but rather attends
another participating university.62 The penalty is that the student-athlete
cannot represent another institution in intercollegiate athletics competi-
tion until the student-athlete has completed two full academic years at
the other institution.63 Further, the student-athlete is charged with the
loss of two seasons of athletics eligibility in all sports.64 However, the
student-athlete can receive a qualified release from the original univer-
sity, thereby losing only one season of eligibility.65 Additionally, there
are several actions that nullify the National Letter of Intent.66 A few
activities that nullify the National Letter of Intent include: active duty in
the armed forces for eighteen months, failure to attend any university for
a year, and if the student-athlete's sport is discontinued at the institution
named on the Letter.67
The second important document is the Financial Aid Agreement.
Before signing the National Letter of Intent, the student-athlete must
have the Financial Aid Agreement in his/her possession.6 The Financial
Aid Agreement is the offer from the university to pay for the student-
athlete's tuition, fees, room, board, and books.69 The wording of the
Financial Aid Agreement is at the discretion of each individual univer-
58. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1290.
59. National Letter of Intent, supra note 54, at http://vww.national-Ietter.org.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1291-92.
67. Id. at 1292; National Letter of Intent, supra note 54, at http://www.national-letter.org.
68. Derek Quinn Johnson, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Con-
tract Theory, 85 COLuM. L.REv. 96, 115 (1985).
69. Davis, supra note 32, at 772.
[Vol. 11:137
2000] PROTECTING UNIVERSITIES' ECONOMIC INTERESTS 145
sity.7 ° Typically, the Financial Aid Agreement contains a list of the
terms and conditions of the award, as well as the amount and duration.71
These terms and conditions require the student-athlete to comply with
institution, conference, and NCAA rules.72 Furthermore, the student-
athlete promises to remain academically eligible and to participate in the
institution's athletic program.73 The Financial Aid Agreement is renewa-
ble on an annual basis, for a maximum of five years.74 However, the
university may withdraw the award if the student-athlete fails to comply
with the conditions set forth the agreement.75
The third material document is the Student-Athlete Statement. Prior
to a student-athlete being able to compete each year, he/she must sign
the Student-Athlete Statement.76 The athletic director or a designee ad-
ministers the Student-Athlete Statement.77 The Statement verifies that
to the best of the student-athlete's knowledge, the athletic department's
conduct, as well as their own actions, are in compliance with the appro-
priate NCAA, conference, and university rules.78 The Student-Athlete
Statement includes a summary of NCAA regulations regarding the stu-
dent-athlete's eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, and amateur status.79
Finally, the Student-Athlete Statement demands that a student-athlete
consent to drug testing." If the student-athlete refuses to sign the Stu-
dent-Athlete Statement, they are ineligible to participate in NCAA
competition.8'
The National Letter of Intent, the Financial Aid Agreement, and the
Student-Athlete Statement, taken together, are an "express contract that
specifically delineates the student-athlete's contractual obligations."'82
The language of these documents clearly indicates that the relationship
between the university and a student-athlete is more than an "academic
gift."83 These documents contain promises that provide consideration
70. Johnson, supra note 68, at 115.
71. Davis, supra note 32, at 771-72.
72. Davis, supra note 36, at 166.
73. Davis, supra note 32, at 772.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. STUDENT-ATHLrE STATEMENT - DMVISION I, NCAA, ACADEMIC YEAR 1998-99.
77. The University of Tennessee at Martin Department of Intercollegiate Athletics, available
at http://vww.utm.edu/-danellef/compliance.html (visited Mar. 25, 2000).
78. Id.
79. Student-Athlete Statement, supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Davis, supra note 32, at 771-73.
83. Davis, supra note 36, at 165.
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for the agreement.84 The student-athlete, in prior possession of the Fi-
nancial Aid Agreement, promises to attend a university when he signs a
National Letter of Intent.85 In exchange for this commitment, the uni-
versity promises to provide the student financial assistance.86 In its sim-
plest terms, the relationship between the university and a student-athlete
satisfies the requirements of offer, acceptance, and consideration.
C. Contract Formation
In order to form the contract between the student-athlete and the
university, it is essential that there is mutual assent and that the parties
intend to be legally bound to the agreement.87 The key issue is whether
each party to the agreement manifests an intent to be legally bound by
their promises.88 Intent is an important element in the contract forma-
tion because the entire transaction may be aborted if either party, ex-
pressly or implicitly, manifests intent not to be bound by their apparent
promises.8 9 A contract will not be enforced if the parties intend not to
be bound or held legally accountable for failure to satisfy their
promises. 9° Thus, further analysis is necessary to examine the intent of
the student-athlete when entering into a contractual agreement with a
university.
The student-athlete's intent is measured by a reasonable person's in-
terpretation of the other party's representation. 91 The recruiting process
by which a prospective student-athlete receives a National Letter of In-
tent offer reflects the serious nature of the prospect's intent to be bound
by the agreement. Recruiting is an aggressive process where prospective
student-athletes compete for scholarships and athletic departments
spend millions of dollars traveling the country scouting athletic talent.92
Another factor used in determining whether the parties manifested
their intent to be bound by the contract is if the document is sufficiently
definite and certain to permit a court to apply an appropriate remedy.93
Here, the National Letter of Intent reflects a final, formal document that
84. Davis, supra note 32, at 771.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1293.
88. Id. at 1294.
89. Id. at 1293.
90. Id. at 1294.
91. Id.
92. Kimberly Sweet, U. Nebraska: University Funding Essence of Athletic Success, Ne-
braska Staff Says, U-WiRn, Jan. 24, 2000.
93. GORDON D. SCHABER & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CoNTRACS, 1, 12 (3d ed. 1990).
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is a reflection of the parties' desire to engage in a comprehensive agree-
ment.94 The National Letter of Intent, along with the Financial Aid
Agreement and the Student-Athlete Statement, represent all the mate-
rial terms of the agreement, leaving no room for judicial 'gap-filling.' 95
Therefore, these documents stand as a clear reflection of the student-
athlete's serious intent to be bound by their commitment to the univer-
sity in exchange for the financial aid.
D. Potential Problems
Even though it appears that a contract exists between student-athletes
and universities, it could be argued that the agreement represents an
adhesion contract.96 The NCAA rules prescribe that member institu-
tions administer documents that are uniform.9 7 For example, Article
3.2.4.5 of the NCAA Constitution states that the Student-Athlete State-
ment "shall [be] administer[ed] annually, on a form prescribed by the
Management Council." 98 Adhesion contracts are contracts that are of-
fered as "take-it-or-leave-it" propositions.99 General contract law indi-
cates that adhesion contracts are looked at with disfavor when there is a
gross inequity in bargaining power between parties to the contract. 100
However, many courts have held that adhesion contracts are enforceable
absent a finding of unfairness or unconscionability. 1° 1 Assuming an indi-
vidual voluntarily enters into a standardized contract (i.e., not procured
by fraud or unconscionability), courts will not invalidate the contract and
will uphold the doctrine of freedom of contract.' 2
Although student-athletes are recruited by numerous universities
and retain a considerable power to choose what university to attend, the
contract documents at each university are the same.10 3 However, the
student-athlete does not agree to any specific clauses that are so shock-
94. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1305.
95. Id. at 1305-06.
96. Mark A. Conrad, Letters of Intent and Scholarships, Sport Law for Sport Managers, in
SPORT LAWv FOR SPORT MANAGERS 218, 227 (eds. Doyice J. Cotton & T. Jesse Wilde, 1997).
97. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION, 2000-01 NCAA DMSION I MAN-
UAL, art. 3.2.4.5 & art. 13.02.9 (2000).
98. Id.
99. James V. Jordan & Judith B. Gitterman, Franchise Agreements: Contracts of Adhe-
sion?, 16 SuM. FRANCHSE L. J., 1, 1 (1996).
100. Conrad, supra note 96, at 227.
101. Jordan & Gitterman, supra note 99, at 1.
102. Jonathan E. Breckenbridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate: Ju-
dicial and Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to Arbitration Agreements, 1991 ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 925, 956 (1993).
103. Id.
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ingly unfair that a court would decide against enforcement. Requiring
student-athletes to maintain a minimum level of academic standing, not
accept extra benefits from sports agents to restrain from using illegal
drugs, and to avoid gambling on intercollegiate athletic competition are
not unconscionable expectations. Furthermore, prospective student-ath-
letes have alternatives to intercollegiate athletics.104 An increasing num-
ber of prospective student-athletes are skipping collegiate athletics
altogether, choosing to turn professional after high school.'05 Thus, ap-
plying the concept of adhesion contracts to the student-athlete/university
relationship may be difficult.
A second potential problem in the contractual agreement between
student-athletes and universities is the possible incapacity of the athlete
to enter into a binding contract. 10 6 Since most prospective student-ath-
letes sign the National Letter of Intent during their senior year of high
school, it is possible that they will only be seventeen and are therefore
considered a minor in most jurisdictions.0 7 Thus, the question arises if
the contract becomes voidable due to the student-athlete's lack of
capacity. 0 8
The National Letter of Intent requires that an adult party (i.e., parent
or guardian) co-sign with the student-athlete in an attempt to ensure that
the agreement will be enforceable. 0 9 Generally, an adult co-signer is
liable for damages when a minor breaches the contract." 0 The use of
the co-signature by an adult allows the National Letter of Intent to exist
as a viable contract even though the student-athlete may still be under
the age of majority."' In addition, most student-athletes will reach the
age of majority when they attend the university and will then implicitly
or expressly ratify the agreement, removing the capacity problem."'
Furthermore, the Student-Athlete Statement, which contains many key
promises, is not signed until the student-athlete has enrolled at the insti-
tution and, most likely, has reached the age of majority.
104. College Basketball Notebook, Tm COUR1ER-J. (Louisville), June 13, 1999, at 11C.
105. Id.
106. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1325.
107. Id.
108. Conrad, supra note 96, at 228; see also, Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1326.
109. Id. at 226.
110. Cozzillio, supra note 27, at 1326.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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III. THE UNWERsITY'S CLAIM
Since a breach of contract action is available to the university, it is
important to analyze what type of claim the university could bring
against the student-athlete."' When a party who owes a duty under the
contract fails to perform that duty, that party has breached the con-
tract. 4 The basic remedy for a breach of contract action involves the
awarding of damages to compensate the injured party. 15
In their contract with the university, student-athletes make several
specific promises. Included in the Letter of Intent, Financial Aid Agree-
ment, and the Student-Athlete Statement are specific clauses where the
student-athlete promises to abide by NCAA, conference, and institution
rules. The Student-Athlete Statement incorporates Articles 10 (Ethical
Conduct), 12 (Amateurism), 13 (Recruiting), 14 (Eligibility), 15 (Finan-
cial Aid), and 16 (Awards and Benefits) into the agreement.116 For ex-
ample, Bylaw 12.3 of the NCAA Division I Manual is included in the
Student-Athlete Statement." 7 The Bylaw states that student-athletes
are not eligible for a sport if they have ever accepted money, transporta-
tion, or other benefits from an agent or agreed to have an agent market
the student-athlete's athletic ability or reputation in that sport.1 8 This
rule, barring athletes from receiving extra benefits has been in existence
for at least fifteen years, and student-athletes are well aware of its
existence. 1 9
Consider a situation where a high profile student-athlete accepts ex-
tra benefits (i.e., money, gifts) from a sports agent placing the unsuspect-
ing university at risk for NCAA violations, financial penalties, and
investigative costs. After a lengthy investigation, the university incurs
several NCAA penalties, including the return of revenues generated
from NCAA Championship competition. Subsequently, the student-ath-
lete who violated NCAA rules has become a professional athlete ac-
cepting a multi-million dollar contract. This scenario could lead a
university to bring a contract action against its former student-athlete.
The university could bring a breach of contract action for monetary dam-
ages to recover for the economic harm incurred, and more importantly,
113. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 166.
114. Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract - A Principled Ap-
proach, 22 ST. MARY'S L. J. 357, 361 (1990).
115. Id. at 363.
116. Student-Athlete Statement, supra note 76.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Tom D'Angelo, Miller Cleared by UF, PALM BEACH Posr, Mar. 31, 2000, at 1C.
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to establish a precedent of holding student-athletes accountable for their
willful misconduct. However, some state statutes bar claims against stu-
dent-athletes for violations of collegiate athletic association rules.120 In
Texas, a cause of action cannot be brought by a regional athletic associa-
tion if, at the time of the violation, the defendant was a student at a
member institution of the regional athletic association.'
Additionally, a student may raise an antitrust defense to a breach of
contract claim. Over the last thirty years, student-athletes have brought
several suits challenging the draft, agent, and compensation bylaws as
violations of antitrust law.' "Courts have rejected all of these chal-
lenges."' 3 Courts have deferred to the NCAA's rules and principles of
amateurism and have concluded that such rules fail to constitute unlaw-
ful restraints of trade. 24 Thus, based on the existing precedent, it is un-
likely that an antitrust defense would be successful.
The university could also bring a claim based on fraud due to the
intentional misrepresentations made by a student-athlete. Fraud in the
inducement claim relates to false representations made prior to the in-
ception of the contract.'2 It occurs when a party to a contract is induced
to enter into that contract by the fraud of the other party.126 Because
fraud neglects the essential element of meeting of the minds, the de-
frauded party has the right to void the contract and/or seek damages. 2 7
A student-athlete may fraudulently represent his eligibility to the
university when signing the student-athlete statement each year prior to
competition. In this situation, the university would have to show that the
student-athlete knowingly made a false representation of a material fact
to the university that the institution relied upon to its damage. 28 Since
the contract documents contain specific clauses that relate to student-
athlete eligibility, particularly in regard to their involvement with agents,
120. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 131.003 & 131.005 (1999).
121. Id.
122. Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARiv. L. REV. 1299,
1302 (1992).
123. Id.
124. Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities,
25 RUTGERs L. J. 269, 310 (1994).
125. Thomas M. Giesler, Jr., Proof of Fraudulent Inducement of a Contract and Entitle-
ment to Remedies, 48 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 329, 338 (Mary G. Leary et al. eds., 1998).
126. Id. at 338-39.
127. 66 Am. JUR. 2d Release § 21 (1973).
128. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAuD AND THE PROCEDURE PERTAINING TO
THE REDRESS THEREOF 3 (1981).
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the university could file a claim based on fraud to recover damages for
economic harm.
Damages from fraud may not be predicated on speculation and must
be a proximate consequence of the fraud. 2 9 Generally, damages for
fraud are in an amount that will compensate the plaintiff for the loss
caused by the fraud.'"0 In a situation where an athlete receives extra
benefits from a sports agent, a university should not have any difficulty
showing that their economic harm was the proximate consequence of the
student-athlete's fraudulent representation. Thus, the university should
be able to recover damages to offset its financial injury.
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNIVERSITY LEGAL ACTION
While a valid contract claim is probably available to a university, the
question remains whether it is the most practical solution to the prob-
lem. In theory, pursuing a contract action against a former or current
student-athlete sounds like a good idea. However, there are numerous
ramifications that may occur if a university brings suit against a student-
athlete.
If a university takes legal action against a student-athlete who has
caused harm to its reputation and economic status, it could have a nega-
tive effect on the university's reputation.' 31 Recently, universities have
received a substantial amount of criticism due to low graduation rates
and the perceived exploitation of student-athletes. 32 Universities con-
tinue to claim that their primary interest is the education of student-
athletes, rather than winning championships and generating revenue.
33
Universities assert that intercollegiate athletics is an incidental and
subordinate activity to the essential task of providing a quality educa-
tion.'34 Legal action against a student-athlete could make a philosophi-
cal statement that universities are more concerned with operating a
business than educating their student-athletes. 35 Therefore, it is con-
129. Fraud, 19A Ill. Law and Prac., Fraud §9 (1991).
130. Id. at §61.
131. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 169.
132. Rob Oller, Buckeyes Bottom Out In Diplomas, THE CoLumBus DIsPATCH, Nov. 14,
1999, at IA; Jim Donaldson, Graduation Rates Are NCAAs Top Farce, TIMms-PIcAYuNE (New
Orleans), Feb. 20, 2000, at C9.
133. Johnson, supra note 68, at 106.
134. Id.
135. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 170-71.
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ceivable to expect a negative media and public reaction to a university
suing a student-athlete. 136
This negative reaction to university legal action could also have a
negative effect on fundraising. 37 While success in athletics obviously
makes institutions' fundraising efforts easier, legal action against stu-
dent-athletes could have the opposite effect. Alumni and other donors
may be less inclined to donate money to a university whose interests may
seem to conflict with that of their mission.' 38
Another potential consequence of university legal action is the detri-
mental effect it may have on future recruiting. Today, the Internet has a
major impact on the recruiting of prospective student-athletes. 139 High
school recruits are well informed about the universities who are recruit-
ing them. 14 Trying to convince a prospective student to attend a univer-
sity that has previously brought suit against a student-athlete would be a
difficult obstacle to overcome.' 4'
Finally, using the legal system to hold student-athletes accountable
for their action would be extremely costly. 4 2 Retaining a private law
firm to handle the university's case would be very expensive. 43 Due to
escalating court costs and legal fees, compounded with the long delays
that result from overcrowded court dockets, the use of the legal system
may not be very cost effective.' 44 Furthering the problem is the fact that
many student-athletes come from impoverished backgrounds and proba-
bly would not be able to pay the damages the university was awarded. 45
V. CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS OF A COACH'S RELATIONSHIP TO
A UNIVERSITY
The problem with individuals disregarding NCAA rules is not limited
to student-athletes and agents. Coaches with a win-at-all-costs attitude
place their own career above the future of the university, often leading
136. Id. at 171.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Steve Eighinger, The Internet is Changing High School Athletics Too, ST. Louis
POsT-DISPATCH, Oct. 4, 1999, at 13.
140. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 172.
141. Id. at 172.
142. Id. at 173.
143. Id.
144. Kathleen A. Devine, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies, Participation, and Pro-
posals, 11 REv. LITIG. 83, 88 (1991).
145. Hal Bock, Report: Two-thirds of Athletes Break NCAA Rules, STATE TiMEs/MoRN-
ING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Nov. 9, 1996, at 2D.
[Vol. 11:137
2000] PROTECTING UNIVERSITIES' ECONOMIC INTERESTS 153
to NCAA penalties.'46 Coaches' contracts have escalated in value with
several college football and basketball coaches making more than one
million dollars. 47 However, regardless of the pressure placed on coaches
by fans, alumni, and boosters, this type of conduct is inexcusable for a
coach who knowingly disregards NCAA rules. 4
The contractual relationship between a coach and a university is
much simpler than that of a student-athlete. Coaches' contracts, like
many employment agreements, contain the usual clauses identifying the
nature, duration, and compensation to be paid.'49 However, one impor-
tant aspect of coaches' contracts is the inclusion of university, confer-
ence, and NCAA rules. 5 ° The contract of Clem Haskins, the former
University of Minnesota men's basketball coach who was involved in the
university's recent academic fraud scandal, included the following com-
pliance responsibilities:
Section 1.4 Compliance. Throughout the term of this Agree-
ment, Haskins shall comply with the current and hereafter en-
acted or promulgated laws, policies, rules and regulations of and
governing the University and its employees and the current and
hereafter enacted or promulgated constitution, bylaws, and rules
and regulations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA"), the Big Ten Conference ("Big Ten"), and any other
conference or organization with which the University becomes as-
sociated or which affects MICA (collectively, the "Governing As-
sociation"). Haskins shall attempt to have all assistant men's
basketball coaches and any other University employees for whom
Haskins is administratively responsible comply with the foregoing
laws, policies, rules and regulations.' 51
Accordingly, if a coach violates any rule governing recruiting or player
eligibility, the coach may not only be subject to NCAA penalties, but
also to a possible breach of contract action by the university.' 52
Coaches' contracts will almost always contain some type of "termina-
tion for just cause" provision. 53 The just cause provision allows the uni-
146. Johnson, supra note 68, at 107.
147. Michael S. Selvaggi, The College v. The Coach, 3 SEToN HALL J. SPORT L. 221, 224-
25 (1993).
148. Id. at 225.
149. Id.
150. Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts: A Practical Perspective, 1 MARQ.
SPORTS L. J. 207, 235 (1991).
151. EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN CLEM SMITH HAsKINs AD REGENTS OF THE
UNvERSriY OF MnqNESOTA (1992) (hereinafter Haskins' contract).
152. Selvaggi, supra note 147, at 226-27.
153. Greenberg, supra note 150, at 265.
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versity to terminate, suspend salary payments, or take other disciplinary
action if there is a determination by the university that the coach has
committed a major NCAA violation.'54 Just cause usually means a ma-
jor violation by the head coach, a major violation by a member of the
coaching staff that the head coach knew about, the conviction of a felony
by the head coach, a substantial failure to perform any of the duties
which are reasonable related to his duties, and multiple secondary viola-
tions.'5 5 In regards to just cause, the determination of whether a major
or secondary rule violation occurred usually requires a finding of the
governing association rather than the university. 56
A coach's contract may also give the university the right to terminate
the contract without just cause.' 57 Normally, the contract will have a
built-in provision for premature termination, without cause, outlining
the amount and method of payment. 5 8 However, some coaches' con-
tracts also contain a provision that allows a coach to be compensated
even if they are fired with just cause.159 For example, Clem Haskins'
contract contained a provision that paid him $423,000.00 in deferred
compensation even if he was terminated with just cause.' 60
One possible solution to hold coaches accountable for their viola-
tions of NCAA rules is for the university to bring a breach of contract
suit.1 61 The university could sue a coach for expectation damages. 62
Expectation damages, including consequential damages, would include
all revenue lost as a result of the NCAA sanctions imposed due to the
coach's violation of rules. 63 In order for the university to receive conse-
quential damages, the university must demonstrate: (1) the damages
were caused by the coach's breach of contract; (2) the amount of dam-
ages with a reasonable degree of certainty, and (3) the damages sus-
tained were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the
agreement. 64
154. Id.
155. Id. at 265-67; HASKINS' CoNTRAcr, supra note 151.
156. HAsKINs' CorRAcr, supra note 151.
157. Greenberg, supra note 150, at 272.
158. Id.
159. Dennis Brackin & Randy Furst, Haskins Covered by Strong Contract, STAR TRM.
(Minneapolis), May 23, 1999, at lB.
160. Id.
161. Selvaggi, supra note 147, at 228.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 228-33.
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It is likely that a university would be able to fulfill this burden of
proof. 6 5 The university should be able to show that damages were
caused by the coach's violation of NCAA rules through the investigative
report. 66 Secondly, the university should be able to prove damages with
certainty by showing its lost television revenue or an inability to partici-
pate in post-season play. 67 Finally, it would seem obvious that both the
university and the coach could reasonably foresee that a violation of
NCAA rules would lead to penalties.168 Thus, a university may be able
to protect its economic interest by recovering consequential damages. 69
If a school would fail to establish the existence of damages, it still
may obtain a judgment for nominal damages. 7 ° Nominal damages re-
present a sum that is fixed without regard to the amount of harm.171
Although nominal damages may not fully compensate the university for
its financial harm, it will establish a precedent that coaches who violate
NCAA rules will be held accountable for their actions.
However, some universities could encounter a potential problem
when pursuing a contract action against a coach. Some states have stat-
utes that bar causes of action brought by regional collegiate athletic as-
sociations when an employee (i.e., coach) of a member institution
violates a rule. 72 Thus, in these locations, universities could not rely on
bringing suit against coaches.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO A BREACH OF CoNTRAcr SUIT FOR HOLDING
COACHES AND STUDENT-ATHLETES ACCOUNTABLE
Since pursuing breach of contract actions against student-athletes
and coaches is a complex situation with various unknown consequences,
it is important to examine alternative possibilities that may address the
problem. The NCAA, coaches, legislators, and educators all have con-
tributed their recommendations to reform the current state of college
athletics) 73 Reform proposals include the use of state athlete-agent leg-
islation, a change in recruiting rules, paying student-athletes, restructur-
165. Id. at 235.
166. Selvaggi, supra note 147, at 228.
167. Id. at 229-31.
168. Id. at 232-33.
169. Id. at 233.
170. Id. at 234.
171. Russ VerSteeg, Slander & Slander Damages After Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet, 38
ViLL. L. REv. 655, 663 (1993).
172. TEx. Crv. PAc. & REM CODE ANN. §§131.003 & 131.005 (1999).
173. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 171.
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ing coaching contracts, and a ban on legal gambling on college
athletics. 74 Thus, the following section will briefly discuss alternative
means of preventing harm to the universities' economic interests.
A. Athlete-Agent Legislation
The problems between athletes, agents, and universities have been
around for quite some time, and it does not appear that they will disap-
pear anytime soon. However, in an effort to address the problems cre-
ated by the unsavory practices of agents, many states have adopted
athlete-agent legislation. 175 Athlete-agent legislation has been imple-
mented to help protect universities' economic interests. Many legislators
believe that the legislation would help reduce or eliminate the chances of
universities being penalized by the NCAA and suffering financially.176
Currently there are twenty-eight states that have adopted some type
of athlete-agent legislation. 7 Penalties imposed upon agents for violat-
ing state athlete-agent legislation range from civil fines to criminal felony
charges.' 78 In addition, some states also impose civil and/or criminal lia-
bility on student-athletes. Civil remedies include restoring the injured
party to their previous position and compensating the victim for any
harm incurred. 79 Some states have expanded the scope of recovering
damages to include lost revenue from media coverage, lost revenue from
the forfeiture of athletic competition, and lost revenue from a ban of
post-season play.'80 Agents can also be subject to criminal penalties. In
Florida, for example, an agent who fails to comply with the state's regis-
tration requirements or engages in unlicensed agent activity is subject to
a third degree felony which could lead to imprisonment not exceeding
five years and/or a fine of up to $5,000.00.181
174. Andrew Bagnato, NCAA Exploring Ways to Fix College Basketball, TIMES-PIcA-
YUNE (NEW ORLEANS), Mar. 12, 2000, at C12; Michael O'Keeffe, Wagers Fuel NCAA's Fears:
Bill Would Ban Bets On Colleges, N.Y. DAILY NEWs, Mar. 12, 2000, at 26.
175. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 172.
176. Don Walker, Legislation Proposed To Target Agents: Lawmaker Wants Protection for
Athletes and Schools, MILWAUKEE J. SENTIEL, Dec. 17, 1999, at 10.
177. Athlete Agent Laws By State, available at http://www.ncaa.org/agentsamateurism/
agents/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2000).
178. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 168.
179. Linda S. Calvert Hanson, The Florida Legislature Revisits the Regulation and Liabil-
ity of Sports Agents and Student Athletes, 25 STETSON L. REv. 1067, 1080 (1996).
180. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 168.
181. Hanson, supra note 179, at 1079.
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Student-athletes can also be subject to liability for violating legisla-
tion. 82 For example, consider Auburn University basketball player
Chris Porter's recent involvement with a sports agent. 18 3 Porter admit-
ted accepting $2,500.00 from an agent and was subsequently declared
ineligible to participate in NCAA competition.' s However, under Ala-
bama's agent regulation law, it is possible that Porter could face further
legal action.'85 Alabama has a sports agent regulatory law that makes a
student-athlete who is convicted of a violation subject to a possible fine,
community service, or a damage lawsuit.' 6 The Alabama law provides
that student-athletes who enter into contracts with agents are subject to
the following penalty: "A student-athlete who negotiates for or enters
into an agent or professional sports services contract without giving the
required notice is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and is subject to a
fine of not more than $1,000, and shall perform a minimum of 70 hours
of community service."187
Furthermore, Alabama law also provides that student-athletes who
accept extra "benefits without giving the required notice [are] liable to
the institution for actual damages that result from the loss of the stu-
dent's eligibility."' 88
Several other states have taken an aggressive approach to dealing
with illegal agent/athlete activity and other states are currently consider-
ing legislation similar to Alabama. 8 9 As a result, some universities have
a specific statutory remedy, an alternative to a breach of contract action,
to hold student-athletes accountable. 90 Furthermore, athlete-agent leg-
islation can also serve to protect nafve student-athletes, who are lured by
agents with the promises of wealth and glory.191 Therefore, the use of
athlete-agent legislation is an important step in providing a safeguard to
both student-athletes and universities. 92
182. Darrell Williams, Porter Says Agent Gave Him Money; Suspended for Now, He
Hopes; For Reinstatement from NCAAS, TnEs-PICAYuNE (New Orleans), Feb. 29, 2000, at
El.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Alabama Agent Laws, available at http://www.ncaa.orglagents?amateurism/agents/al-
abama.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2000).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Adam Mertz, Sauer Backs Bill to Control Agents, THE CAPrrAi TiNrs (Madison),
Dec. 17, 1999, at 1C.
190. Moorman & Hums, supra note 8, at 169.
191. Hanson, supra note 179, at 1070.
192. Id. at 1082-83.
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B. Changes in NCAA Recruiting Rules
The NCAA has proposed a change in the summer recruiting calendar
for men's basketball in the hopes of decreasing the chances of students
receiving extra benefits from AAU coaches, summer camp directors, and
agents. 193 Recently, many violations involving prospective student-ath-
letes receiving extra benefits from individuals with ties to agents prior to
enrolling in college have caused a great deal of disruption.194 For exam-
ple, St. John's University point guard, Erick Barkley, was suspended
twice during the season for receiving extra benefits. 95 His relationship
with a sports agent is still the focus of a NCAA investigation. 96 An-
other example includes UCLA forward, JaRon Rush, who was sus-
pended for receiving $6,325.00 from an individual with connections to
agents and a shoe company. 97
The summer recruiting period was used because it is more cost-effec-
tive for college coaches to evaluate the top high school prospects in a
few summer camps than to travel the country to see each player individ-
ually during the season.' 98 However, this reliance on summer recruiting
has led to an increase in NCAA violations.' 99 The NCAA is hoping the
changes in summer recruiting will help reduce the unwelcome influences
faced by student-athletes.20° Although this change could negatively af-
fect small universities with limited budgets who rely on the summer to
recruit, it may alleviate some of the problems of athletes receiving extra
benefits.20 1
C. Restructuring Coaches Contracts
Since universities may not desire to go to litigation as a result of hav-
ing to "air their dirty laundry" in a public proceeding, the need to
193. Ken Goe, NCAA Official Pushes for Culture Change, PORT'AN OREGONIAN, Mar.
31, 2000, at C7.
194. Scott M. Reid, Points of Contention: The NCAA is Taking a Hard Look at Poten-
tially Serious Problems That Plagued Men's Basketball This Season, THE ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER (Orange County, CA), Mar. 31, 2000, at D10.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Goe, supra note 193, at C7.
199. Id.
200. Hank Lowenkron, NCAA Approves Changes in Summer Recruiting, Scholarships,
AP, April 28, 2000.
201. Goe, supra note 193, at C7.
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restructure coaches' contracts is evident.2°2Coaches' contracts that allow
a coach to be paid even if they are terminated with "just cause" promote
an environment that tolerates unethical behavior.2°3 Removing this type
of clause from a coach's contract will send the message that coaches are
going to be held accountable for their role in NCAA violations.
D. Ban on Legal Gambling
Student-athlete involvement in gambling can not only threaten the
integrity of the game, but can also have a negative financial effect on
universities through investigation costs and financial sanctions.
A [1996] study by the University of Cincinnati of 648 Division I
Intercollegiate men's basketball and football respondents indi-
cated that 25.5% had gambled money on other college sporting
events, 3.7% had gambled money on a game in which they had
played, and 0.5% received money from a gambler for not playing
well in a game.20 4
These results have caused the NCAA and its member institutions to be
concerned with the integrity of intercollegiate athletics.2 05 Currently,
legislation is being proposed that would eliminate legal gambling in Las
Vegas.20 6 The NCAA believes that this proposed legislation will aid in
preserving the integrity of college sporting events and assist in protecting
student-athletes from pressures to influence the outcome of a game or
contest.
207
However, the gambling industry will not give up the approximately
$1 billion that is wagered on college sports each year in Las Vegas with-
out a fight.208 Some people believe that the elimination of legal betting
will only make the sports betting problem worse by putting it under-
ground.20 9 Nevertheless, at worst, a ban on legal gambling can only help
increase the integrity of the game, increase the likelihood that student-
202. Rick Linsk, Contract Gives Coach Clem Haskins Lofty Severance Package; Coach
Compensated Even if Minnesota Can Justify Removing From Job, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
June 11, 1999, at Sports, 1.
203. Greenberg, supra note 150, at 265.
204. Bock, supra note 145, at 2D; Gambling/Sports Wagering, available at http://
%vwv.ncaa.org/gamb1ing (last visited Mar. 25, 2000).
205. O'Keeffe, supra note 174, at 26.
206. Id.
207. Gambling/Sports Wagering, supra note 204.
208. O'Keeffe, supra note 174, at 26.
209. Steve Tetreault, Gaming Has NCAA in Retreat, LAs VEGAS R. J., Nov. 24, 1999, at
IA.
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athletes will not bet on games, and help out the public image of an or-
ganization that desperately needs support.
VII. CONCLUSION
The relationship between a university and a student-athlete repre-
sents a binding contract. Universities have access to a valid legal claim, a
means to recovering financial losses, and an important mechanism to es-
tablish a precedent of holding unethical student-athletes accountable.
However, filing a lawsuit against a student-athlete also comes with many
possible consequences. Institutions must realize that there are many po-
litical, social, and public relations issues that may negatively affect the
university if it decides to pursue a contract action against a student-ath-
lete. In addition to a contract claim, universities have several alterna-
tives that may allow them to hold student-athletes accountable and to
maintain a level of institutional control.
The time has come to treat student-athletes and coaches as adults
and require a minimum level of accountability. One corrupt student-
athlete or coach can set an athletic program back for years and unques-
tionably damage the reputation and finances of the university for several
years. However, universities do not have to sit back idly while student-
athletes and coaches run afoul of NCAA regulations. The choice to pur-
sue a contract action resides with the university. Nonetheless, universi-
ties must take further steps to protect themselves from the unethical
behavior of student-athletes, agents, and coaches.
KEviN STANGEL
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SAFE AT FIRST: A GUIDE TO HELP SPORTS ADMINISTRA-
TORS REDUCE THEIR LIABILITY
Gil Fried
[Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press 1999]
519 pages
ISBN: 0-89089-761-1
Gil Fried, the author of this book, is well known in the area of sport
law and sport litigation. Fried has amassed a large publication list - in
books and articles - as well as teaching and practicing law. Safe at First
was also edited by Herb Appenzeller, who is also well known and
respected in the sport law and risk management fields. Therefore, one
goes into reviewing a book with such "heavy hitters" associated with it
with a greater expectation of quality and clarity. This book truly lives up
to those expectations.
The author emphasizes that this book is actually a guide to assist
coaches and administrators in the sports field in reducing their risks of
being sued, as well as creating a safer environment to view and partici-
pate in sport. While the book consists of four major sections (Event
Development, Event Participants, Event Spectators, and the Appendi-
ces), the "text" of the book - which gives the reader a primer in sport
law - consists of only 141 pages.
Section I of the guide includes all the basics for the understanding of
sport law as it relates to risk management, including major concepts and
legal cases. The legal cases are very concise and beneficial in under-
standing the legal concepts being discussed, and won't intimidate the
novice legal reader. The Event Development section begins with the in-
troduction to the reader of the need for a risk management plan, which
includes facts and lists of previous areas of litigation and risks associated
with sport. The guide goes on in subsequent chapters to discuss basic
legal terms and principles useful in developing risk management pro-
grams, the responsibilities and need for a risk management committee -
or as the author recommends, an "event safety committee." After the
development of a committee, Fried discusses area of liability concerns
and then the means in which to exculpate the organization from liability
and possible litigation and damages. The author introduces the use of
waivers and releases, statutory issues that may influence an organiza-
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tion's liability, membership associations which may assist in the develop-
ment of the standard of care requirements, and the issue of insurance.
After reading the first section of the guide, the reader is ready to
tackle the issues of specific sport and event risk management techniques.
The Event Participants section of the guide discusses the most popular
sports of baseball, basketball, football, golf, gymnastics, hockey soccer
and track and field. Other sports events addressed in a broader manner
are contact sports such as wrestling and the martial arts, racquet sports,
water sports (swimming pools, water parks and water craft), wheel sports
(from bicycles to auto racing), and winter sports (from skiing to bobsled-
ding). For the most part, these chapters include discussions on facility,
equipment and supervision issues, with case synopses to serve as exam-
ples. The section also includes chapters, which discuss risk management
issues associated with officials, first aid, and the ever important and
troublesome area of transportation.
The third section of the guide deals with the area of Event Specta-
tors, which, as anyone who reads the news knows, is becoming an ever
important area of risk and possible litigation due to violence and specta-
tor expectations. The first chapter in this section covers the area of spec-
tator management, and discusses the issues of facility inspections,
required warnings, sport specific spectator issues and crowd manage-
ment (which is very concise and very useful). Other very important top-
ics dealt with in this section are concessions, alcohol policies, and
parking.
The guide concludes with extensive Appendices, which include policy
examples, checklists, manuals on sexual abuse in youth sports, and ex-
amples of waivers and releases. These documents and the examples are
extremely useful for the practitioner who has not gone through formal
risk management training and does not have access to such documenta-
tion. The practitioner can either use these documents as examples to
create their own policies and checklists, or use them simply to refine and
update the ones they currently use.
The risk management guide Safety at First by Gil Fried is an excellent
reference book for anyone in the area of sport event management. The
book is simple and concise, easily understood, and very practical. The
issues discussed in the book are documented well through case law and
other reference materials, and the Appendices serve as a specific guide
for the reader in special areas of policy development and applications.
The book can be used by sports professionals in the field, as well as stu-
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dents of sport law who wish to have a better understanding of risk man-
agement program development.
RODNEY L. CAUGHRON, PH.D.
AssIsTANT PROFESSOR
Sports Management
Department of Leadership in Educational & Sport Organizations
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, Illinois

YOUTH SPORT AND THE LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL ISSUES
Tom Appenzeller
[Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press 2000]
216 pages + x pages
ISBN: 9-89089-663-1
In Youth Sport and the Law: A Guide to Legal Issues, Tom Appen-
zeller ambitiously attempts to cover all aspects of the law as applied to
youth athletics. Appenzeller's overview contains an analysis of various
topics including; tort liability for injuries suffered by players and specta-
tors, sports facility issues, disabled athletes and those with HIV, and
sports medicine. Appenzeller provides basic information primarily di-
rected at those outside of the legal profession.
The opening pages of the book chronicle the beginnings of youth
sports. In six pages the author takes the reader from the ancient Olympic
games, to muscular Christianity, and then to the formation of little
league baseball in the United States. This is a good indication of the
amount of ground superficially covered. This opening chapter is
strangely concluded with a reprint of the article Sports Are Bad for
Children.
Appenzeller moves on with a discussion about litigation in youth
sports. He begins by speculating on the reasons, in general, for the in-
creasing litigation in the United States. Unfortunately, Appenzeller pro-
vides no new insight; instead, he cites the usual reasons for the rise in
lawsuits, i.e. the media, the lure or necessity of large monetary awards, a
sense of entitlement, and overaggressive attorneys.
Appenzeller then offers readers some basic instruction in the con-
cepts of negligence, liability, and the assumption of risk. This section
would be aptly titled Tort Law 101. While this discussion is oversimpli-
fied, there is some value to providing non-legal professionals with this
basic information. That is, it informs the public in an easy to read and
easy to digest manner about the rights and responsibilities of those in-
jured by another's action or lack of action. Armed with this knowledge,
some readers should be inspired to take the appropriate action to avoid
liability and litigation.
The book follows a similar format in the majority of its thirteen chap-
ters. Specifically, a problem or area of youth sport law is presented and
described. The author then provides an often oversimplified and brief
summary or summaries of cases brought under the described area of law.
For example, in the chapter titled Organization and Administration, Ap-
penzeller gives Tarkanian v. NCAA, a single paragraph of discussion.
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Given the context of the book and the intended audience these simplifi-
cations are forgivable.
The chapters lacking case discussion, however brief, are less defensi-
ble. For example, the chapter dealing with Sports Medicine lacks any
discussion of case law. Instead, the author opted to discuss the occur-
rences of ailments such as heat illness and nose bleeds. This chapter
would have provided the reader with a more useful direction with some
case law discussion.
The book concludes with numerous examples of forms used in youth
sports. The examples include application forms, checklists for athletic
trainers, accident reports, emergency contact information, insurance
forms, and emergency contact forms. These forms are very useful as they
round out the basic information readers need to protect themselves from
liability.
Youth Sport and the Law: A Guide to Legal Issues is written from the
prospective of a sports professional, sports participant, and parent. It is
intended to speak to similar individuals. The book combines case law
discussion, personal stories, and basic overviews of legal principles. In
the end, Appenzelier has written an informative and easy to digest book
for the non-legal professional. Although not detailed and by no means
comprehensive, this a worthy and valuable effort for the target audience.
KIRSTEN HAUSER
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